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Abstract
This thesis examines various reductive case studies in thermal physics. In particular,
I argue that according to my account of reduction-as-construction, there are two suc-
cessful examples of reduction. Thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, and
statistical mechanics reduces to the underlying microdynamics — be they quantum or
classical. The reduction of a given theory alters that theory’s scope, that is: its domain
of applicability. The scope of thermodynamics will be central to this thesis — and I will
argue for a narrower scope than some authors. This thesis consists of four Chapters,
together with an introduction and a conclusion.
In Chapter 1, I discuss how different levels of description relate to one another. I
argue that a higher-level of description is reduced to the lower level, if the higher-level
quantities and their behaviour can be constructed or captured by the lower-level theory.
I claim that ‘functionalism’ can be helpful in securing reductions. In this Chapter I also
argue that the aim of reduction is to vindicate, not eliminate, the higher-level theory.
In Chapter 2, I tackle the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. I
articulate the functional, or nomological, role of various thermodynamic quantities
that are implicitly defined by the zeroth, first and second laws of thermodynamics:
temperature, energy and entropy respectively. I then argue that there are quantities in
statistical mechanics that realise these roles: though finding them sometimes requires
us to focus on quantum, rather than classical, statistical mechanics.
In Chapter 3, I consider the reductive relationship between statistical mechanics
and the underlying microdynamics. I demonstrate how the irreversible equations of
statistical mechanics can be constructed from the underlying microdynamics using what
I label the ‘Zwanzig-Zeh-Wallace’ framework. Yet this framework uses a procedure
called ’coarse-graining’ which has been heavily criticised in the literature; so in this
Chapter I offer a justification of coarse-graining. One upshot is that the time-asymmetry
in statistical mechanics is weakly emergent.
In Chapter 4, I consider a question about the domain of applicability of thermal
physics. Namely: does it apply to self-gravitating systems, such as elliptical galaxies?
Much controversy surrounds this question: some argue yes, others argue no. I deflate
the dispute by claiming that thermodynamics does not apply, but statistical mechanics
does. Thus, my delineation of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics earlier in
this thesis not only makes headway with the question of reduction, but also sheds
light on this dispute. I argue that this situation — statistical mechanics, but without
thermodynamics — can be understood in terms of a central notion in thermal physics:
the thermodynamic limit. But as I also discuss: justifying this idealisation has been
philosophically controversial.
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Introduction
The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is a central, and classic topic
in philosophy of science. But one might wonder: is it a tired topic? One might hold that
for many years, surely since e.g. Nagel (1961), it has been clear that thermodynamics
successfully reduces to its successor, statistical mechanics. Yet historically, it was far
from obvious that thermodynamics would reduce to a lower-level theory or indeed
that it would not itself be foundational. Thus, Kragh (2001) summarises the debate
in the 1890s by saying: “thermodynamics.... was sometimes argued to not only be
different from mechanics in principle, but also to have priority over mechanics as a
more satisfactory foundation on which all of physics could be built” (Kragh, 2001, p. 7).
Moreover, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the relationship
between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This literature has centred on
phase transitions, where an infinite limit must be invoked in order to recover the
thermodynamic description in statistical mechanics (cf. inter alia (Batterman, 2001),
Menon and Callender (2011), Butterfield and Bouatta (2012)). Consequently, there has
been much scepticism in the philosophy of physics over whether thermodynamics
reduces to statistical mechanics.
Not only is the relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics of
philosophical interest, it is also of real interest in theoretical physics. It is important
for the current quest for a theory of quantum gravity. The thermodynamics of black
holes guides the search for a theory of quantum gravity in a specific way: the hope is
that black hole thermodynamics will be to a theory of quantum gravity, as thermody-
namics is to statistical mechanics (Wall, 2017). As such, the thermodynamics-statistical
mechanics relationship is meant to be analogous to the relationship between black hole
thermodynamics and quantum gravity. But such a claim obviously prompts philoso-
phers of physics to ask: what exactly is the relationship between thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics?
This question is at the heart of this thesis. But fascinating though the case studies
of phase transitions and black holes are, there is much philosophical work to be done
in central but less popular areas. The term ‘thermal physics’ conjures up a cluster of
theories: the kinetic theory of gases, phenomenological thermodynamics, classical and
quantum statistical mechanics as well as condensed matter physics. Here I will be
concerned with three different levels of description, described by:
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1. Thermodynamics.
2. Statistical mechanics.
3. The underlying microdynamics: classical mechanics, and quantum mechanics.
Overall, I will claim: there are two cases of successful reduction in thermal physics. (1)
thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, and (2) statistical mechanics reduces
to the underlying microdynamics.
Proclamations of successful reduction are, of course, relative to an account of reduc-
tion. So throughout this thesis I develop my views on reduction. Of course, the word
‘reduction’ looms large in other areas of philosophy. Metaethics addresses the question:
do normative properties reduce to non-normative properties? And in philosophy of
mind perhaps the most central question of all is: does the mind reduce to the brain?
That is, does the mental reduce to the physical? This latter question of course inter-
sects with the philosophy of science especially in the debate about whether the special
sciences, such as psychology, reduce to physics.
This literature about the special sciences treats ‘physics’ as a homogenous enterprise.
But there are many different levels of description within physics — even beyond the
three levels that this thesis focuses on. Thus, the types of issues that arise in the debate
about the special sciences — multiple realisability, emergence and autonomy — arise
also within physics. Indeed, there is good reason to think that thermodynamics qualifies
as a special science (cf. Hemmo and Shenker (2015)). After all, one crucial feature of the
special sciences is that they are non-fundamental.
Yet thermodynamics is an unusual physical theory, in various ways. As a recent
review jokingly put it: “If physical theories were people, thermodynamics would be the
village witch.... The other theories find her somewhat odd, somehow different in nature
from the rest, yet everyone comes to her for advice, and no one dares to contradict her”
(Goold et al., 2016, p. 1).
One way in which thermodynamics differs from other physical theories is that there
are no spontaneous dynamics under which the system evolves — independently of
our description of, or interest in, the system. Instead, thermodynamics concerns the
interventions that we can or cannot perform on a system. For this reason, Planck
worried that thermodynamics is anthropocentric (cf. Uffink (2001)). Furthermore, some
claim that the time-asymmetry in thermal physics is also anthropocentric — in a way
that prevents one from being a scientific realist about these theories. Throughout this
thesis, I will defuse this worry, by arguing that theories in thermal physics are not
inherently anthropocentric, in any way that is different from the rest of our scientific
theories.
Another general theme of my approach is what I call a ‘pragmatic naturalism’. By
this I mean: the practice of science must be given priority over philosophers’ quibbles.
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That this is my background philosophical position is manifest in several places. For
example, I claim that the aim of reduction is to vindicate, rather than eliminate, the
higher-level theory and its entities. The only reason to eliminate a theory is that it is
not longer useful. This is why even if we had a completed physics, this would have a
limited impact on the special sciences.
This pragmatic naturalism is also visible in my focus, in my account of reduction, on
the practice of science. Thus, I focus on the mathematical and conceptual relationships
that in fact obtain between theories, rather than focussing on questions of how they
could in principle be related. Approximations, idealisations and abstractions are a
crucial part of the practice of physics— and accordingly, their importance has often been
emphasised by anti-reductionists, such as Batterman (1995). I hope to incorporate these
important insights into my account of reduction. Anti-reductionists also emphasise the
importance of the higher-level theory — and this supports the anti-eliminative view.
Furthermore, the higher-level theory is often ‘autonomous’ from the lower-level details
— at least, to a certain extent. This robustness, or imperviousness to the lower level, is
especially prominent in the case of thermodynamics: the theory makes a lot of progress
in blissful ignorance of the nature of matter.
I hope that my account of reduction throughout this thesis can capture some of the
insights of both the reductionist and anti-reductionist camps. Consequently one might
worry: am I giving an account of reduction worth the name? I contend that the answer
is yes. After all, an anti-reductionist position is defined in opposition to a particular
conception of reduction. If my account is one that self-describing anti-reductionists do
not wish to oppose, then I take this to be progress.
In Chapter 1, I outline my account of reduction and the relationships between dif-
ferent levels of description. I outline, and endorse, List’s formal framework of levels.
After discussing the plausibility of supervenience and the relationship to reduction, I
set out my view of reduction-as-construction. According to this view: the higher-level
theory Tt (t for ‘top’) is reduced to the lower-level theory Tb (b for ‘bottom’) if the
equations and quantities of Tt can be constructed — using whichever approximations,
idealisations and abstractions the physicist requires — from Tb.
I then explore why advocating ‘functionalism’ has in recent years become a more
popular position in philosophy of physics. I claim that this popularity is because
functionalism can calm some worries about differences between the different levels
of description. But I also claim that an account of functionalism fit for physics differs
from some accounts of it in the philosophy of mind. Functionalism will be especially
central in Chapter 2, where I consider the case study of thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics.
In Chapter 2, in order to tackle the relationship between thermodynamics and statisti-
cal mechanics, I have to first construe both theories. This is in itself a substantive project,
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because in the practice of physics the concepts are often blurred together. Stipulating
the content of the two theories is a substantive project partly because thermal physics is
a strange beast, untamed by the conceptual rigour that other physical theories possess.
In particular, statistical mechanics is often considered to be a collection of frameworks
and distinct schools of thought, with no uncontroversial formalism (e.g. Uffink (2006a,
p. 4)). As a result, there are many conceptual problems and approaches that I have to
leave to one side in this thesis.
The relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics is a vast topic,
and consequently I cannot tackle all of the central issues in a sustained and collected
manner. Two conspicuous omissions will be the nature of both probability and entropy.
Much controversy surrounds the nature of entropy: Jaynes and Wigner called entropy
‘anthropomorphic’ (Jaynes, 1965, p. 6); Lloyd (2006), Bekenstein (1973) and others
claim it is an information-theoretic concept. Some evangelically advocate and others
vehemently oppose the connection between entropy and ignorance, or our state of
knowledge cf. Denbigh and Denbigh (1985). Whilst I believe that my rejection of
anthropocentrism in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics throughout this thesis
will have ramifications for the nature of entropy, I do not explore them here.
In part, this is because considering the nature of entropy involves a more sustained
engagement with the topic of probability in statistical mechanics than I am able to
give here. But, as I discuss when ‘construing’ statistical mechanics, I believe statistical
mechanics probabilities are wholly objective. Furthermore I believe — although I
cannot argue for this here — that the problem of understanding probability in statistical
mechanics cannot be disentangled from the problem of understanding probability in
QM (cf. Wallace (2016)). Indeed, understanding the nature of probabilities in statistical
mechanics is one of the two main foundational problems in statistical mechanics. The
second of which I consider in Chapter 3: the nature of time-asymmetry.
Having construed statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, I focus on reduction.
I claim that we can consider the functional, or nomological, roles of the quantities
implicitly defined by the laws of thermodynamics and then search for the quantities in
SM that realise these roles. Whilst traditionally functionalism has involved the entire
theory, my strategy will be to take the laws of thermodynamics one by one; I proceed
from the Zeroth Law to the Third law articulating the functional roles of the quantities,
temperature, energy and entropy respectively; and then finding the realisers in SM.
In the course of this project, I will make several substantive (i.e. controversial!) claims,
such as:
• I will claim that — in general — temperature is not mean kinetic energy.
• I will claim heat and work do not simply correspond to ‘disordered’ and ‘ordered’
molecular motion.
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• I will claim that the Second Law is not quite the titan it is sometimes claimed to be.
For instance, Atkins (2007) goes as far as to say that the Second Law is the reason
‘anything at all’ happens. By distinguishing the different types of irreversibility,
and by distinguishing the Minus First Law from the Second Law, I will show that
the scope of the Second Law is constrained to cases where quasi-static processes
are possible.
• I will find the realiser of the Second law within quantum statistical mechanics.
As such, I break with the tradition in the philosophy of thermal physics by
not limiting myself to classical statistical mechanics: in certain cases, quantum
considerations are important (as emphasised by Wallace (2015c,a) and Albert
(2000)).
By considering the relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics
in this functionalist manner, the absence of the thermodynamic limit in my discussion
may seem conspicuous. The thermodynamic limit is, roughly speaking, the idealisation
that the number of constituents of the system is infinite. Justifying this idealisation is
philosophically controversial: no actual systems are infinite, and yet certain features
only obtain in this limit — and, worryingly, our descriptions of these features seem
resistant to ‘de-idealisation’. Usually, the idea is that the exact features of the TD
description are recovered from the SM description in this limit — as will be discussed in
Chapter 4. But we can make headway with the project of reduction without considering
the thermodynamic limit. Indeed, seeing this done in Chapter 2 and 3 should be a
welcome advance, given the worries about no actual systems being infinite. Thus, I
delay my discussion of the thermodynamic limit until Chapter 4.
In Chapter 3, I consider the relationship between statistical mechanics and its under-
lying microdynamics. This relationship has been considered paradoxical or puzzling.
The equations of statistical mechanics are time-asymmetric but the microdynamics
which underpin these equations are time-symmetric. Where does the asymmetry come
from? How can the two levels be reconciled?
I argue that progress can be made by considering what I term ‘the Zwanzig-Zeh-
Wallace’ framework. This framework constructs the time-asymmetric equations of
statistical mechanics from the underlying dynamics, but in doing so requires an initial
condition assumption. This is where the motivation for considering a ‘Past Hypothesis’
comes from: but for the most part I leave such cosmological considerations to one
side (cf. Wallace (2011)). This framework also uses a procedure that has been heavily
criticised: coarse-graining. Thus, the main project of this Chapter is to give a justification
of coarse-graining.
According to my account of reduction developed in Chapter 1, the two levels at issue
are reconciled with one another in this framework: statistical mechanics is reduced
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to the underlying microdynamics, be they classical or quantum. Besides, in Chapter
1 I will argue that my account of reduction is compatible with emergence. And this
compatibility is illustrated by the case study of Chapter 3: the time-asymmetry, i.e.
irreversibility, of statistical mechanics is weakly emergent.
In Chapter 4, I consider the scope of thermal physics. In particular, does it apply to
self-gravitating systems such as elliptical galaxies or globular clusters? These systems
contain roughly between 105 and 1011 stars interacting by Newtonian gravity. Callender
(2011) raises this topic by asking: does the distribution of stars in the night sky have a
thermal explanation? There is a live dispute over this question: some physicists argue
yes, others argue no.
Thermodynamics makes few assumptions about the constitution of the system.
Consequently, many, such as Planck and Clausius, have argued that TD has universal
scope (Uffink, 2001). Thus, Einstein is quoted as saying: “ [Thermodynamics] is the only
physical theory of universal content, which I am convinced, that within the framework
of applicability of its basic concepts will never be overthrown” (Klein, 1967, p. 509).
But I resist this claim of universal scope. I argue that the dispute over the applicability
of thermal physics to self-gravitating systems can be deflated if we properly distinguish
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. Here, my delineation of thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics echoed from Chapter 1, bears fruit.
I claim that thermodynamics does not apply to self-gravitating systems — as these
systems do not display the right equilibrating behaviour and so there is no equilibrium
state space appropriate for these systems. Here, the functionalism about thermodynam-
ics argued for earlier comes into play: whilst thermodynamics itself does not legislate
whether it applies to stars or steam engines, the system in question has to display
certain behaviours so that there are quantities to fill the thermodynamic roles: and
self-gravitating systems do not play the right role.
But I argue that whilst thermodynamics is inapplicable, there is — to a certain
extent — a statistical mechanical description of self-gravitating systems. This case study
demonstrates that even though thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, the
scope of applicability of the two theories can still come apart. Besides, I claim that
the (non-existence) of the thermodynamic limit can explain this difference of scope:
statistical mechanics without thermodynamics.
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1.1 Introduction
Nature admits of different descriptions. Eddington (1928) famously described a table
in radically different ways: it can be described as wooden and solid, or alternatively
as consisting of concentrated masses whose diameter is far smaller than the chasm
between them. Leaving aside the differences between the descriptions of the manifest
and scientific images of the world (Sellars, 1963), even within science there are a
multitude of different descriptions. And like Eddington’s table, which description is
appropriate depends on the context.
Understanding how different descriptions given by different scientific theories fit
together, if indeed they do, is the project of inter-theoretic reduction. The seminal work
of Nagel (1935, 1961) (and in his footsteps, Schaffner (1967)) has defined much of the
subsequent literature on inter-theoretic reduction in science. This account is in keeping
with the philosophy of its time; Nagel’s contemporary Hempel (1948) advocated the
covering law account of explanation. An explanandum was successfully explained if
one could provide an argument with an explanans that invokes the appropriate laws
of nature as a premise, and from which one can logically deduce the explanandum.
Nagel’s account has a kindred explanatory spirit: to reduce the higher-level theory
(henceforth: Tt) to the lower-level theory (Tb) one must be able to derive the laws of
Tt from the laws of Tb, in certain cases with the help of appropriate ‘bridge laws’.1 A
bridge law defines the terms, or vocabulary, of the higher-level theory in terms of the
terms of Tb, where the definiens is on the right hand side of the universally quantified
biconditional.
Since Nagel, there has been much debate about the correct account of reduction. In
this Chapter I cannot do justice to that rich philosophical heritage, nor do I aim to give
an account of reduction appropriate to all possible cases. But in what follows I will
argue for a particular account of reduction, which will be the standard to which my
reductive claims throughout this thesis will be held.
The ubiquity of stable, macroscopic patterns means that it is uncontroversial in
science that sometimes the most productive way to describe a given phenomenon is to
1Whether bridge laws are required or not defines whether the reduction is inhomogeneous or homoge-
neous respectively. But the details of Nagel’s account will not be required in what follows.
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discuss it at the ‘higher-level of description’ rather than in terms of its more fundamental
constituents. Little progress would be made in ecology if the only permissible language
was that of physics. Examples abound: understanding why platypuses have venomous
spurs and no teeth, is a challenging task from the perspective of evolutionary biology,
but asking for a description in terms of cellular biology—let alone quantum mechanics—
is surely an unreasonable request. Different levels are appropriate for different tasks.
And so the talk of ‘levels of description’ fits naturally with scientific practice.
But understanding the relationships between these levels is a controversial —yet
central— philosophical project. Why is asking for a description of a platypus in terms
of the Schrödinger equation an unreasonable request? Is the higher level an imperfect
way of grasping the lower level? A mere crutch or heuristic we rely on, owing to our
cognitive limitations? Or does reality itself admit of different levels, perhaps in the
manner described by the British Emergentists (Broad, 1925; Alexander, 1920)? Or is
‘levels talk’ merely metaphorical?
In Section 1.2, I discuss and endorse a formal framework given by List (2017), which
makes levels talk precise. One assumption of this framework is that different levels are
related by supervenience mappings; I explicate supervenience and its philosophical
significance in Section 1.3.
One feature of List’s framework is that the higher-level worlds are multiply realised
by the lower-level worlds. Traditionally, multiple realisability has been taken to be
problematic for certain accounts of reduction. In Section 1.4 I rebut these objections
in the literature (following Sober (1999)). I then suggest that multiple realisability is
widespread. Shapiro (2000) resists this claim by distinguishing between substantive
and trivial cases of multiple realisability, but I argue that this move is unsuccessful.
Admittedly, some putative cases of multiple realisability may be surprising — but part
of the reductive project is discovering which differences do not matter — and so I will
argue that reduction renders seemingly surprising examples of multiple realisability
unsurprising.
In Section 1.5, I outline my account of reduction-as-construction. I will claim that the
higher-level theory (Tt), or a model of this theory is reduced to the lower-level theory
(Tb), or a model of that theory, if the equations or quantities of Tt can be constructed
from the equations or quantities of Tb. Because the crucial aim of reduction is that the
behaviour of the phenomena described by Tt is captured by Tb, I claim, in Section 1.6,
that in some cases functionalism can be helpful in securing reduction. The quantities of
Tb need to fill the role of the quantities described by Tt — but not all the features of Tt
will be part of this role.
Whilst I will claim that functionalism is sometimes helpful, I will reject Kim (1998,
1999)’s account which focuses on causal roles — not least because it is opaque how
to understand causation in physics. I also reject the eliminative aim of his account.
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Instead I argue in Section 1.7 that if Tt is reduced to Tb, this is a vindication of Tt. We
should only eliminate the properties described by Tt if they are no longer useful —
and I will give various reasons why a reduced theory is often still useful. In this way,
the considerations about reduction are sometimes orthogonal to our metaphysical
commitments. Further, I argue that reduced higher-level descriptions might earn the
name ‘emergent’. Finally, in Section 1.8, I discuss the difference between reduction in
principle and reduction in practice, and why I am concerned with reduction in practice;
not least because the rest of this thesis is concerned with case studies.
1.2 List’s formal framework
Whilst ‘levels-talk’ is popular, is it just a mere metaphor? (cf. Kim (2002) Owens (1989)).
In this Section, I outline how levels-talk is made precise by a framework suggested by
List (2017) (and ancestors, or close cousins of this framework are proposed by many
authors, inter alia Lewis (1988) and Butterfield (2012)). List outlines a formal framework
for considering ‘systems of levels’. A system of levels is a pair < L,S >:
• L is a class of objects called ‘levels’.
• S is a class of mappings between the different levels, called ‘supervenience
mappings’. Such a mapping σ goes from the source (’lower’) level L to the target
(‘higher’) level L′, σ : L → L′. For any given pair of levels, there is at most one
map in S.
Another crucial feature of σ is that it is a surjective function. There is a set of possible
worlds Ω at each level. This means that each world w ∈ Ω at the source level L gets
mapped to at most one world w′ ∈ Ω′ at the target level, L′: thus, σ is a function.2
Surjectivity: every world w′ at the target level L′ is in the range of the σ function. This
means that no higher-level possible world lacks a lower-level realiser: we can write this
as ‘w is the lower-level realiser of w′’.
In addition to discussing worlds at one level supervening on worlds at another level,
we can discuss facts at one level supervening on facts at other. The propositional
content (i.e. intension) of a sentence φ is the set of worlds where that sentence is
true. Thus, the propositional content of a sentence asserting a certain fact is the set
of possible worlds where that fact obtains. In List’s words: “Let E′ ⊆ Ω′ represent
some higher-level fact, namely the fact that the higher-level world falls inside the set
E′” (List, 2017, p. 11). σ−1(E′) is the inverse image under the supervenience mapping:
2Strictly speaking, σ must be a partial function: not every world at the source domain need be mapped
to any world at the target level: for example, not all physically possible worlds lead to biologically
possible worlds. My thanks to Sam Fletcher for this point.
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σ−1(E′) = {w ∈ Ω : σ(w) ∈ E′}. This set of lower-level worlds is the supervenience
basis of E′. σ−1(E′) is called the lower-level fact corresponding to E′.3
List uses the terminology of ‘levels’ but points out that ‘scale’, ‘domain’ and ‘subject
matter’ are also apt: the latter two especially so, because it makes it clear that the levels
need not be linearly ordered, but only partially. Thus, ‘subject matters’ or ‘domains’
makes it clear that geology and biology might both supervene on the physical, while
neither biology nor geology supervenes on the other.
A system of levels has certain formal features so that it forms a mathematical object:
a category. The resources of category theory, in particular the different types of maps
known as functors, can be brought to bear on the relationships between different sys-
tems of levels. List considers four different types of systems: levels of grain, ontological
levels, levels of description, and levels of dynamics, which I take up in turn in what
follows.
Note that List is operating at a greater level of generality in considering the relation-
ships between systems of levels. When considering inter-theoretic reduction, we are
concerned with the relationships between certain different levels within one system of
levels. Indeed, the examples most appropriate for discussing inter-theoretic relations
between scientific theories is List’s ‘levels of description’ and ‘levels of dynamics’,
which I explicate in Section 1.2.2 and Section 1.2.3, after, in Section 1.2.1, outlining the
levels of grain. Then in Section 1.2.4, I consider how these systems of level relate to
each other and ontological levels.
1.2.1 Levels of Grain
There is one set of possible worlds Ω. This set can be partitioned in different ways, by
different equivalence relations. (In effect, this is the same apparatus as Lewis (1988)’s
subject matters4). Ω∼ denotes the set of equivalence classes induced by the ∼ relation.
If ∼ is just the identity relation, then this is a finest-graining possible. If ∼ is the total
relation so that every world in Ω is in the same equivalence class, then this is the
coarsest-graining possible. Of course, the interesting cases are somewhere in between
these two extremes.
We can generate a system of levels as follows. For any two partitions Ω∼ and Ω≈,
we say that Ω∼ is at least as fine-grained as Ω≈ if each equivalence class in Ω≈ is a
3List (2017) advocates a world-based, rather than entity-based, understanding of levels. In an entity-
based understanding the ‘higher than’ relation is not modal (as supervenience is) but mereological.
But the part/whole relation doesn’t always line up nicely with the higher/lower than relation.
Instead, once we have the best theory of a particular level, we can then commit to those level-specific
entities. See (List, 2017, p. 11), Norton (2014), Block (2003) for more details on this debate.
4Note, however, that for Lewis (1986b) the worlds are real possibilities, but for List, the worlds are sets
of sentences. When considering levels of description which each level has a language L, the worlds
are defined as maximally consistent sets of sentences of the language. However, the details and status
of possible worlds is not needed for what follows.
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union of equivalence classes in Ω∼. The relation “is at least as fine-grained as” can
then be used to partially order partitions. And in these cases we can define a function
σ : Ω∼ → Ω≈, which assigns to each equivalence class in Ω∼ the equivalence class in
which it is included in Ω≈.
List gives an example from decision theory: an agent’s possible levels of awareness
can be modelled as levels of grain. An agent has a greater level of awareness if they
can draw finer distinctions between different possibilities. Such levels of grain are
often understood epistemically, as different ways of representing the world. Here is
an example from physics: levels of precision. The outcomes of repeated experiments
can be put into different equivalence classes, and there will be different partitions
depending the level of precision required. Jane and Michael might have found the
same value for the gravitational constant, g — depending on how precise one is. Two
outcomes g = 9.81 and g = 10 will be put in the same equivalence class if the level of
precision is ‘to the nearest natural number’: but not according to a finer-grained and so
more precise partition.
1.2.2 Levels of Description
In order to define a system of levels of description, List defines a formal language
L, which has certain features (a negation operator and a notion of consistency): an
example of such a language is standard propositional logic. Defining a language L
induces an ontology, which is a minimally rich set of worlds ΩL such that (i) each world
in ΩL ‘settles’ everything that can be expressed in L and (ii) nothing else is settled that
is not entailed by what is expressible in L. Different languages L and L′ generate two
sets of worlds ΩL and ΩL′ respectively. We define a system of levels of description
as the pair < L,S >, where each level L in L is a pair < L,ΩL > and S is a class of
surjective functions of the form σ : ΩL → ΩL′ .
The connection to inter-theoretic reduction is that a scientific theory can be considered
to be a set of sentences in a particular language.5 Different sciences use different
predicates: physics uses the predicate ‘is an electron’ whereas as evolutionary biology
uses the predicate ‘is a platypus’. Of course, the languages invoked by List are formal
languages; the reality of science in practice is much more messy. Whilst this idealised
formal approach is helpful for setting the scene, I will ultimately defend a pragmatic
account of reduction.
5This is the syntactic view of theories, but see Halvorson (2013), Lutz (2017) and Hudetz (2017), for a
discussion of the view that the syntactic and semantic views of theories are equivalent.
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1.2.3 Levels of Dynamics
Another system of levels that List (2017) and Butterfield (2012) describe are levels of
dynamics. Coin flipping can be modelled at a detailed microscopic level: think of
calculating all the forces and initial position and the exact angle. This level describes the
coin’s trajectory. Alternatively, the coin flip can be modelled on a coarser probabilistic
level, where there are only two outcomes ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ (cf. (List, 2017, p. 15-
16)). Likewise, the weather, the economy and the climate can either be studied at a
‘micro-dynamical’ or a ‘macro-dynamical’ level.
To define a dynamical system, let us first define the lower-level state space S. An
element s ∈ S represents a possible state of the system, which is an assignment of a
value of each quantity. Following Butterfield (2012, p. 15), the set of quantities Q varies
from theory to theory. But as an intuitive example, one can imagine that each quantity
Q ∈ Q is a real-valued function on S. We can think of the differences in values of certain
quantities as distinguishing the different microstates. That is, for two distinct elements
s1 6= s2 ∈ S, there is a quantity Q ∈ Q such that Q(s1) 6= Q(s2).
Next we can define the lower-level dynamics as a map D : S → S. The dynamics
could be one-to-one, in which case we called it deterministic. If the dynamics are
one-to-many, they are ‘past-to-future’ indeterministic. Finally, if they are many-to-one,
they are ‘future-to-past’ deterministic. A history h is a map from the linearly ordered
instants of time t ∈ T into S, h : T → S. For each time t ∈ T, a state of the system
s ∈ S is assigned. The set Ω of possible histories allowed by the dynamics is a set of
nomologically possible histories, and this set Ω plays the role (at this lower level) of the
set of possible worlds discussed above.
We can now define the higher-level state space. In keeping with the above notation, I
write upper dashes to denote the higher-level state space S′ and higher-level quantities
Q′. We assume that the higher level supervenes on the lower level. For example,
the higher-level states could be aggregates, or equivalence classes, of the lower level.
For example, in the coin-tossing case the higher-level states are ‘heads’ or ‘tails’. The
higher level is the macroscopic level — and a macrostate is compatible with many
different lower-level microstates. One example: the aggregate state of a glass of water
is compatible with many different configurations of the water molecules within the
glass.
There is a partition P on S that splits the totality of microstates into exhaustive and
mutually exclusive subsets Ci ⊂ S. The cells of the partition represent the macrostates
s′ ∈ S′. The supervenience map σ takes each microstate s to a macrostate s′, as before:
we require that σ : S→ S′ is a surjective function. The function will induce a mapping
from the set of micro histories Ω to the set of macro histories Ω′. (Here, a macro-history
h′ is of course defined as an assignment of a macrostate s′ to each time, t ∈ T.)
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We can consider the induced macrodynamics D′ as follows. We already have the
microdynamics D : S → S, we now want to consider how the macrostates s′ evolve
over time: i.e. what is D′ : S′ → S′. We know that each macrostate s′ ∈ S′ is a set of
microstates Ci ⊂ S. Each state s in the Ci evolves under the microdynamics. What is
the temporal evolution of a cell Ci, D(Ci)? Generally, the image of D(Ci) is not another
single cell, i.e. macrostate: s1 6= s2 ∈ Ci might get sent to microstates s3 and s4 which
are elements of distinct cells Cj and Ck. Thus, the induced macrodynamics can be
indeterministic, even if the microdynamics is deterministic. This is illustrated in Figure
1.1.
Figure 1.1: The failure of meshing, from Butterfield (2012). Here
⋃
represents σ, and T
represents D.
But if the microdynamics takes every state in the partition cell Ci to another cell Cj,
i.e. the image d(Ci) is another element of the partition, then the microdynamics induces
deterministic macrodynamics: for which an appropriate jargon proposed by Butterfield
(2012) is ‘meshing dynamics’. In other words, the time evolution D and coarse-graining
implemented by σ commute. See Butterfield (2012) for a range of interesting examples
of successful and unsuccessful meshing.
Thus, dynamics at different levels can be interestingly different from one another.
List and Pivato (2015) give an example of how the microdynamics can be deterministic
(i.e. one-to-one), but the induced macrodynamics can be indeterministic, i.e. a failure
of meshing as in Figure 1.1. This is vividly illustrated in Figure 1.2.
The levels of dynamics will be especially useful for considering cases of reduction
in physics. One important difference to note about levels of dynamics in physics,
compared to more speculative cases of reduction between special science and physics,
is as follows. In the case of levels of dynamics, it is clear that the same system is being
described from different perspectives. (‘System’ is, of course, just scientific jargon for
the philosopher’s ‘object’). But it is not obvious that the same ‘system’ will be under
discussion when a higher-level description E′ is pulled backed under σ−1. Indeed, the
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Figure 1.2: Emergent chance: deterministic lower-level histories are compatible with
higher-level indeterminism, List and Pivato (2015).
lower-level description E may not be recognisably about the same object.
1.2.4 Ontological levels
Finally, we have List’s systems of ontological levels. Not only do our representations
of reality stratify into different levels, but reality itself is stratified into levels. Instead
of just having one set of possible worlds (over which we consider different partitions),
there are now different worlds at different levels. Level-specific worlds can be viewed
as specifications of level-specific properties. A possible world at a particular level is a
full specification of the way the world might be at that level. For example, the possible
worlds at the social level is a specification of the totality of social facts (List, 2017, p. 9),
whereas worlds at the chemical level require a specification of the totality of chemical
facts. “From a lower-level perspective, a higher-level world thus looks like a partial or
incomplete specification of the world, which leaves certain facts (namely lower-level
ones) indeterminate” (List, 2017, p. 9).
One feature relevant for future Sections is that “the relationship between higher-level
and lower-level worlds is one of supervenience with multiple realisability” (List, 2017,
p. 9). The lower-level facts fix the higher-level facts: the physical facts ‘fix’ the chemical
facts, for instance. Each physical world ω ∈ Ω gets mapped by a σ function to a
chemical world ω′ ∈ Ω′: ω is physical realiser of ω′. The supervenience requirement is
that σ is surjective — there is no higher-level world which lacks a lower-level realiser.
But one particular chemical world could be compatible with many physical worlds:
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that chemical world is multiply realised. In other words, the supervenience map σ from
the set of lower-level worlds Ω to the higher-level worlds Ω′ is a many-to-one function.
There is a connection between levels of grain and ontological levels: “if each coars-
ened partition of the underlying set Ω is re-interpreted as a set of higher-level worlds,
then the given ‘level of grain’ will fit the formal definition of ontological levels” (List,
2017, p. 13). Although all systems of levels of grain are thus interpretable as systems
of ontological levels, the converse isn’t true: a system of ontological levels without a
lowest level is not equivalent to any system of levels of grain. A further difference is
that a system of ontological levels is a more general object than a system of levels of
grain: higher-level worlds might be picked out by equivalence classes of lower-level
worlds, but they needn’t get identified with them and so they might still ‘have their
own spirit’, or in non-metaphorical terms, these higher-level worlds might still have
features of scientific or philosophical importance. Sometimes the language used is
that the higher-level facts are something ‘over and above’ the physical facts (despite
supervening on them).
Here we run into the difficult controversy about property identity, which cannot be
resolved by appeal to supervenience (Horgan (1993)). For example, there is a set of
physical worlds where my hand hits the face of someone who has in no way provoked
me — and the equivalence class of the different ways I could do this would correspond
to the higher-level worlds ‘Katie does some morally reprehensible punching’: but these
worlds (and the properties instantiated in them) might have their ‘own spirit’.
For instance, Moore (1903) and Hare (1952) agree that if my punching you is wrong in
this world, then it is also wrong in a world identical to this one (identical with respect to
say, the ‘physical facts’). Twin Katie also should not punch people. As such, fixing the
descriptive facts fixes the moral facts. But despite both subscribing to a supervenience
thesis about the moral, namely that moral facts supervene on natural or empirical facts,
Moore and Hare disagree about the nature of moral facts. According to Moore, moral
properties have their own nature, whereas Hare believes ‘wrongness’ merely expresses
our psychological attitude to punching (and includes a recommendation not to punch
people). Thus, an A family of properties might supervene on a B family of properties,
but this doesn’t fix the nature of the A properties.
Explicitly distinguishing ontological levels from other systems of levels is helpful.
This is because it makes clear that the metaphysical implications of ‘levels talk’ is
a further project beyond considering how the different levels described by different
sciences relate to one another. Even if we understand a system of levels of description
or dynamics, how this relates to a system of ontological levels is still to be considered.
Here, the relationships between different systems of levels comes in.
We can find a functor from a system of levels of description or dynamics to a system
of ontological levels, but in general this functor will be forgetful in the category theoretic
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Figure 1.3: How different systems relate. Here the arrows represent forgetful functors.
That levels of grain are a subset indicates that they are a special case of
ontological levels.
sense: levels of description encode more information than ontological levels. As such,
“different systems of levels of description involving different level-specific languages
could induce structurally equivalent systems of ontological levels” (List, 2017, p. 16).
Different languages can in principle be used to describe the same sets of level-specific
worlds and level-specific properties, while describing them differently.
For example, levels of description have a minimally rich set of worlds ΩL that settle
everything that can be said in L. But there might be some ‘descriptive fluff’ in L (as is
familiar from the literature on ‘gauge’ quantities in physics) and so we should commit
to the system of ontological levels that corresponds to ‘forgetting’ this descriptive fluff.
1.3 Supervenience
In this Section, I discuss the notion of supervenience, since one central feature of
List’s framework is the supervenience mappings, σ. In Section 1.3.1, I explicate what
supervenience is, and why it is such a central topic. I then argue, in Section 1.3.2, that
the idea of global supervenience is plausible.
1.3.1 The formal idea
A set of properties, A supervenes on another set of properties, B, if there is no difference
in A without some difference in B. But this can be an asymmetric relation: there could
be some difference in B without any difference in A. Another way of putting this is
that there are no two worlds which agree on all the B facts, but disagree about the A
facts. Because of this asymmetry, the A properties are often called the ‘higher-level
properties’. Within the context of different scientific theories, a claim of supervenience
would be: the higher-level trajectories/entities/properties described by that theory Tt
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(‘t’ for ‘top’) supervene on the lower level Tb (‘b’ for ‘bottom’). That is, there are no two
worlds which instantiate the same trajectory/entities/properties described by Tb but
differ in their Tt trajectory/entities/properties.
The idea of supervenience is closely related to implicit definability in model theory.
Once a certain realm of facts are fixed (i.e. once the B facts are fixed), that fixes the rest
of the facts about that structure (i.e. the remaining, i.e. A facts).
Aside from List’s framework, supervenience is a central philosophical topic, because
of its connection to the doctrine of physicalism: in a slogan, the thesis that all the facts
are fixed by the physical facts. That is, all the higher-level facts (say, about our mental
states) supervene on the physical facts: there are no two worlds which are identical
with respect to their ‘physical facts’ but differ with respect to their higher-level facts
(say, the ‘mental facts’). However, physicalism is a contested thesis6 — and not one I
will discuss here.
Next, I discuss why I think the assumption of supervenience in List’s framework is
plausible.
1.3.2 The plausibility of supervenience
Earlier in Section 1.2 we saw that in List’s framework, the map σ expresses the idea
that the higher-level supervenes on the lower level.7 Why should we think that this is a
plausible assumption?
The challenge is as follows. For level A to supervene on level B, for every distinct
state or possibility described by A, there must be at least one distinct state described
by B. That is, the map from states of B to states of A must not be one-many (hence the
requirement that σ is a function). Furthermore, this function must be surjective: there
must be no states of A ‘left out’ by the map from B to A.
A necessary (but not sufficient!) condition for A to supervene on B is that the number
of states in B (that get mapped to A) must be at least as large of the number of states in
A. (This condition does not suffice because even with more states in B than A, the map
might go from one state of B to five states of A: if this were so then, as above, it would
be possible to have difference in A without a difference in B).
Why think that this necessary condition will (generally) be fulfilled? Taking inspira-
tion from Wilson (1985), one reason to think that there will be a physical description
6Not only is physicalism a contested thesis, but to echo Crane and Mellor (1990), Butterfield (2011a) and
Dasgupta (2014) amongst others, care must be taken to render physicalism a coherent and substantive
thesis. In particular, stating that the supervenience basis is the ‘physical facts’ is a fudge. Which
physical facts? The facts described by our current most fundamental theory? Or of an imagined
completed final theory? The danger is that the ‘physical facts’ will be just defined to be those facts
which fix everything else; thus rendering physicalism trivial. See, e.g., (Butterfield, 2011a, §5.2.2) for
further discussion.
7List is talking about the supervenience of possible worlds, so this is global supervenience - a weaker
thesis than local supervenience, cf. Teller (1984).
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corresponding to the higher-level description is the richness of mathematical functions.
In order to secure supervenience, there needs to be at least one physical description of a
given state of affairs. If not, we could end up with the ‘gappy’ situation of a ‘something’
at the A level without a corresponding ‘something’ at the B level: in this way, the facts
at the A level would outstrip the facts at the B level. For example, the higher-level
description could be the chime of a grandfather clock, the currents in a river or the
splitting of stem cells. The reason to think that these processes will supervene on
processes at the lower level (and indeed at the fundamental level, if there is one) is that
there are just so many possible mathematical functions. For example, there is a function
that describes the trajectory of the centre of mass of Trump’s left hand, my cat Tibby
and the football that Son used to score Tottenham’s last goal.
This seem counter-intuitive; undergraduate physics courses teach us that physics
can only deal with highly specialised situations (hence the joke: ‘assume a spherical
chicken’). Finding ‘closed-form’ equations and doing calculations is very difficult. Thus,
writing down the evolution of the above complicated centre of mass seems well-nigh
impossible. Or less flippantly, writing down a predicate such as ‘unemployment in the
Cambridge area’ or ‘inflation of 5 per cent’ in the language of physics seems impossible.
Admittedly, it is unclear that we could write such a function describing Trump’s
hand, my cat and Son’s football down. But nonetheless the richness of the real functions
means that somewhere in the Platonic heavens this function exists. This is because
the function need not be nice — like the type that we deal with in physics. But in full
generality, a function is just a list of ordered pairs. Thus, the moral of Wilson’s paper is
that a function for the position and momenta of anything can be described by physics.
(Of course, this way of putting the point assumes a classical world view. But there is
no reason to think that this descriptive richness would go away when moving to the
mathematics of quantum mechanics).
Does establishing (the plausibility of) the supervenience of the higher-level theories
to the lower-level theories make reduction easily had? There are a range of formal
connections between supervenience and reduction. For example, when the two theories
under consideration are first-order theories and the other conditions for Beth’s theorem
apply are fulfilled, supervenience collapses into reduction.8 But the assumptions
required for Beth’s theorem do not hold for many realistic cases of scientific theories,
since our scientific theories are not first-order formal languages.
List (2017, p. 31) gives a ‘combinatoric’ argument as to why reduction (in a certain
sense) can be elusive despite supervenience. The moral is: the number of possibilities
at each level is vast, and the supervenience map needn’t be nice — it could just be a
list of elements of equivalence classes. This not only makes getting hold of σ daunting,
8The first philosophers to emphasise Beth’s theorem as threatening such a collapse were Hellman and
Thompson (1976), and Butterfield (2011a) discusses this topic in detail.
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there are in-principle reasons to think it is sometimes impossible.
But fascinating though these formal connections between supervenience and reduc-
tion are, they will not be the focus of this thesis. Instead, my focus is on particular case
studies of reduction — and any misgivings about assumptions of supervenience mak-
ing reduction ‘too easy’ are quelled by considering the difficult details and controversies
that surround any putative case of reduction.
1.4 Multiple realisability
We have already encountered multiple realisability within List’s framework, where a
higher-level world w′ has multiple lower-level worlds w that realise it: in other words,
σ is not injective. Multiple realisability is also discussed in terms in properties.9 A
(homogeneous) higher-level property is multiply realized when it is realized by many
distinct (heterogeneous) lower-level properties. As such, the map from the lower-level
properties to the higher-level properties is many-to-one. A common example in the
literature is jade. Being jade is a higher-level mineralogical property that is multiply
realized, as it is realized by two chemical properties: ‘being jadeite’: NaAlSi2O6, and
‘being nephrite’: Ca2(Mg, Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2. Another popular (hypothetical) example:
‘pain’ is realised by ‘C-fiber firing’ in humans but ‘D-fiber firing’ in octopuses.
In this Section, I review why various authors consider multiple realisability to be a
problem for reduction — and I offer several reasons to think that multiple realisability
(MR) need not block reduction. In fact, I will go further: I will argue that MR is very
widespread. Indeed, Mellor (1978) goes as far as to say that any property is multiply
realised by its instances. Yet this threatens to make MR trivial, which leads Shapiro
(2000) to offer an account of ‘substantive MR’. Nonetheless, in Section 1.4.2, I will argue
that reducing the higher level Tt to the lower-level Tb makes the seemingly surprising
(or substantive) cases, unsurprising or non-substantive.
1.4.1 Multiple realisability: a problem for reduction?
In this Section, I outline the examples from the literature which argue that MR of a
higher-level state (or ‘kind’) M by multiple lower-level states (or ‘kinds’) (P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3)
is a problem for reduction. This is known as the multiple realisability argument (MRA).
Different authors think that MRA causes problems for different reasons. For example,
we will see in Section 1.4.1.1, that for Fodor the lower-level disjunction threatens the
law-like nature of statements involving that disjunction. For Putnam, in Section 1.4.1.2,
the disjunctive lower level cannot provide an explanation unlike the higher level. Whilst
9If a possible world is defined to be the histories of all the properties of all the objects in that world,
then the world and property view of multiple realisability come together.
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Fodor emphasises laws and Putnam emphasises explanation, the problem for reduction
from MR is nonetheless treated as a single argument in the literature, which I will rebut,
following Sober (1999).
1.4.1.1 Fodor’s horror
Fodor (1968, 1975) argues that multiply realisability (MR) blocks reduction. In his
well-known diagram (cf. Figure 1.4), the kinds of the special science S1, S2 are multiply
realised by physical kinds P1, P2, P3. This has the consequence that the higher-level law
S1 → S2 is translated as (P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3) → (P∗1 ∨ P∗2 ∨ P∗3 ).10 For Fodor, a higher-level
theory is reduced to a lower-level theory if the laws of Tt are explained by the laws of
Tb. Not only must we explain, using the resources of the lower level, why the laws of
Tt are true, but also why they are laws. In order that the generalisations of Tt are bona
fide laws, they must be derived solely from law-like statements. But Fodor claims that
disjunctions cannot feature in laws, and so MR prevents reduction.
To link this to the earlier discussion of levels of description: even if the propositional
content of a higher-level explanation [φ] can be expressed in the lower-level language
LB, the ‘peppering’ of the explanation with the word ‘or’ prevents this from qualifying
as reduction in Fodor’s eyes.
Thus, Fodor is committed to (at least) two assumptions: (1) laws must be reduced to
laws; (2) disjunctions cannot figure in laws. Sober (1999) argues that Fodor is motivated
by considering natural kinds — and Goodman (1954)’s example of grue and bleen.
Allowing disjunctions into laws comes at a price that Fodor is not willing to pay: one
can no longer ‘read off’ natural kind predicates from a law statement.
But I reject Fodor’s motivation, since interpreting the metaphysical implications of
our scientific theories is not a matter of reading off natural kinds predicates. Thus,
I believe the MRA does not prevent reduction, because there is no reason to think
disjunctions cannot figure in laws, as Sober (1999) argues.
Figure 1.4: Fodor (1968)’s multiple realisability diagram.
10There’s a certain irony that he sees this as presenting a problem for reduction. In the physicist’s sense
of reduction if you can demonstrate such a diagram then you’ve got reduction sorted!
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1.4.1.2 Putnam’s peg
Putnam (1967, 1980) uses the MRA to block reduction by focussing on the explanation
of singular occurrences. His famous example is that of a square peg not fitting into a
round hole. There are many different microphysical configurations compatible with a
certain dimension of the peg and hole: these properties (the hole, the side length of the
peg) is realised by a multiplicity of pegs of different colours, materials, temperatures
and weights (to name just a few ‘microphysical’ details). But these details are irrelevant
to the geometrical explanation of why the peg doesn’t fit through the hole: its sidelength
is too large.
Putnam claims that whilst we could give a micro-detailed description of the peg,
there would be too many extraneous details for this description to be an explanation of
why the peg doesn’t fit. And he says: because the lower level (the microphysical level)
cannot explain the higher level, the higher level is not reducible to the lower level.
Here, once again, I think Sober (1999) offers a convincing reply. The lower-level
description might give you more details than you want to hear, and you might say its
not the best explanation; but it is nonetheless an explanation. Generality (i.e. breadth)
and depth (i.e. being detailed) are competing virtues in an explanation. Which you
prefer is not an objective matter — and so anti-reductionists are mistaken to think
breadth trumps depth tout court, just as reductionists (or ‘eliminativists’) are mistaken
to think that more details, and so depth, trump generality tout court. Whether depth or
breadth is better depends on the context. Sometimes more details cloud the relevant
facts, and sometimes the details lead to more precision. It depends on the situation and
what you care about.11
To sum up: Putnam’s argument requires that (1) explanation is a core component of
reduction and (2) a given phenomenon can only be explained at one level; there cannot
be both microscopic and macroscopic explanations. But I reject both (1) and (2).
1.4.2 Multiple realisability is widespread — and non-substantive?
I have argued that MR is not worrying for reduction. But the debate surrounding
the MRA implicitly assumes that multiple realisability is a substantive or special
phenomenon. Yet in List’s framework, multiple realisability is widespread. In this
Section I outline why, in general, MR is widespread, and consequently why it is
tempting to want to offer a criterion to distinguish between substantive and non-
substantive cases in order to retain the mystery of MR as a special phenomenon. But I
will argue against this strategy and I claim that the project of reduction between the
11As (Sober, 1999, p. 549) notes, Putnam would not accept this reply, since he believes that the “goodness”
of an explanation is not a “subjective” matter. Context-dependence needn’t imply subjectivity, but
nonetheless, this reply is unlikely to convince Putnam.
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two levels in question, will render seemingly substantive, or in more psychological
terms: surprising, cases of MR akin to the widespread non-substantive cases.
1.4.2.1 Substantive and non-substantive MR
It is easy to find examples of multiple realisability. The property ‘blue’ is multiply
realized by aquamarine and cobalt. We can “simply point out that we employ different
standards of accuracy at different levels and so it is unsurprising that we see heteroge-
neous properties on one level and homogeneity on another” (Mainwood, 2006, p. 123).
This is clearly an example of List’s levels of grain.
Furthermore, even a maximally specific shade of blue can be multiply realized by a
painting or a computer pixel. Thus, the determinate-determinable relation is another
sense in which MR can be unsurprising. The property blue is multiply realised by its
different shades.
But one might worry that this trivialises the idea of MR: “the lower-level realizer
properties are distinct only due to differences manifestly irrelevant to the higher-level
properties they realise” (Mainwood, 2006, p. 123) (emphasis added). Pain can be
realised by neurons and by neurons stained purple: the staining is manifestly irrelevant.
In response to this abundance of trivial MR, Shapiro (2000) aims to articulate a
definition of substantive MR which hones off the irrelevant ways in which a property
might be multiply realised. Shapiro’s criterion for ‘substantive’ cases of multiple
realisability is: MR is non-trivial only when realisers differ in an aspect ‘causally
relevant’. For instance, pain can be realized both by neurons and by neurons which
have been stained purple, but this is mere trivial, non-substantive, or unsurprising MR
since purple staining is causally irrelevant. The aim of his account is to give a criterion
for multiple realisation that captures the interesting or substantive cases, whilst ruling
out the manifestly irrelevant cases such as purple staining and differing standards of
accuracy.
However, I do not think Shapiro’s criterion succeeds in capturing the right cases. Pain
is meant to be an exemplar case of MR and so — if anything does — pain should surely
count as ‘substantive’. Yet, pain being realized by ordinary neurons and silicon-based
lifeforms would also count as trivial, as the causally relevant aspect of electrical activity
is present in both.
Furthermore, if causation is understood as ‘difference-making’ (cf. Woodward (2005)),
then the lower-level details are by definition causally irrelevant. Whichever ways the
lower-level realisers differ (and however surprising they might be), by definition these
differences won’t matter for instantiating —i.e. causing the existence of— the higher-
level property.
Thus I am skeptical that Shapiro’s criterion successfully distinguishes substantive
30
1 Wrestling with Reduction
from non-substantive cases. But furthermore, I think that sorting ‘trivial’ from ‘substan-
tive’ cases of MR is unproductive, because it just depends on how well-understood the
connection between levels are — i.e. whether the reduction has been carried out yet or
not.
1.4.2.2 MR and reduction
Working out which lower-level differences are irrelevant for the higher level is part
of the reductive project. For example, we are unsurprised that neurons and neurons
stained purple form an equivalence class and the difference — i.e. the staining — is
irrelevant; no one ever thought that staining would be crucial. But the case of carbon
and silicon-based life differs. Electrical signals are the crucial feature or commonality
across carbon and silicon-based life: but it is only once we understand the centrality
and importance of electrical signals that the differences becomes manifestly irrelevant.
Once we understand the relationship between the higher-level state and its lower level
realisers — e.g. once we understand the relationship between electrical signals and
pain — we can often see why the lower-level details didn’t matter. In connecting two
levels of description as is done in reduction, the irrelevance is made manifest. If we
understand why the two lower-level states s1 and s2 realise the same higher-level state
s′, then we can understand why the higher level is impervious to change between s1
and s2.
Whether an example of MR appears substantive seems to hinge on how surprising
we find it. In non-substantive cases, the differences between realisers is manifestly
irrelevant. But there are cases where it is not obvious that the differences shouldn’t
matter. As such, that the lower-level states s1 and s2 form an equivalence class, may be
surprising.
This is what Papineau (2010) emphasises — if there were a higher-level law that
‘plastics dissolve in lakes’ but this law was MR by a variety of physical mechanisms
with nothing in common (in one lake an acid dissolves the plastic, another is so hot
it melts etc.), then the higher-level regularity is surprising.12 So the lower-level states
differ in ways that are not manifestly irrelevant for the higher level. Thus, it often might
not be obvious — i.e. manifest — why the lower-level states form an equivalence class:
i.e. why the differences are irrelevant.
Within List’s framework, the lower-level states s1, s2...sn ∈ S form an equivalence
class that gets mapped by σ to the higher-level state s′ ∈ S′. What do s1, s2...sn have in
common? According to the formal framework, they need not have anything intuitive
or ‘natural’ in common (such as being close to one another on the colour wheel).
12Papineau goes on to claim that as a consequence the higher-level regularity cannot be a law, but I resist
this move since whether a regularity counts as a law does not depend on issues of reduction as laws
don’t inherit their status from the lower level.
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Mathematically speaking, there are no rules about what forms an equivalence class:
each class could be a random list of elements. If the realisers seemingly have little in
common, it will certainly be surprising that they realise the same higher-level state or
world. Indeed, were Papineau’s examples true, they would be surprising.
Papineau claims that there must be some unifying feature of the lower-level realisers.
Establishing how the higher-level world arises from the lower-level will mean that the
equivalence class will no longer look like a random list. And according my account, this
is done through ‘reduction-as-construction’. Thus, through reduction we will remove
the surprise, because we will understand why particular lower-level states form an
equivalence class. Thus, the MR will seem non-substantive.
But, by way of criticising Papineau, note: whether the equivalence class of lower-level
realisers is ‘unified’ is vague. Papineau portrays the anti-reductionists as claiming that
there is nothing in common at the lower-level, but this is uncharitable. There is a limit
to how different the realisers are: after all, they are described by the same theory Tb.
Furthermore, how ‘similar’ two lower-level states, or worlds, count as is notoriously
vague. There are so many — infinitely many! — ways to make equivalence classes out
of the lower-level states. Aside from brute enumeration of random elements, one could
form equivalence classes of states depending on the value of one independent variable
such as position, whilst abstracting away from all values of momenta. Alternatively, the
states could be members of the same equivalence class if they have the same average
over several variables. There so many possible partitions and it unclear that one
partition unifies the lower-level states more than another. Indeed — and some may
think this a concession to the anti-reductionist— note that: in List’s framework, it could
be that the equivalence classes can only be ‘unified’ (for want of a better word), by
using the higher-level language.
To end with more wisdom from Sober: “This is the kernel of truth in the MRA: the
higher-level sciences ‘abstract away’ from the details that make for differences among
the micro-realisations that a given higher-level property possess” (Sober, 1999, p. 560).
This phenomenon is widespread and nicely encoded in List’s framework.
1.5 The reduction-as-construction account
Throughout the preceding Sections I have considered the literature surrounding ac-
counts of reduction such as Putnam’s explanation and Fodor’s laws. Now, I outline
my own views on reduction. In Section 1.5.1, I answer the question: reduction between
what? The aim of reduction is to capture the behaviour described by Tt in terms of Tb.
But because one theory can describe a diverse range of behaviour, it might be that it
is between particular models of each theory that the reduction relation holds. As such
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reduction might be said to be local.
In Section 1.5.2, I outline the core of my account: reduction-as-construction. I stipulate
that if the equations or quantities described by Tt can be constructed from the lower-
level theory Tb, then Tt is reduced to Tb. This focus on the mathematical relations, rather
than logical relations fits with a theme of this thesis: I am concerned with reduction
in practice rather than in principle (cf. Section 1.8). In Section 1.5.3, I suggest that
whether the lower-level theory must capture the equations or the quantities lines up
with whether the higher-level theory is dynamical in a certain sense. The special
sciences are not dynamical theories in the way familiar from physics — and this leads to
an important distinction. Sometimes we are concerned with reducing an older theory to
its successor, but —as is familiar from the discussion of the special sciences— sometimes
we are concerned with reducing a higher-level, or macroscopic theory to a lower-level,
or microscopic, theory. In Section 1.5.4, I spell out this distinction, and suggest it is a
difference in degree, rather than kind.
Having spelt out my view of ‘reduction as construction’, I will then suggest, in
Section 1.6, that functionalism can be useful for securing reduction. But I will reject
Kim’s account — and his eliminativist aim. Indeed, in Section 1.7, I will argue that
the aim of reduction is to vindicate, not eliminate the higher-level. This will lead to
spelling out my metaphysical position — and discussing how my account of reduction
is compatible with emergence. Finally, in Section 1.8, I discuss the distinction between
reduction in principle and practice.
1.5.1 Reduction between what?
Different accounts hold that the asymmetric reduction relation holds between different
relata: properties, theories, models...to name but a few. Indeed different accounts’
requirements on reduction only make sense between certain relata. For instance, it is
unclear what it means for one theory to be a limit of another. Limiting relations are
more usually defined to hold between mathematical functions. Thus, it is more precise
to say that one quantity (represented by a mathematical function) reduces to another:
limn→∞ Q(n) → P(n). I am going to stipulate that reduction holds between theories,
but sometimes this should be understood as a local matter — sometimes it is better to
say that one model reduces to another and so reduction is a local affair.
First I want to emphasise, following other authors, that it is “the behaviour charac-
teristic of the system [that] is the focus of reduction” (Rueger, 2006, p. 343). Similarly,
Rosaler (2017, p. 4): “Fundamentally, the concept of reduction that we investigate here is
about showing that all real behaviours that can be accurately modelled in one theory
can be modelled at least as accurately in another. Taking limits and deriving one set
of laws from another may turn out to be useful strategies toward this goal, but neither
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requirement is regarded from the outset as a sine qua non of reduction”.
Theories can describe a wide range of behaviours. For example, the regular swing of
a single pendulum and the chaotic motion of a double rod pendulum are both described
by the same theory: classical mechanics, TCM. Especially clear examples of different
behaviour between two histories of the same theory can be found by considering
time-reversed trajectories. Releasing the molecules from a balloon will lead to these
molecules exploring the entire room. But the time-reverse of this trajectory represents
all the gas molecules converging together and all entering the balloon. Both are possible
histories according to the lower-level laws, but they display very different behaviour
and so might be described by different higher-level theories. (This example will be
central in chapter 3).
As an example, take Newton’s third law, F = ma. This law applies to wide range
of different systems and there are many different initial conditions which generate a
range of different possible histories, which are the possible worlds according to TCM.
Yet these histories can be qualitatively very different — think of a collection of particles
with random trajectories or perfectly aligned trajectories — depending on the initial
conditions. Thus, there is a range of behaviours encompassed by the one theory. Indeed,
the same equation can govern a wide range of different behaviours.
Because the histories, or possible worlds, describable by one theory are diverse, they
might not all give rise to higher-level worlds. For instance, not all physically possible
worlds will give rise to biological worlds: the conditions could have been not ‘just
right’ to give rise to life. Less speculatively, there are quantum mechanically possible
worlds that do not give rise to classically possible worlds: those worlds where the
environment is such that decoherence does not happen (Schlosshauer, 2007). Or less
controversially, there are CM histories (i.e. the ‘going-back into the balloon’ type case)
which do not give rise to thermodynamically possible worlds. As such, the lower level
can countenance possibilities that do not give rise to the higher-level regularities.
Thus, as seen in Figure 1.5, and as described earlier, the (pre-image of the) set of
possible histories (or worlds) according to Tt may only be a subset of the possible
histories according to Tb. To sum up: because we are concerned with modelling
‘behaviour’, reduction is a local affair.13 The reduction relation might not be global but
instead different detailed stories might hold for different systems, or models.
1.5.2 Reduction-as-construction
‘Reduction’ between two theories occurs when the behaviour of phenomena described
by Tt can be captured by the lower-level theory Tb. Usually, in a highly mathematised
13This local nature of behaviour, rather than MR, is the reason that reduction is sometimes local, rather
than global.
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Figure 1.5: The pre-image of the higher-level possible histories might only be a subset
of the lower-level possible histories.
science such as physics, this will involve constructing the key equations or quantities
described by Tt in the framework of the lower-level theory Tb. Construction is conceived
informally: the physicist can use whatever is required to get the job done. The idea
is: start with the expressions or models of both Tt and Tb, and then perform what-
ever conceptual or mathematical manipulations are required to take you from one
model to another. Admittedly, this is not a detailed specification of ‘construction’ —
but instead of a weakness of my account, I see this as a strength: physicists should
use whichever techniques they require, without being hamstrung by philosophers’
restrictions. Typically, construction might involve defining new variables (perhaps
by summing or performing other ‘irreversible’ mathematical operations) and a whole
range of approximations, idealisations — and whatever mathematical or computational
tricks the physicist can lay her hands on.14
This is not intended as an alternative account to a Nagelian account. Rather the focus
is different. Whereas Nagel focuses on logical ideas: Tt is reduced to Tb if Tt (or a close
cousin) can be deduced from Tb augmented by appropriate definitions. Reduction-as-
construction focuses on the mathematical features of reduction: Tt is reduced to Tb if the
key features (i.e. equations of motions and key quantities) of Tt can be constructed (for
a particular domain or for a particular level of accuracy) using whatever mathematical
resources are available from the key features of Tb.
Here are two illustrative examples.
1. The equations of Newtonian mechanics can be constructed (or recovered) from
special relativity by taking the vc → 0 limit (Batterman, 1995).
2. The irreversible equations of statistical mechanics can be constructed from the
14One might worry that such laissez-faire attitude to approximation and idealisations leads to dialectical
issues. In particular, these approximations and idealisation are exactly the type of issue that anti-
reductionists such as Batterman think prevent reduction. Is this account of reduction worthy of
the name? Would an anti-reductionist oppose this account? I am happy if they do not: for if that
is so, I will have succeeded in my aim to capture what is right about both the reductionist and
anti-reductionist camps. I am grateful to Alex Franklin for this comment.
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Liouvillean dynamics by coarse-graining the probability distribution and mak-
ing several assumptions (such has an initial state condition and the Markovian
approximation), as I will extensively discuss in Chapter 3.
1.5.3 Dynamical vs. ‘non-dynamical’
I claim that to capture the behaviour described by Tt in terms of Tb, the equations
or quantities of Tt must be constructed from the equations or quantities of Tb. In
this Section I explain why I used the phrase ‘equations or quantities’. Equations and
quantities are, of course, not unconnected: the dynamical equations describe how
various quantities evolve over time. I first consider how ‘meshing dynamics’ naturally
fit with the dynamical theories that physics is concerned with. But I then discuss how
‘dynamics’ in this sense are not always central, by considering special sciences and
Fodor’s diagram.
Dynamical theories, in the sense familiar from physics, are considered by an account
given by Rosaler (2015, 2017), which is version of the levels of dynamics discussed in
Section 1.2.3. The important difference from the initial discussion of levels of dynamics
is that here we start with the higher-level dynamics, which have already been specified
independently by Tt. We can then compare an original higher-level dynamical trajectory
with a trajectory induced — as we saw in the toy example of Section 1.2.3 — by the
coarse-graining.
A dynamical theory specifies a state-space (which represents different possible states
of the system K), and a dynamics D (which specify K’s trajectory through this space).
If there are two different dynamical theories Tb and Tt describing K, there will be a
state-space and a dynamics for each theory: Sh and Dh , Sl and Dl respectively. The solid
lines in figure 1.6 show the trajectories in each state-space representing K’s dynamical
evolution.
Rosaler describes the meshing dynamics as follows. The map B (or in our earlier
notation σ) takes states in Sl to states in Sh, cf. Figure 1.6. The dashed line B(Dl(xl , t)) is
the induced dynamics, or the higher-level image of the lower-level dynamical trajectory
Dl(xl, t)). The solid line Dh(B(xl, t)) is the dynamical evolution of K according to the
high-level dynamics Dh. Here the map B commutes with the dynamical evolution of
states in Sl: we have the meshing situation of Section 1.2.3.
Now we can compare the induced macrodynamics with the original higher-level
dynamics — and we see that they match, but only approximately. That is, the image
is not identical: the two theories might only agree within a certain margin of error, δ.
Furthermore, the dynamics and coarse-graining may only commute for certain domains
dl ⊂ Sl . That the errors do not accumulate to render the higher-level description useless
is part of Duhem’s principle of stability (cf. Fletcher (2017)).
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Figure 1.6: Diagram from Rosaler (2015)
The meshing idea is illuminating — but not always central. It is only appropriate
for certain theories familiar from physics: that is, the theory specifies a state space of
physical possibilities for the system and then the dynamics specifies how a system
spontaneously moves from one point to another in that state space. Then the trajectories
through that space state can be compared in the above manner. But many sciences (for
example, arguably organic chemistry) does not have dynamics in the way that physics
generically does. Likewise, as I discuss in chapter 2, thermodynamics is an unusual
physical theory in this way: it does not discuss spontaneous trajectories. Thus, it is
unclear that Rosaler’s account is applicable here.
Of course, there’s an ‘in principle’ sense in which all systems ‘have a dynamics’, in
that their state changes over time! But this not always a detailed or central part of the
science describing that system. The main concern is not recovering different equations
of motion.
This is made especially clear in Fodor’s famous diagram 1.4, displayed earlier in
Section 1.4.1.1, about the relationship between physical kinds and special science kinds.
Here Fodor has just assumed that the ‘meshing’ situation obtains — a substantive
assumption. (See Papineau (2010) and Butterfield (2012) for evolutionary reasons to
think Fodor’s hope is not foolish). But here the key point is that Fodor is not concerned
with the left to right arrows— how the dynamics at the different levels relate to one
another. Instead, the concern is how the quantities P1 and S1 relate to one another: the
up-down arrows.
If the two theories under consideration are not dynamical theories as in physics, then
the concern shifts to whether the quantities of Tt used to capture the behaviour of the
phenomena in question can be constructed from Tb. (To flag a connection to Section 1.6:
I have stipulated that ‘capturing behaviour’ is crucial to reduction. Behaviour will of
course be centre-stage when considering equations of motion or dynamics. But in these
‘less dynamical cases’ where temporal change is implicit, functionalism may be helpful
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for keeping the focus squarely on behaviour.)
1.5.4 Two kinds of reduction: vertical and horizontal
In this Section, I will distinguish two types of reduction. In one case, Tb is the ‘better’
theory and Tt is the ‘tainted’ theory — Tb offers an improvement over Tt. I will label
this ‘horizontal reduction’. This horizontal reduction is often exemplified when an
older theory is reduced to its successor. In certain limits, the old theory’s description
of a given system’s behaviour is very similar to, i.e. approximates, the new theory’s
description. In the second case, Tb is the ‘bottom’ theory and Tt the ‘top’ theory — I
will label these ‘vertical reduction’. In these latter cases, the different levels describe
different subject matters. For example, Tt might describe the macrolevel, and Tb
might describe the microscopic realm. The crucial distinction is between reduction as
improvement (horizontal) and reduction between different subject matters (vertical).
An alternative labelling would be ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ reduction, but these
labels elicit temporal, or historical, considerations which I do not consider.
These two types of reduction have different philosophical consequences. Whether
there are examples of horizontal reduction, and how extensive they are is important
for the scientific realism debate. For if we can construct our old theory from our new
theory we can see how the old theory was successful, despite its falsity — and we can
articulate the part of it which is ‘approximately’ true and will be preserved over theory
change.
The presence (or lack of) vertical reduction has historically been taken to have
metaphysical implications. Carnap and the Vienna Circle, for instance, were interested
in establishing the unity of science. If there were no vertical reductions at all, one might
wonder in what sense physics is primary (and so wonder about whether physicalism is
true). Are the imperialistic overtures of physics justified? In particular, the existence
of vertical reduction is important for the debate about the autonomy of the special
sciences — and the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism.
In Section 1.5.4.1, I argue that approximation is crucial to horizontal reduction and in
Section 1.5.4.2, I argue that abstraction is crucial to vertical reduction. Then, in Section
1.5.4.3, I question how strong the distinction between approximation and abstraction is,
and demonstrate how the two can come together in particular cases. This emphasises
that the difference between horizontal and vertical reduction is one of degree, not kind.
My aim in drawing this distinction is to emphasis that Tb is not always better. This will
not only be important for Section 1.7’s metaphysical considerations, but also in Section
1.5.4.4 to give a reply to Putnam.
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1.5.4.1 Horizontal reduction: reduction as ‘improvement’
In the case of horizontal reduction, Tt is the tainted theory. That is, it is someway inferior
to Tb — most likely, there will be situations where it is less empirically successful. Hence,
Tb is the successor theory to Tt. But, in order to have been accepted in the first place, Tt
will of course be empirically successful, but just to a lesser extent than Tb. Frequently,
Tb reveals that domain of Tt was limited — it was successful for certain problems, but
not for all. And the successor theory Tb can explained why Tt was successful in these
domains. Often it is because Tt approximates Tb within certain confines. (I agree with
Rosaler (2017) that what counts as a successful approximation depends on the situation,
and so is an empirical, and local, matter).
Until this point, I’ve assumed that reduction is a two-place relation. But here we can
see that centrality of approximation requires that it is a really a three-place relation. I
endorse Rosaler’s claim that empirical information about the world is often required
into work out whether one theory reduces to another. In this sense, formal approaches
to reduction that treat reduction as a two-place relation between theories or models
which can be analysed using purely mathematical or logical resources miss out on
something important. That important thing is that approximations are often used, and
the world (i.e. empirical input) tells us which approximations we can ‘get away with’.
(Mathematically we can show how one thing approximates something else in a limit,
but if the circumstances of the limit are not even approximately realised in the world,
then this is not very enlightening). Thus, reduction is a three-place relation between
some set of systems (i.e. patches of the world) and two descriptions of that patch.
Rosaler (2017, p. 2): “Domain subsumption is taken to rest not only on an abstract
analysis of logical or mathematical relations between these representations, but also
on further empirical input concerning where they succeed at describing real physical
behaviours”. One obvious point is that we don’t want to worry about recovering the
stuff that Tt gets wrong! Thus, we must also specify the domain of the theory: (i) the
set of systems well-described by models of that theory, and (ii) the set of circumstances
under which those models succeed (i.e. the timescales and level of accuracy).
I agree that reduction involves tangling with the messy details of where our theories
are successful; this is because I think reductions often involve approximations, and
whether and how these succeed is always an empirical matter. Rosaler gives the
example of Ehrenfest’s theorem, which shows the dovetailing of the mathematical
structures of QM and CM. But this holds over timescales over where the ensemble
spreading in the quantum model can be ignored. Thus, we need empirical input
about the timescales of which classical model succeeds at tracking the alpha particles
behaviour. Another example: as we will see in Chapter 3, the recurrence timescale will
be important for thermal physics.
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Hence for horizontal reduction, the successor theory Tb’s domain will subsume the
domain of Tt, because —to a certain degree of accuracy δ and within a certain domain
of applicability— Tt and Tb give the same answers.
One key part of horizontal reduction is that the Tb is the successor theory, and so
Tt might be thought to be eliminated or replaced. But the domain of applicability
point above explains why the old theory might still be used in scientific practice. If the
problem, such as taking astronauts to the moon, is within the domain of applicability
and the description given in Tt is accurate enough, then it might be pragmatically
well-advised to use the old theory. For example, using Newtonian gravity rather than
General relativity to calculate how to take the astronauts to the moon is much more
tractable.
Thus, it is more convenient to apply Newtonian mechanics rather than general rela-
tivity for calculating rocket trajectories, or NM rather than QM for baseball trajectories.
But the idea is that rocket launches and baseball trajectories fall within the domain of
applicability of the QM and GR — and furthermore, their domains subsume NM.
To sum up: A model of Tt is reduced to a model of Tb if the Tt model describes the
same behaviour as the Tb model — to a certain degree of approximation δ and for a
certain class of systems. Limits, such as vc → 0 and h¯→ 0, can be useful for explaining
why Tt approximates Tb in these domains.
Before describing vertical reduction, we should note the latitude in the term ‘domain
of applicability’. The requirement is appliability so it just has to be that Tt could be
applied, but doesn’t have to be that in fact for all practical purposes it does get applied.
Thus, there are three different precisifications, which I list in descending order of
strength.
A given system K, previously successfully described by Tt, falls within the domain
of applicability of Tb if:
1. There is a description of K within Tb which is in fact used in practice.
2. There is a description of K within Tb which could be used in practice:
a) but sometimes isn’t, due to tractability considerations.
b) but sometimes isn’t, because Tt offers a ‘better explanation’.
3. There is —in principle— a description of K within Tb.
1.5.4.2 Vertical reduction: reduction between different scales
Sometimes different scientific theories seem to be talking about different things from
one another; platypuses never come up in undergraduate quantum mechanics courses,
for instance. As such, it seems that biology and physics have different subject matters.
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The term ‘subject matter’ has a heuristic use – familiar from the retort ‘but you are
changing the subject’, i.e. the concern or focus of a dispute. When I am altering an
examination syllabus in order to help or hinder the average student’s chances, my
concern is not about how any individual student, with their various idiosyncrasies, will
do: the concern, and so subject matter, is different – how hard an exam it is.
One way to see that two levels could have different subject matters, but nonetheless
be connected, is if abstraction is involved. Abstraction involves purposefully leaving
out details. The formal counterpart of this idea is ‘forming an equivalence class’, where
the objects in that class can differ in certain respects but are identical with respect to
a given attribute. That is, they can differ in all respects except the given attribute. To
take an example from Frege (1968), the set of straight lines can be partitioned into
equivalence classes according to which lines are parallel to one another; we abstract
away from the respects in which the lines differ, with the exception of their directions.
Taking equivalence classes leads to a coarser description of the set of worlds, as is
familiar from List’s formal framework. Because you have purposefully thrown away
details about the lower-level of description, these details are not part of the subject
matter of the higher level. As such, the subject matter can be more or less fine-grained.
Thus, a different level of description is one that discusses a different subject matter: this
could be a matter of grain, or more generally, the subject matters might cross cut one
another.
Different levels of description, or subject matters, are often described by different
scientific theories: as with the platypus and the electron. And these different scientific
theories uses different languages. We needn’t look as far apart as the platypus and
the electron: fluid mechanics talks of viscosity, whereas statistical mechanics talks of
entropy, and chemistry of enthalpy. Another way of putting this point is that different
scientific theories (and indeed levels more generally) talk of different variables.
In cases of horizontal reduction, the two theories are rivals, competing to describe
the same phenomena and answer the same questions about the world. We don’t need
to talk about reduction at all in order to evaluate which is the more accurate theory.
The old theory — where it was successful — often approximates the new, more accurate
theory. In contrast, in cases of vertical reduction, at least prima facie, the two levels are
not competing to describe the same patch of the world: the top theory might be talking
about macroscopic phenomena such as crowd behaviour, whereas the lower level might
be concerned with the behaviour of individuals. Furthermore, you can’t (necessarily)
predict herd behaviour from looking at the behaviour of individuals. The reason
that studying lone individuals is unlikely to lead you to discover herd behaviour, or
studying individual hydrogen and oxygen molecules is unlikely to lead you to discover
the properties of water is the obvious point that when we are considering the many not
the few, interactions are important.
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As we increase the number of particles from 1 to infinity, there is no obvious qual-
itative change in behaviour from the CM perspective: we still only have two-body
interactions. There are no new fundamental forces that appear at a certain number —
but there are, nonetheless, new bulk properties described by higher-level theory. The
higher-level of description— or macroscale subject matter— may discuss these bulk
properties (such as the clustering of a crowd, or the polar bonds in H2O) and abstract
away from the microvariables.
Indeed, the variables of the higher-level L′ in certain cases may dynamically decouple
from the variables of the lower level L. As we saw with List’s levels of dynamics, if the
two levels ‘mesh’, then describing the evolution, that is the dynamics, of the higher-
level state s′ does not require knowing the evolution of the lower-level state s (and we
will see a vivid example of this in Chapter 3). In fact, this ‘dynamical decoupling’ or
autonomy is important for L′ to be a useful—rather than gerrymandered— level of
description. That this often happens is part of the contingencies (or good fortune) of
our particular world — and I believe provides the answer to Loewer (2009)’s question:
‘why is there anything other than physics?’
Because, in cases of vertical reduction, Tt and Tb have different subject matters, they
are not, prima facie, competing to describe the same patch of the world. What does it
mean for one theory to be more accurate than another theory? CM is more detailed
than SM so you might think that therefore it is more accurate. Yet this impulse would
suggest that the level of physics is always more accurate than the psychological level.
But frequently this claim can’t be adjudicated. This is because in order to adjudicate the
comparative predictive success of two different theories, they need to be able to answer
the same question (e.g. ‘at what velocity will the ball hit the window?’).
In order to compare the two theory’s predictions, one must be ‘translated’ into the
other. (Of course whether this ‘construction’ or ‘translation’ is deserving of the name -
or is sufficient for - reduction is disputed). Once this is done, we can then ask about
accuracy. First I discuss this translation, and then accuracy.
A quantity such as ‘temperature’ or ‘pain’ is not amongst the predicates of the
lower-level language, say of CM or QM. The subject matter of SM includes describing
the behaviour of quantities such as temperature. Such quantities are not outside the
domain of CM as such, but CM does not readily give a more accurate description of
these quantities: the only way for CM to answer the SM questions is to construct the
SM equations from CM.
There are two ways of seeing this. Firstly, formally we can think of a ‘translation’
in the following sense. A sentence S at the higher-level has propositional content, φ.
This is the function from the set of possible worlds w to the worlds where that sentence
is true. Secondly, and more informally, the higher-level variables can be ‘constructed’
from the lower-level theory. This second way is especially relevant when the two levels
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describe different scales — the variables of the higher level can be constructed from the
lower level. In certain cases, the higher-level variables will be collective variables.
Only once we have an image at the lower level of the higher-level description of
Tt, does it make sense to claim that they are both describing the same system K and
to ask which theory is more accurate. But we might think that there is a limit to how
different the constructed, or translated, description will be from the original higher-
level description, especially if the original higher-level, or macroscopic, variables were
used to ‘guide’ the constructed variables. Nonetheless, whilst the bulk of the image
will coincide with the original higher-level description (as that is what it has been
engineered to do), there might be details at the fringes which differ. In particular, the
lower-level image might reveal circumstances in which Tt is not accurate — and so
limit its domain of applicability. This suggests a blurring of vertical and horizontal
reduction, which I now consider.
1.5.4.3 Distinguishing approximation from abstraction
In abstraction, there is no aim to remove the abstraction in order to get a more accurate
representation. This is unlike idealisation where de-idealising (if possible) would lead
to a more accurate representation. Approximation is similar to idealisation in that there
is an element of falsity in the description - and furthermore, one might want to remove
this unrepresentative aspect (for certain purposes).15 Whether an approximation (such
as replacing sin θ by θ) is a good one, depends on the system at hand: replacing sin θ by
θ is good for small θ — and what counts as small depends on the situation. As such, it
is an empirical matter. Whether it is a good approximation depends on the world. We
could change lots of different parameters by e but for some parameters this will lead to
a big – i.e. greater than e— difference in the description of the system, but for others
the description will still be similar, and accurate.
I have claimed that abstraction is involved in vertical reduction, and approximation
is involved in horizontal reduction. But is this a strong dichotomy? A description of
pendulum that does not mention the colour of the pendulum could be characterising
as abstracting away from the colour of the pendulum, or falsely representing it as
having no colour. Likewise one might think of an ‘old’ description of a system given
by Tt as only caring about a certain level of precision. As such, it is a less fine-grained
description of the system. We could reformulate the old theory as successful within a
domain and to a certain degree of accuracy. This suggests that Tt has a different subject
matter, a different level of precision.
If abstraction involves taking equivalence classes of lower-level states — i.e. saying
15I will not distinguish between approximation and idealisation here, but see Norton (2012) for a
discussion of the distinction.
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that certain details that differentiate the elements of this class don’t matter for the
higher-level theory — perhaps a similar story can be told for approximation. In the case
of approximation, the equivalence classes are error margins: these results are the same
within a certain error margin. There suggests that approximation is just abstraction
away from certain errors, and so there does not seem to be a strong theoretical difference
between the two. Are we abstracting to a different subject matter for a different
purposes? Or are we just abstracting to a different level of accuracy?
One clear example where the distinction between approximation and abstraction is
blurred is given (for different philosophical purposes) by Dennett (1991). In his example
of a ‘noisy’ barcode shown in figure 1.7, the exact distribution could be replicated via
a bit map. Alternatively, the pattern can be described as a barcode pattern with 25%
noise. At a very coarse-grained level of description, it simply has a barcode pattern.
Figure 1.7: A barcode pattern with 25% noise (Dennett, 1991, p.31)
These different descriptions can be glossed in two different ways. (i) The simple
‘barcode’ description could be described as an approximate description: including the
details of each pixel makes the description more accurate. (ii) The ‘barcode’ description
is a higher level of description that abstracts away from the details of each pixel. The
barcode can be described in a variety of ways for different purposes.
The goals of abstraction and approximation differ; and there is the following ex-
planation for this. Abstracting to higher-levels of description — by throwing away
certain details or moving a collective or new variable — can reveal new macroscopic
patterns. But taking larger and larger equivalence classes of accuracy is unlikely to
reveal new patterns about different subject matters, i.e. different phenomena, in way
that abstraction allows us to do. Thus, whilst there are borderline cases, approximation
and abstraction are different types of activity. Regardless of the noise, claiming that the
pattern is a barcode is useful — for some purposes.
Whilst there is no a priori difference in kind, in particular cases we can tell the
difference. The crucial difference between the theoretical devices of abstraction and
approximation is whether you want to remove that device. Thus, the goal separates
the two activities of approximation and abstraction. Is there an empirical advantage of
moving to the Tb? If so, then this suggests the reduction is horizontal, and the theoretical
device is approximation.
Of course we might get it wrong! The progress of science might reveal that we should
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have cared about the differences between the levels. i.e. it might be more empirical
accurate to use neuroscience for the same task than folk psychology. But of course,
what counts as success is context-dependent. We might want a quick way to predict
something, or only need a certain level of accuracy. In which case, the details at the
fringes might not matter.
1.5.4.4 Why the distinction matters: future physics won’t tell us about society
Approximation and abstraction — and so horizontal and vertical reduction — can
overlap, but there is a danger in failing to distinguish the two. Thus, there is a reason
to make the distinction, even if it is only a difference in degree, not kind. In discussing
Putnam’s view of multiple realisability, Sober says “there is a lot that the physics of the
present fails to tell us about societies, minds and living things. However, a completed
physics would not thus be limited, or so reductionism asserts (Oppenheim and Putnam)”
(Sober, 1999, p. 543).
But future physics will not be any more enlightening about societies, minds and
living things than current physics. No one expects that finding (a much sought-after)
theory of quantum gravity will give us insight into human behaviour. The Oppenheim
and Putnam view fails to appreciate that physics has a different subject matter to
psychology.
It is not that we need a better fundamental physical theory in order to describe the
higher-level subject matters. To the extent, or degree of accuracy, that our higher-level
theories are empirically successful, we expect them to remain so. In this sense, our
higher-level theories are robust under changes of the lower-level theory. The higher-
level phenomena described by Tt might be insensitive to the lower-level details. Indeed,
in the case study of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, we will see that the
higher-level regularities thermodynamics describes are insensitive to the nature of
matter. Likewise, Newtonian mechanics was incredibly empirically successful in certain
domains; the advent of QM doesn’t change this. Of course, there were areas where
CM was not successful – small scale and very large scale phenomena. But it is only to
the extent that the higher-level science depends on the details of these unsuccessful
areas, that progress in the lower-level science matters. Only if biology or psychology
depended sensitively on cosmological facts, will the nature of future physics matter.
But inductively, we have no reason to expect this: psychology has not been sensitive to
developments in cosmology.
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1.6 A tool for reduction: Functionalism
Functionalism about X is the view that ‘to be X is just to play the X-role’. For example,
‘being locked’ is classic example of a functional property: it can be realised by various
mechanics — D-locks, padlocks, combination locks etc. Functionalism has become a
more popular position in the philosophy of physics, so in Section 1.6.1, I first catalogue
some of these functionalist views, and then I suggest this rising popularity is because
functionalism is helpful for considering inter-theoretic relationships. In Section 1.6.2, I
then discuss the functionalism of Lewis (1972) and Kim (1998, 1999) in the philosophy
of mind, but I ultimately reject their focus on causation and Kim’s eliminativism. In
Section 1.6.3, I discuss what account of functionalism is appropriate for physics.
1.6.1 Functionalism in the philosophy of physics
Functionalism has become a more popular position in the philosophy of physics in
recent years. As part of their wavefunction realism project, Ney and Albert (2013) are
concerned to find objects in 3N-dimensional configuration space that play the role of
ordinary 3-dimensional objects such as tables and chairs. Wallace (2012b, Ch. 2) appeals
to functionalist intuitions when recovering the macroscopic world from the Everrettian
multiverse; for example, he claims that to be a tiger is just to be a tiger-like pattern in the
wavefunction. Knox (2013) advocates functionalism about spacetime; to be spacetime is
just to play the spacetime role, that is: to pick out the inertial trajectories. Functionalism
about spacetime forms a springboard for considering emergent spacetime in quantum
gravity (Lam, 2018).
Why consider ‘functionalism’ in physics? The motivation for philosophers of physics
advocating functionalism about a certain concept is connected to concerns about inter-
theory relations. For instance, spacetime functionalism is a position that allows us to
compare spacetimes across different physical theories. Likewise, Albert and Wallace
are hoping to recover the classical world that is described by classical physics, from
the quantum. The key message of this Section will be that functionalism helps with
reduction-as-construction: provided we can construct a quantity/equation/piece of
theoretical machinery at the lower level Tb that has the same relevant behaviour, i.e.
that plays the same role as the quantity/equation/piece of theoretical machinery at the
higher level Tt, we can achieve a reduction (in this sense).
This view makes reductions easier to have. If the higher-level concepts are functional
role concepts, then the realiser just has to play the same role, i.e. have the same behaviour.
Consequently, certain differences between the quantities of Tt and Tb that one might
worry block reduction — might not matter. For example, Sklar raises the following
concern: The “temperature equals mean molecular kinetic energy’ bridge law identifies
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a fundamentally non-statistical quantity with a fundamentally statistical quantity. How
is this supposed to work?” (Sklar, 1993, p.161) as quoted by Batterman (2010).
Sklar’s worry is that mean kinetic energy and temperature have different features:
the former is statistical and latter not, and thus this blocks the reduction. But if the
non-statistical nature of temperature is not part of its functional role, then the same
behaviour can be captured by a statistical property: provided they have the same
relevant behaviour.
This strategy originates with Lewis’ plan for psychophysical identification (Lewis,
1972). This raises the question: should the lower-level property or quantity (henceforth:
Xb) be identified with the higher-level property (henceforth: Xt)? That is, does the
reduction establish that temperature just is mean kinetic energy?16 In the next Section
I outline Lewis’ plan for psychophysical identification, and then Kim’s functional
reduction. I discuss, and reject, Kim’s motivation for considering causal powers:
‘ontological simplification’. I then argue that discussing causal powers is a non-starter;
following Rueger I argue that for both vertical and horizontal reduction, generally Xb
and Xt will have different causal profiles. I then, in Section 1.6.3, discuss ‘functionalism
fit for physics’.
1.6.2 Functionalism in the philosophy of mind
Lewis’s plan for psychophysical identification goes as follows.17 The higher-level
concept, such as pain, is a functional role property: for a mental state to be pain is just
for it to play the pain role within the whole web of folk psychology. For example, it
is caused by tissue damage and typically leads to avoidance behaviour. If a state is
found by physiology (putatively ‘C-fiber firing’) that plays the same causal role, then
the occupants of the pain role would be identical to the physiological quantity ‘C-fiber
firing’.
Using functionalism in this way to secure reduction, or in Lewis’ case, an identifica-
tion, is appealing because it leaves room for the two levels Tb and Tt to differ in certain
ways. For instance, one might think that if Tt is folk psychology and Tb is physiology,
these levels differ in the concepts they invoke. Furthermore, our epistemic access to
the concept of pain is very different from our epistemic access to the concept of C-fiber
firing. The former we access through everyday, first-person phenomenal experience,
whereas the latter we learn about through physiology. As such, the higher level has
a certain amount of independence, or autonomy. But nonetheless, they both pick out
the same state in the world. Two states can be identified, despite certain differences.
(Whether this entails identifying properties requires tackling philosophically controver-
16One thing to flag is that in Chapter 2 I will reject this example.
17Lewis’ functionalist ambitions are global, but here I just focus on the philosophy of mind case.
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sial issues in the metaphysics of properties, such as whether properties are ‘abundant’
or ‘sparse’ (cf. Oliver (1996) for a review of the issues) — which I leave aside in this
thesis.) But nonetheless Kim claims that the aim of such theoretical identifications is to
reduce the number of properties one is committed to.
According to Kim (1998, 1999)’s account of functional reduction: “The model, briefly
is this: (1) functionalize a higher-level property M in terms of a causal role, (2) find a
“mechanism” P (the realizer of M), i.e., a property that is based on lower-level properties
and can fill the causal role, and (3) find a theory at the lower level that explains how P
is able to do the job of filling the causal role constitutive of M. If these steps succeed,
M can be identified with P, or better: the causal powers associated with M can be
identified with the causal powers of P ” (Rueger, 2006, p. 336).
This model has two features that I reject. (1) The first feature of Kim’s account that I
reject is his view, like Lewis, that the roles are causal roles. Rueger (2006) argues that this
strategy will not work, as the extra details at the lower level will mean that the causal
roles of M and P differ. Rueger says “In more metaphysical terms: there are always
causal contributions from P which are not needed or which are superfluous for doing
the job M was supposed to do” (Rueger, 2006, p. 340). Moreover, since it is unclear
what causation in physics is18, functional or nomological roles are more appropriate.
(2) The second part of Kim’s account I reject is his aim: to effect a ‘genuine ontological
simplification’ by eliminating the high-level entity after identifying it with its realiser.
But in Section 1.7, I will reject elimination as an aim of reduction. I now discuss how
his eliminative aim motivates his use of causal roles.
The reason that Lewis and Kim focus on causal roles is because one might think
following Alexander’s dictum ‘to be is to have causal powers’. If two quantities have the
same causal powers, then perhaps they are identical. E.g. if Hesperus and Phosphorus
have all the same causal powers, then this suggests that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In
Lewis’ case if pain and C-fiber firing have the same causal powers, then we can make
the psycho-physical identification: pain just is C-fiber firing. Whereas previously we
thought that there were two properties ‘pain’ and ‘C-fiber firing’, there is in fact only
one. The terms ‘being in pain’ and ‘C-fibers firing’ pick out the same property as their
referent.
But in the case of scientific theories, it is frequently much less clear what the referents
of our scientific terms are (and indeed whether they do in fact refer in the way that
the scientific realist hopes they do). Many of our scientific theories do not describe
macroscopic objects like Venus or Jack the Ripper, but rather they describe complex phe-
nomena like Bose-Einstein condensates, evaporation or quantum tunnelling. Spelling
18I am sympathetic to the interventionist account of causation and to the idea that causation may be
a folk concept with no natural place within physics. It certainly seems hard to identify causes and
effects in the pattern of events described by a time-symmetric differential equation, such as the
Schrödinger equation.
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out the ontological commitments associated to one’s scientific models of a system is a
substantive and philosophically controversial project.
Indeed this was made especially clear in List’s different systems of levels. We might
understand the relationships between different levels of description (or dynamics), but
there is still a further project to understand how that system of levels relates to a system
of ontological levels.
To look ahead to Chapter 2. Suppose we assume that the project of finding statistical
mechanical realisers of the roles of various thermodynamic quantities is successful.
Should we then identify XSM with XTD? Functionalism — or the functionalism I want
to advocate — deflates this question. Realisation is not distinct from identification,
as follows. Role-playing, rather than reference, is centre stage in the functionalist
view I want to advocate. All that it is to be X is to play the X role. If David Tennant
is currently playing the Hamlet role, then within this production he is Hamlet. In a
different production, Benedict Cumberbatch plays Hamlet. Both realise the role, but it
does not make sense to ask which actor we should identify Hamlet as.
This analogy with acting also illuminates our earlier discussion of multiple realisabil-
ity. If to be Hamlet is just to play the Hamlet role, we then expect many different actors
(i.e. ‘realisers’ of this role). Hence, if a theory has a functional role concepts, then it is
to be expected that its concepts will be multiply realised by the lower level. We might
anticipate that in different systems, different physical quantities as characterised at a
‘lower level’ might play a given role.
In the same way that David Tennant ‘is’ Hamlet: if lower-level quantity XSM plays the
higher-level quantity XTD role, then within SM, XSM ‘is’ XTD. In this way, realisation is
the most one can ask about identification. Yet, had we said that Hamlet really is David
Tennant, like we say Hesperus really is Phosphorus, then we could have decreased
the number of entities we are committed to — thus, achieving Kim’s eliminative aim.
Consequently, the role-playing view of identity is not compatible with Kim’s goal of
ontological simplification. But, in Section 1.7, I argue that, contra Kim, such ontological
simplification or eliminativism is not the aim of reduction.
In the next Section I consider what account of functionalism is appropriate for the
case studies in physics I want to consider.
1.6.3 Functionalism fit for physics
In the philosophy of mind, the functional role is understood as a causal role. The pain
role was spelt out in terms of what typically causes it (tissue damage) and what it typi-
cally causes (avoidance behaviour). Yet it is unclear that the functionalist account from
the philosophy of mind can just be imported wholesale into the philosophy of physics
for two reasons. Firstly, it is opaque, at best, what causation is in physics. Secondly,
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much of the functionalism literature deals with issues specific to the philosophy of
mind debate, especially qualia, which have no obvious analogue in physics. Given the
rising popularity of ‘functionalism’ in philosophy of physics, it would be helpful to
find an account of functionalism fit for physics.
A natural suggestion would be to find a criterion to separate the functional from
the non-functional. Perhaps the obvious suggestion for such a criterion is functional
definition: the functional concepts are those which are functionally defined. Indeed, a
functional definition of pain is ‘the property of an animal having some physical property
that typically leads to aversive behaviour and is often caused by tissue damage’. The
key features of a functional definition is that it is second-order and involves a pattern
or web of relations. This might suggest that the property picked out by the functional
definition is extrinsic: it depends on the existence of other properties, and of other
objects, e.g. the tissues getting damaged, the limbs doing the aversive movement.19
However, this won’t give us a way to sort the functional from the nonfunctional. How
a property is defined — i.e. whether it is given a functional definition or not — does
not seem to provide a criterion to help us separate functional role properties from the
rest. This is because we can define any theoretical term in terms of the web of relations
it enters into (Lewis, 1970). Given a theory, we can formulate the Ramsey sentence of
that theory, where the term to be defined is the ‘T-term’. The Ramsey sentence is the
‘theoretical postulate’ (i.e. the entire theory as a sentence) with the T-term replaced by a
variable and existentially quantified.20 In this sense, our term to be defined is implicitly
defined by the whole body of the theory. Lewis illustrates this with Cluedo: A detective
tells a story about a murder involving X, Y, Z, where ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ are not explained.
In Cluedo the body of evidence is eventually enough to work out that X, Y, Z are Mrs.
White, the billiard room and the lead piping. In this way, all scientific terms — and the
properties they denote — seem able to be functionally defined by the theory they enter
into.
In response, one might suggest that the difference between functional role properties
and non-functional role properties is that the former can only be functionally defined.
All properties can be functional defined, but only some must be. But proving that a non-
functional definition of a given quantity does not exist seems difficult: moreover, there
are reasons to think the distinction between functional and non-functional definitions
19However, I will not go into the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction here because we can give a
extrinsic specification of an intrinsic property. For example, ‘the height of the person who is the sister
of someone who is a final year medical student and cycles for Cardiff university track team and plays
the oboe’ picks out my height: and that is nonetheless is an intrinsic property of me, despite the
relational/extrinsic specification.
20Really what we want is the open formula (i.e. the Ramsey sentence before it is existentially quantified),
because we want an (implicit) definition which serves to pick out the functional role property in the
world. The extension of the Ramsey sentence is just true or false, and so it is not quite the object we
want.
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will not have much bite within in physics.
This is because whether a given quantity appears functionally defined is language-
dependent, or theory-formulation dependent (cf. Wilson (1985)). For example, Wilson
claims that in the force-is-primitive Newtonian account, the potential energy U is
functionally defined. But in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics, the potential
energy U is a primitive notion, but the gravitational force “has a ‘functionally defined’
guise” (Wilson, 1985, p. 8). That is, it depends on which terms are primitive in the
language in which it is defined. Furthermore, due to cardinality concerns Wilson
claims that physics cannot have a unique language. Thus, whether a given quantity is
functionally defined or not may just be a feature of the language chosen, rather than a
feature of the world.
To sum up: there is not an obvious criterion to separate the functional concepts from
the non-functional concepts. Indeed, I believe that Lewis’ approach to theoretical terms
shows that all concepts in science can be considered to be functional concepts. This
formal point has an informal counterpart: “Functionalism is the idea enshrined in the
old proverb: handsome is as handsome does. Matter matters only because of what
matter can do. Functionalism in this broadest sense is so ubiquitous in science that it is
tantamount to a reigning presumption of all science” (Dennett, 2001, p.233) (as quoted
in Lam (2018)).
Of course, one might then worry that this means that ‘being a functionalist about X’
is a pretty empty thesis: all concepts can be considered to be functional, and claiming
this about X is fairly unremarkable. Furthermore, one might expect to have lots of
reductions. However, I claim that the substantive part of ‘being a functionalist about X’
is spelling out X’s functional role. In the case of spacetime functionalism: claiming that
the functional role of spacetime is to define the inertial trajectories is a a substantive
position.
One might ask: is there a general prescription for spelling out functional roles? Taking
the Ramsey sentence looks like an easy option. But this will not be helpful for our
purposes. As we saw above, Lewis’ framework uses the entire web of a given theory.
But we will want a smaller part of the web, for the following reason. Functionalism
in philosophy of physics is used to consider inter-theoretic relations. If the role of X
is defined by the entire theory, then we will not be able to compare the X candidates
across different theories. If the whole web is used then instead of having a relatively
constrained role such as ‘defining inertial trajectories’ the entire theory will used: and
so we cannot compare. But not only would using the entire web make functionalism
impotent for philosophy of physics, much of the web is not important or relevant for
a certain concept. (Of course the entire theoretical framework might be implicated in
some way, but we want to isolate the ‘essential role’ of X).
Thus, substantive work in advocating functionalism in philosophy of physics is
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spelling out the functional, or nomological, roles. But, of course, in particular case
studies, cashing out which differences matter and which don’t will be very controversial.
For Lewis’ pain case, causal differences matter, but conceptual differences need not.
In the case of thermal physics, the Gibbs vs. Boltzmann debate can be seen as a
dispute over which behaviours or functional roles of thermodynamics need to be
instantiated by the underlying realisers. Thus, thermodynamics defines entropy to
be a strictly non-decreasing quantity: a feature captured by the Gibbs coarse-grained
but not the Boltzmann entropy. However the Boltzmannian might argue that ‘strictly
non-decreasing’ is not a crucial role of the thermodynamic entropy, cf. Callender (2001).
I will focus on functional roles, but note that the terminology ‘nomological’ roles is also
appropriate.
1.6.4 Conclusion
Functionalism can help secure reductions — but the hard work remains of spelling out
the ‘essential role’ of the quantities in Tt. Advocating functionalism about the higher-
level theory allows one to claim this theory Tt is reduced to Tb, provided that a realiser
in Tb can be found (i.e. ‘constructed’) that plays the same role. But nonetheless the two
levels can differ in certain ways. Earlier, we saw that the concepts of folk psychology
differ from the concepts of physiology in our epistemic access to them. We can learn
about folk psychology independently of physiology. The higher-level theory may be
partially (though not wholly, due to our assumption of supervenience) independent or
autonomous of the lower level. Here functionalism is illuminating: if a higher-level
theory has functional role concepts, then its no surprise that the higher-level theory is
autonomous of the lower-level theory. Mainwood (2006) gives the example of dynamical
systems theory: the system is treated like a black box and so it is unsurprising that the
results of dynamical systems theory are independent of, e.g. particle physics.
1.7 Metaphysics and reduction
As we saw earlier, for Kim, the aim of the reductive project is to decrease the number
of properties one is committed to. But I believe that what exists is orthogonal to what
is reduced, since I believe that what exists is what is useful. Newtonian mechanics
provides a useful description of certain systems. Another way of putting this is that
there are real patterns that Newtonian mechanics describes.21 Consequently, I think
that the entities described by the reduced Tt should only be eliminated or replaced if
21Some think that this ‘real patterns’ account of ontology is ambiguous between realism and instru-
mentalism, but I think that Dennett (1991)’s argument (and the Ladyman and Ross (2007) view that
patterns are real if they are projectible) can be seen as a version of the no miracles argument.
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they are no longer useful.
Indeed, the considerations of the previous Sections suggest that often Tt remains
useful. For example, in the case of the vertical reduction, if Tt and Tb have different
concerns or subject matters, then they will be useful for different purposes. But even if
Tb offers an improvement over Tt (as is the case in horizontal reduction), Tt might still
be useful. As we saw at the end of Section 1.5.4.1, Tt might provide a better explanation,
or be more tractable than Tb for certain purposes or systems. Thus, even if Tt is reduced
to Tb, Tt might still be useful and so I believe should not be eliminated. Thus, contra
Kim, the slogan aim of reduction should be: vindicate! Don’t eliminate!
Why think that Tt has been vindicated? Even in the case of ‘improvement’ reduction,
Tt will have been shown — for certain degrees of accuracy, over certain timescales, and
for certain systems — to give the same answers. Thus, despite no longer being the best
theory for a certain subject matter or phenomena, if it has been reduced, then we have
an explanation of why it was so successful. Indeed, were the theory Tt not successful,
then we wouldn’t care about recovering it from its successor.
I think this anti-eliminativist commitment lies behind those who advocate ‘anti-
reductionism’ in physics. The higher-level theory Tt is useful — and furthermore in
some cases knowledge of Tt might be indispensable for the securing the reduction (cf.
Rueger (2006)). For instance, knowledge of the macroscopic variables might be required.
At the very least, we will need to know which macroscopic pattern we are aiming to
capture (as discussed earlier). If the higher-level information is indispensable, then it
cannot be eliminated. But since I say elimination is not part of the aim of reduction, the
indispensability of the higher-level information poses no block to reduction.
Of course, one might claim that eliminability is a condition on reduction — i.e. even if
there are good reasons to not eliminate after reduction, one could hold that a successful
reduction gives one the ability to eliminate the higher-level terms.22 But I want to resist
this view, because eliminability is too strong a requirement on reduction. Carrying
out a reduction of Tt to Tb is a cognitive achievement, even if you need higher-level
information to guide you.
Indeed, in practice we will often need the higher-level theory or concepts to guide
you. To see the plausibility of this, recall just how many possible σ maps from the lower
to higher level there are: that is, there are so many different equivalence classes of lower-
level states. How should we know which is the right one? If you are totally ignorant
of Tt, how will you find the right regularities? After all, there are so many different
possible variables one can use to describe the world, as we saw in the discussion of
the descriptive richness of physics earlier. Which variables we pick depends on our
epistemic and cognitive limitations — i.e. on which variables we can latch onto and
manipulate. Temperature is one such variable, but the centre of mass of Trump’s hand,
22My thanks to Neil Dewar for this point.
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my cat and a football is not. In horizontal reduction, Tb might be a better theory than Tt
because of improvements in experimental technique and control. Thus, the variables
that we can latch onto and manipulate have changed. Constructing the older Tt from
Tb in complete ignorance of Tt and its variables seems like an impossible talk.
Having argued that reduction vindicates the higher-level theory, I will now discuss
how reduction is nonetheless compatible with the higher-level entities being weakly
emergent: indeed, I go further and suggest that in cases of vertical reduction, emergence
will be endemic. I then connect this to how the higher-level entities can have their own
spirit, or in other words: be autonomous.
1.7.1 Emergent special sciences
The account I have outlined in this Chapter is an account of reduction-in-practice
(and, in the next Section, I will discuss the distinction between ‘in principle’ and ‘in
practice’). To declare that Tt reduces to Tb, the equations or quantities (in this latter
case, functionalism may help) of Tt, must be constructed from Tb. I say constructed not
constructible. The construction must be demonstrated. In this sense, it is a relatively
stringent requirement. But nonetheless it is compatible with (weak) emergence —
understood as ‘novel and robust behaviour with respect to a given comparison class’
(Butterfield, 2011a,b).
If the type of reduction is Section 1.5.4.2’s vertical reduction, then emergence is going
to be prevalent. In fact, we might want to go as far as to say that all higher-level theories
that have been reduced are, in this sense, emergent. I first suggest why they will fulfil
the novelty criteria. I then discuss in what sense they fulfil the robustness criterion.
Novel: if Tt describes a genuine higher-level of description (as opposed just to being a
gerrymandered level, or just a different level of ‘coarse-ness of description’), then it will
describe substantively different behaviour. Of course, this raises the question: what
counts as a genuine level of description?
Earlier we saw that there are many different possible levels that could be defined,
but some of these we might consider ‘gerrymandered’. Nonetheless, it is unlikely
to be fruitful for scientists to investigate these gerrymandered levels; thus, there is a
sociological reason to think that the special sciences will investigated ‘genuine levels’.
One way of seeing that a level is genuine higher level is if it has autonomous dynamics,
since this means that it doesn’t make reference to the lower-level of description. This
autonomy of the higher level is sometimes a brute fact (i.e. we just discovered the
higher-level regularities in the world, like how long to brew tea) or sometimes these
higher-level rules are constructed from the lower level (as we will see in Chapter 3). But
in both cases, a genuine higher level will have autonomous dynamics — that is, they do
not require the lower-level details. These means that certain lower-level details won’t
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matter, and so the higher-level variables are robust with respect to certain changes.23
Indeed, in List’s framework, the supervenience map defines the higher-level states as
equivalence classes of lower-level states — thus, by definition, it won’t matter to the
higher level which element of the equivalence class represents the system’s state. Of
course, there are degrees of robustness: some lower-level changes will matter.
This independence from lower-level details is one sense which the higher-level
description may be said to ‘have its own spirit’.24 One example of higher-level inde-
pendence: much (indeed most) of our macroscopic theories are independent of the fact
that the world is quantum, not classical. But in a way this is unsurprising — insofar
as these theories are empirically successful, they will remain so. But were the world
classical and not quantum, matter would not be stable, and so the higher-level patterns
might not emerge. As such, the independence is limited. Working out which changes
don’t matter — that is, which changes the higher-level theory is robust under — is part
of the reductive project (cf. Section 1.4.2).
But robustness is not sufficient for emergence: there can be examples of ‘good variable’
choice — we can find some variable that has an autonomous description and so is
robust with respect to certain lower-level changes — but it may not be suitably novel
(moving to a centre of mass description might be an example).
To conclude: generally, if a higher-level description is novel and robust compared to
the lower-level description, we can say that it is weakly emergent. I submit that special
sciences that have been reduced will frequently earn the name ‘emergent’. They are
novel descriptions — if they were not, they would not be a genuine different level or
science but would be subsumed under the science of the lower level. If a description
given by the special science can be constructed from the lower-level description, then in
this case we can see under changes (and so in what sense), this higher-level description
is robust. Of course, how robust they higher-level description must be to qualify as
emergent might differ across different authors. But in principle: the special sciences
can be emergent, even when reduced.
1.8 Reduction in practice vs in principle
The account I have outlined is comparatively liberal; there are no constraints about
explanation, for example. Additionally, the conclusion of Section 1.6 was that it seems
that any theory can be ‘functionalised’. Furthermore, any mathematical tools are
23To connect, the mathematical criterion of ‘autonomy’ to the issue of laws of nature: if the higher-level
dynamics are autonomous, they will be time-independent. And this suggests that they may be
thought of as bona fide laws of nature: regularities that are not time-dependent. Of course, this
mathematical criterion for laws of nature may not be appropriate for less mathematised sciences such
as biology.
24I will use ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ interchangeably to capture this idea.
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permitted in trying to construct for example, the dynamical equations of one theory
from another. But by allowing such liberty in my account, one might expect to find
many examples of reduction; generally, the more stringent one’s account of reduction,
the fewer examples one anticipates finding. And yet, we do not have a plethora of
examples of reduction-as-construction. Why is this?
One strategy to explain the paucity of examples, despite the liberal account of reduc-
tion: distinguish between reduction-in-practice and reduction-in-principle. Reduction-
in-principle is concerned with which relations can possibly obtain between Tb and Tt.
Demonstrating that these relations do in fact obtain in particular cases is reduction-
in-practice. To borrow David Lewis’s example, in principle I can speak Finnish. But
“Facts about the anatomy and operation of the ape’s larynx and nervous system are not
compossible with his speaking Finnish” (Lewis, 1987, p. 77). But, in practice, I can’t
speak a word of Finnish.
Accounts of reduction differ over whether they have reduction-in-practice or reduction-
in-practice in mind. For example, advocates of the ‘limits account’ such as Batterman
(2001) are generalising from particular case studies of reduction, i.e. from reduction in
practice — thus they are aiming to generate a principled account from particular cases.
In contrast, Nagelian-type accounts that require logical deduction as a requirement on
reduction, are starting from a general account of reduction, of reduction in principle —
and then aiming to demonstrate that this relation holds in particular case studies, i.e.
that such a reduction relation is found in practice.
The limits account focuses on mathematical relations between Tt and Tb, and mathe-
matics is the lingua franca of physics. In contrast, the Nagelian account focuses on the
logical relationships between Tt and Tb, the lingua franca for discussing possibility. In
general, logical deduction is not part of the everyday practice of science.
Thus, accounts that focus on logic are more appropriate for considering reduction in
principle, whereas accounts focusing on mathematics are well-suited to considering
reduction in practice (in physics). Yet, mathematical approaches and logical approaches
to reduction need not be in tension with one another. They both reveal interesting, but
different, features of the relationships between our scientific theories. Clearly, given
the emphasis on mathematical construction in my account of reduction, reduction-in-
practice is my target. Indeed in the rest of this thesis I am going to consider two case
studies, and so reduction-in-practice.
Thus, the difference between what we can do in principle and what we can do in
practice explains why there is a chasm between the liberties allowed by the construction-
as-reduction account and the dearth of examples.
Nonetheless, we might reasonably demand: why is there a difference between what
can be done in principle and what we can do in practice? Fletcher gives a sociological
explanation. He claims that we could find more examples of reduction — it is just this
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hasn’t been a focus of physicists’ attention. Were it to be so, we should find many more
examples.
Yet I think it is not physicists’ lack of interest: there are other reasons. For example,
statistical mechanics considers systems of the size ∼ 1023 particles. (This is the number
of molecules in one mole of gas). This is a very large number: greater than the number
of grains of sand on Earth — which should give an idea of just how hard it is to solve
1023 coupled equations for the change in position of each particle in CM. Computational
intractability makes reduction-in-practice hard.
Whilst these tractability issues are not a mere lack of interest, one might still worry
that the presence of reduction — or thereof — is irrevocably entwined with our cog-
nitive, computational or epistemic abilities. As a consequence it might seem that the
dearth of examples of reduction is a mere consequence of our perspective on reality,
rather than reality itself. A Laplacian demon would be able to secure the reduction, but
we cannot.25 That is, the failure of reduction in practice is an anthropocentric feature.
But there is a rich variety of patterns in the world; which ones are pertinent to us
arguably depends on features of our epistemic standpoint on reality: on which variables
we can measure and manipulate. Knowing the fundamental level might not be enough
for the Laplacian demon, in addition to their impressive computational powers, the
demon will need to know our epistemic standpoint (i.e. our cognitive limitations) in
order to uncover these higher-level patterns and so effect a reduction.
1.9 Conclusion
In this Chapter I have outlined the account of reduction in practice that I will now
use to consider the case studies of Chapters 2 and 3. According to my account of
reduction-as-construction, if the equations or quantities of Tt are constructed from the
equations or quantities of Tb, then Tt is reduced — and vindicated by — Tb. A whole host
of mathematical devices might be required, such as defining new variables or taking
limits. I claim that the use of approximations is distinctive of horizontal reduction: the
reduced theory Tt describes the same behaviour of a system — to a certain degree of
approximation and within a certain domain. Vertical reduction connects two theories
Tt and Tb which are concerned with different subject matters, and so abstraction — the
throwing away of lower-level details irrelevant for the higher-level phenomena — will
be distinctive of vertical reduction. This type of reduction is familiar from the debate
25I have reservations about invoking the Laplacian demon. If all levels of description supervene on
the fundamental level, and the demon has ‘god-like’ powers, he is just by definition able to secure
reductions, which is not very enlightening. I think that this tactic is used to make it sounds as if lack of
reduction is mere epistemological significance, and so shouldn’t have any metaphysical consequences
about the status of the higher-level. But earlier I claimed that reduction was independent of these
metaphysical considerations, so I will not pursue this point further.
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about the special sciences, which I suggested could be considered as weakly emergent.
Generally, a reduction of Tt to Tb allows us to see how the macropatterns or regularities
described by Tt emerge from the micropatterns and details described by Tb.
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statistical mechanics
2.1 Introduction
In the wider philosophical literature, the relationship between thermodynamics (TD)
and statistical mechanics (SM) is taken as the paradigm example of reduction. But
within the philosophy of physics, there is scepticism. For example, Batterman (2010,
p.159) says: “it is almost surely the case that thermodynamics does not reduce to
statistical mechanics according to the received view of the nature of reduction in the
philosophical literature.” However, in this Chapter I will argue that according to my
view of reduction: TD is reducible to SM.
Yet, as I will argue in Section 2.1.3, thermodynamics is not a dynamical theory in
the way physical theories often are, and so the ‘meshing type’ account will not apply
here. Instead, the goal will be to find the SM ‘image’ or realiser of various quantities.
In particular I will take a functionalist approach: the SM quantities need only capture
the key or essential role of the TD quantities. Of course, in spelling out these roles,
temporal features, i.e. how these quantities change over time in certain interactions
and situations, will be discussed. And so whilst issues about dynamics are not at the
forefront, temporal notions are implicitly considered.
In Chapter 1, I argued that there is a sense in which all quantities could be considered
functional. The hard part (and thus the substantive position in professing functionalism
about a certain discourse) is spelling out the roles. Yet whilst functionalism could be
applied to any theory, thermodynamics lends itself especially naturally to a function-
alist perspective. This is because many of its core arguments and notions, such as the
Carnot cycle, are very abstract. Thermodynamic systems are described by only a few
parameters and the microscopic details are purposefully not considered. (Historically,
the microscopic details were purposefully ignored because of ignorance: more partic-
ularly, the controversy surrounding the atomic hypothesis at the time.) In this way,
functional commonality, while allowing physical diversity in the microstructure, is a
theme in thermodynamics — which is conducive to taking functionalist approach.
Taking this functionalist approach will allow me to achieve two things:
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1. As I outline in Section 2.1.1, it will allow me to reply to certain sceptics about
reduction, by showing how TD can be reduced to SM.
2. In Section 2.1.2, I will explain the sense in which, despite this reduction, TD is an
‘autonomous special science’.
2.1.1 Silencing scepticism
My views about functionalism and reduction-as-construction allow me to reply to one
form of scepticism about the reduction of the TD to SM that originates with Gibbs
(1903), and which Sklar (1993) endorses.
“It should not surprise us that Gibbs, when he came to associate ensemble quanti-
ties with thermodynamic quantities in Ch XIV of his book, spoke of the “thermody-
namic analogies” when he outlined how thermodynamic functional interrelations
among quantities were reflected in structurally similar functional relations among
ensemble quantities. He carefully avoided making any direct claim to have found
what the thermodynamic quantities “were” at the molecular dynamic level.” (Sklar,
1993, p.350) as quoted by (Batterman, 2010, p.161).
But according to reduction-as-construction, demonstrating the same functional inter-
relations — i.e. equations— between the quantities of the lower theory Tb (i.e. SM)
and Tt (i.e. TD) is all that is required. Here it is tempting to ask: if an SM quantity is
the lower-level realiser of the TD quantity, can the two be identified? (And one might
think this project is the “were” that in the quote above). But this questions raises murky
issues about property identity that I do not want to engage with, and that I set aside
in Chapter 1. Instead I endorsed a functionalist view of identity: to be X is just to
play the X-role. Throughout this chapter, any statement of identifying higher-level
quantities with lower-level quantities should be read in this functionalist spirit. The
claim SM quantity X is identified with the TD quantity Y should be read as X is the SM
image/correlate/realiser of the TD quantity.
For which TD quantities do we need to find the SM realiser? Many expositions
of thermodynamics explicate how the Zeroth, First, Second law of thermodynamics
implicitly define new quantities (functions of state) temperature, energy and entropy
respectively. For this project, I shall adopt one such exposition: Tong (2012). By
following the details of such an exposition, we can thus articulate the nomological
roles that these quantities play — and search for quantities in SM that have the same
behaviour, and so play these roles. If this can be done across the board, that is, if all
or the majority of the quantities in thermodynamics, can be constructed from, or is
realised by, SM, then we have reduced TD to SM.
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To summarise what lies ahead:
• In part II: The Zeroth Law implicitly defines a quantity that is numerically identi-
cal for two bodies in mutual thermal equilibrium: temperature. The SM quantity
that plays this role is ∂E∂S . I will argue that the familiar identification — that T is
mean kinetic energy — only holds in special situations and for particular systems:
for cases where quantum effects are negligible.
• In part III: The First Law tells us that heat and work are interconvertible and
thus there is a conserved quantity: energy. Finding an SM realiser is in some
ways easy and in other ways hard: conservation of energy is a basic assumption
of the microdynamics from which SM is constructed — and so SM secures the
conservation of energy ‘for free’. But spelling out the distinction between heat and
work at the SM level is unobvious (and some have argued: anthropocentric), but
I argue — following Maroney (2007)— that it can be done in quantum statistical
mechanics (QSM).
• In part IV: Spelling out the nature of the Second Law is a controversial task. I
argue that it should be properly distinguished from the Minus First law (whose
underpinning is considered in Chapter 3). It follows that the key role of TD
entropy is that it is constant in quasi-static adiabatic processes and increasing in
non-quasi-static processes. I argue that the Gibbs entropy plays this role — and
once again quantum considerations are enlightening.
• In part V: The Third Law does not implicitly define any new TD quantity — but I
briefly discuss the sense in which it can be given a QSM, but not classical statistical
mechanical (CSM) explanation.
2.1.2 Autonomy
Despite being reducible in this way, thermodynamics nonetheless has a certain degree
of autonomy (and often this lies behind the scepticism about reduction, cf. (Sklar, 1993,
p. 344)). But my view that thermodynamics describes functional role properties allows
us to explain this autonomy (cf. Chapter 1’s discussion of dynamical systems theory).
Thermodynamics is autonomous from certain molecular details—exactly what one
would expect of a theory that describes functional role properties. Furthermore, if you
are noncommittal about the constituents of the system, you might go further and treat
the system as a black box. And hence, provided that a lower-level system interacts with
other systems in a thermodynamic way, it will be a realiser of the laws of TD despite
the latter’s lack of commitments about the internal nature of these systems.
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But there are limits to this autonomy: thermodynamics is only autonomous of the
lower-level theory, statistical mechanics, to a certain extent. TD is not so independent
of the lower-level details that we are ‘free to make any choice’ about how the world
could be at this level. Recall chapter’s 1 assumption that the higher level (here: the TD
level) supervenes on the lower level. As such, the TD is not wholly independent of the
lower level. In general, a higher-level state or phenomena might be independent of
some of the lower-level details — but not all.
On the other hand, there’s a historical reconstruction of events according to which
TD got along just fine in ignorance about atoms. Perhaps this is an oversimplistic gloss:
Carnot’s original cycle was inspired by a water wheel with caloric as the fluid — and so
in light of the work of Joule and Thomson had to be altered. (But one might nonetheless
still marvel at how slight this alteration was, given the radical revision about the nature
of heat).
The independence, or autonomy, that TD has from the underlying constitution of
matter is an epistemological independence. It did not matter that we did not know
about the nature of matter (particles, fluids, fields?) which is hardly surprising given
the ‘black box’ approach of TD. This is why it is frequently said that the ideas of TD
apply to quantum systems, classical systems — and even black holes. (As such, the
concepts are variably realised across these different domains).
In addition to explaining the autonomy of thermodynamics, this functional role
understanding of thermodynamics also sheds light on controversies about the scope
of thermodynamics. Thermodynamics is claimed to be a substrate-neutral theory
(Rosenberg, 2008, p. 197), and this sometimes leads to the thought that its domain
of applicability should thus be unrestricted; insofar as TD does not depend on the
constitution of the system at hand, it should apply to all systems. This is the intuition
behind the claim that thermodynamics is a universal theory, cf. inter alia Planck (1926),
Eddington (1928), Atkins (2007).
But the functional nature of thermodynamic concepts puts pressure on this idea.
Just because the theory is substrate-neutral doesn’t mean that it is universal. Whilst
TD is independent of the details of the constitution of the system, the system must
nonetheless obey certain constraints — such as having equilibrium states — in order
for thermodynamics to be applicable to these systems. Thus, its domain of applicability
is restricted, not universal: as I discuss in Chapter 4. 1
Yet when we are searching for SM realiser, the nature of matter does matter. As
1Black hole thermodynamics delivers on the state-space of thermodynamics. For example, the no
hair theorems show that black holes can be characterised by a few parameters. But beyond that lies
controversy. For instance, there is controversy over whether surface gravity fulfils the temperature
role (cf. Dougherty and Callender (2016), Wallace (2017, 2018)). And others, e.g. Prunkl and Timpson
(2018), argue that black holes do behave like thermodynamic objects — they can undergo Carnot
cycles — and so are bona fide thermal objects. From the functionalist perspective described here, that
Black Holes behave in the right way is all you can ask.
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discussed above, one theme of this chapter will be that sometimes it is a lot easier to
find the realiser or image of certain parts of TD in QSM, rather than CSM. It matters
that the world is quantum, not classical. And thus this is a sense in which the nature of
matter matters for TD. Indeed, this is unsurprising, since no higher-level regularities
are independent of/autonomous from the quantum nature of matter: were the world
not quantum, matter would not be stable. Thus, TD floats free from the micro-details —
but not completely.
There is another sense in which TD doesn’t float entirely free: its scope is constrained
by the lower level. Above we saw that limits to the scope of TD are imposed internally
by the theory. But limits to a higher-level theory’s scope can be imposed by its lower-
level realiser (or in more common jargon, by its reductive base). Indeed this is one way
in which the lower-level theory is helpful: it can be used (as an additional source than
experimental information) as a way of determining the scope of the higher-level theory.
(Note that the same is true of SM and CM — the CM considerations of Chapter 3 show
that there will be situations where the SM equations do not apply).
One might think that SM corrects TD in certain respects and so in this way SM con-
strains TD. And the lower level can be a source of information — and improvement.
There is no denying that SM has the upper hand in many respects: it describes fluctua-
tion phenomena and transport times and derives equations of state from first principles
(as opposed to the empirical generalisations and phenomenological equations of state
of TD). These are sources of information. We don’t want to make the mistake of putting
the older – if conceptually cleaner – theory on a pedestal. But whether this is the case is
a source of controversy which depends on the conceptual priority of one over the other
(cf. Chapter 1 and 4).
In chapter 1, I suggested that one level of description, such as psychology, is au-
tonomous from another, such as physics, insofar as the two levels have a different
subject matters. Indeed, we will see that throughout this chapter I have had to work
hard to make TD and SM be ‘answering the same question’, i.e. describing the same
situations and phenomena. As we will see in part I, each theory naturally describes
different situations (SM describes: the spontaneous approach to equilibrium, the value
of macroscopic quantities at equilibrium, TD describes: how quantities at equilibrium
change under external interventions) suggests that they have — to a small extent —
different subject matters and hence it is to be expected that TD is slightly autonomous
from SM.
2.1.3 Prospectus
This Chapter consists of five parts:
• In part I, I outline thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.
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• In part II, I consider the Zeroth Law.
• In part III, I consider the First Law.
• In part IV, I consider the Second Law.
• In part V, I briefly consider the Third Law, and then conclude.
Part I. Thermodynamics in general
In this Part, I describe the lay of the land according to thermodynamics and statisti-
cal mechanics, and set out the required preliminaries for what follows in the rest of
this Chapter. In Section 2.2, I outline the state-space of thermodynamics: the space of
equilibrium states parametrised by a few macrovariables. In Section 2.3, I tackle the con-
troversial question about how we should understand curves through this state-space,
and thermodynamic processes more generally. Because of the nature of equilibrium
states, TD processes proceed by external interventions on the system, which in Section
2.4 I discuss in depth. Finally, in Section 2.5, I consider whether such interventions
mark TD as worryingly different from other scientific theories. In particular, I consider
whether TD is anthropocentric in the way that Bridgman (1943) argues. Then, in Section
2.6, I briefly outline the key concepts in statistical mechanics required for what follows.
2.2 Equilibrium state-space
The state-space of thermodynamics is the space of equilibrium states, parametrised by
two or more macrovariables. I will call this state-space, Ξ. For a gas, the points of Ξ
can be labelled by pressure and volume (p, V); for a film, they are labelled by surface
tension and area; for a magnet, magnetic field and magnetization; and for a dielectric,
electric field and polarization (e.g. Tong (2012, §4)).
Thermodynamic equilibrium states are states in which the macrovariables no longer
vary in time: the system (as described by thermodynamics) will sit there indefinitely.
Of course, the absolute nature of thermodynamic equilibrium is an idealisation.2 Nev-
ertheless, the key point is that we get away with treating a system as if it were in
thermodynamic, i.e. absolute, equilibrium (at least: for the cases where TD is empiri-
cally successful.)
2Many features of the theories underpinning TD suggest that a system won’t stay in equilibrium
forever. For example, Poincaré recurrence suggests that systems will eventually return to earlier states.
Furthermore, to take an example from (Wallace, 2015b, ft. 1): hydrogen and oxygen may seem to be
in equilibrium with one another, but if you strike a match, we see the system change dramatically:
that equilibrium, also, wasn’t forever.
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Equilibrium is at the heart of thermodynamics, and it is a presupposition of the
theory that systems will end up in equilibrium. That systems will reach such an unique
equilibrium state has been dubbed the ‘minus first law’ of thermodynamics (Brown
and Uffink, 2001) — systems will spontaneously reach an equilibrium state, which then,
by definition, will not change.
Figure 2.1: The equilibrium state-space Ξ appropriate for an ideal gas. The co-ordinates
(P1, V1) label point x1 and (P2, V2) label point x2.
Figure 2.2: A curve through the above equilibrium state-space Ξ.
2.3 Dynamics
Having outlined the state-space of TD, we now need to consider the ‘dynamics’ in
‘thermodynamics’. Usually, the evolution of a physical system is determined by the
theory’s equations of motion and its evolution can be represented by a curve through
state-space parametrised by time. But this familiar situation is alien to thermodynamics.
TD is not a dynamical theory. Indeed, one might think that ‘thermostatics’ would
be a more appropriate name. There are no equations of motion and no explicit time
parameter. Furthermore, its hard to see how a curve in an equilibrium state-space could
represent any dynamical process; and hard to see which direction this process would
occur.
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Not only is it unclear how to interpret these curves as ‘processes’: Norton (2016) goes
further and claims that they are paradoxical. He emphasises that the term ‘equilibrium
process’ is oxymoronic: if equilibrium is understood to mean ‘a state in which nothing
changes’ then by definition it contradicts a ‘process’ - whose meaning is that something
changes; cf. also Lavis (2017) and Valente (2018). In this Section I first describe how
we must conceptualise change in TD: viz. as interventions.3 I then motivate why we
must tackle the ‘paradoxical’ issue of equilibrium curves, before outlining my preferred
position on the debate.
By the very definition of an equilibrium state, once a system reaches such a state
(and so is represented by a point x1 : (p1, V1) such as in Figure 2.1), it will remain there
indefinitely — it cannot spontaneously move to another state labelled x2 : (p2, V2).
Thus, for any change or process to occur, there must be an intervention on the system.
Its external parameters, such as its volume, must be altered: e.g. by inserting a piston.
This point is emphasised by Wallace: “[Thermodynamics] is not in the business of
telling us how those equilibrium states evolve if left to themselves, except in the trivial
sense that they do not evolve at all: that is what equilibrium means, after all. When the
states of thermodynamical systems change, it is because we do things to them: we put
them in thermal contact with other systems, we insert or remove partitions, we squeeze
or stretch or shake or stir them. And the laws of thermodynamics are not dynamical
laws like Newton’s: they concern what we can and cannot bring about through these
various interventions” (Wallace, 2014, p. 1).
But if such an intervention knocks the system out of equilibrium, then its state is
no longer represented in TD state-space, Ξ. However, the Minus First Law of TD says
that once the external parameter is no longer changing, the system will return to a —
perhaps, new — equilibrium state.
To illustrate this, consider the following example: the Joule free expansion of a gas.
The system is initially in equilibrium state x1. The partition is removed and the gas
rapidly expands in an uncontrolled manner. After some short time, the gas settles down
to a new equilibrium state, x2, with a larger volume. Only the initial and final states
of this process are represented in Ξ: thermodynamics is silent on what happens away
from equilibrium. Figure 2.1, but not Figure 2.2, represents the Joule expansion.
Considering a curve through the equilibrium state-space Ξ raises issues. Figure 2.2
shows an undirected, continuous curve from point x1 to point x2. How can such a
set of points represent any process? Any intervention will knock the system out of
equilibrium — indeed, this is required for anything to happen. And we can’t just ignore
this problem. Although many processes in TD will be like the Joule free expansion
3Whilst Norton has recently brought this issue to the attention of the philosophical community, others
have also pointed out the problem: for example, Cooper (1967, p. 174) says these processes are
‘either a contradiction in terms or limits of processes through non-equilibrium states which cannot be
described in terms of equilibrium theory” as cited in Lavis (2017, p. 3).
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(i.e. will not be represented by such curves), much of thermodynamics will involve
examining curves through Ξ. In particular, a common strategy is to integrate the small
changes in parameters such as p, V along such curves to find new thermodynamic
quantities, especially ones which are path-independent. This will allow us to talk of the
changes in the values of these quantities even in processes such as the Joule expansion
— which involves the non-equilibrium goings-on of which TD is silent.
So let us face ‘the fog of paradox’ as Norton calls it. My ‘defogging’ strategy is to
outline what I take to be the common thread to the three main recent papers on this
controversy: Valente (2018); Norton (2016); Lavis (2017), who openly admit that there is
not a vast difference between their resolutions.4
First, all agree no actual system will trace out the curve spontaneously. Hence,
Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa called these curves ‘quasi-processes’ to emphasise that
they are unphysical, mathematical constructs (Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, 1925, 1956). But
the orthodoxy is that we can make very small interventions to external parameters,
and the system will then arrive at a new, neighbouring equilibrium state and thus
proceed stepwise along a curve, without ever being ‘too far’ from equilibrium. These
small interventions are iterated, and so the system is nudged along the curve. This
is Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa’s concept of iterated equilibria (Valente, 2018, p. 17). The
intervention takes the system away from the equilibrium, but then (due to the Minus
First Law) it will return. The key idea is the deviation from equilibrium will scale with
the size of the intervention. By iterating many small interventions, the system will go
through a sequence of points on the curve (though not all of them). By performing
more and more, smaller and smaller interventions, the system will ‘stop off’ at more
of these points on its route from x1 to x2. This is embodied in Lavis’ “Hypothesis of
Cause and Effect: that in most situations as the manipulations of the control variables
are weakened to zero, the deviation of the state from equilibrium during the ensuing
process also approaches zero” (Lavis, 2017, p. 5).5
But we now face a problem: Norton (2016, p. 43-44) writes “Incantations of ‘infinitely
slow’,‘insensible’ and ‘infinitesimal’ have no magical powers that overturn the law of
the excluded middle. Either a system is in equilibrium or it is not; it cannot be both.”
There are two questions: 1) how far is ‘not too far’? 2) The orthodoxy is that intervening
‘gently’ or ‘slowly enough’ will ensure this closeness to equilibrium — but why should
‘going slow’ help?
4For example: “Granted, the two proposals do not seem to differ too much from each other. But it
is worth to noticing that the basic intuition underlying Norton’s attempt to solve the paradox was
already contained in the original work by Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa on the foundations of thermody-
namics” (Valente, 2018, p. 17), and “the work of this paper has similarities with that of Norton (2016)”
(Lavis, 2017, p. 2).
5This requires that the system is thermally stable – a property that is not ubiquitous – and will be
discussed in Chapter 4. An obvious counterexample, as Lavis points out, is phase transitions, where
a small change in an intensive variable leads to a big change in others.
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1) There is an undesirable vagueness in the claim that the system is not ‘too far’
from equilibrium. How far is too far? There is no satisfying answer to this question.
As Valente notes, it is hard to make this precise: we can’t appeal to a topology over
non-equilibrium states to say that they are close enough to equilibrium, since they are
not described by TD). Instead –as is so often the case with approximations– whether
the system is ‘close enough’ is an empirical matter. Indeed, this is how Afanassjewa-
Ehrenfest discussed the issue: we need an “empirically grounded concept of ‘close
enough to equilibrium’ ” (Valente, 2018, p. 17).
2) Why is it assumed that performing the interventions slowly enough will help the
system stay close to equilibrium? Equilibrium requires that the macroparameters are
not changing in time. The idea is that by perturbing the system slowly — e.g. inserting
the piston slowly — the macroparameters will not be changing very quickly in time,
and so the system will not be too far from equilibrium. But how should we evaluate
‘fast’? Fast compared to what? There is no global, nor a priori answer, but to give a
rough idea: in the case of the ‘slow insertion’ of the piston to intervene on the volume,
the time taken to make a small change (the next ‘hop’ in the iterated equilibrium)
should be long compared to the timescale over which the molecules bounce between
the piston and the wall.
Such slow processes are called ‘quasi-static’. So the picture thus far is that small
interventions push the system along the curve in one direction. (A distinct intervention
is required to travel in the opposite direction: e.g. removing rather than inserting
a partition). The idea is that as the interventions get gentler, the deviations from
equilibrium get smaller. Thus, the curve in Ξ, ‘the equilibrium process’, is a limit of set
of non-equilibrium processes. But clearly the curve represents no process involving
change. In the limit where the change to the external parameter is zero, the system
remains in its original equilibrium state, and does not change. Hence this curve is a
‘quasi-process’.
We have a succession of smaller manipulations leading to a succession of smaller
deviations from equilibrium. But, as Lavis (2017, p. 6) says “the limit of this succession
does not exist... there is no model of thermodynamics which includes the possibility of
manipulation of the controls to propel the system along [the curve]. Rather [the curve]
‘delimits’ or is the ‘common frontier’ of the set of all sequences of processes” which
take the system from x1 to x2 — via non-equilibrium states. These processes can be
considered to be approximations. Thus, the term ‘quasi-static’ properly denotes a set of
processes, whose sequence heads in the direction of the common frontier, but never
meets it.6
The bare curve can become a directed curve — the curve can be traversed in either
direction, but different interventions will of course be required for each direction. To
6Norton and Lavis emphasis that Duhem (1902, p. 78) has a similar approach.
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go in one direction pistons must be inserted, and in the other direction they must be
removed. Thus there is a set of processes whose sequence heads towards the common
frontier, for x1 to x2, but a distinct set of processes for x2 to x1.
Because the curve can be transversed in either direction, there is a sense in which it
is ‘reversible’. But as will be discussed in Part IV on the Second Law, there are many
concepts of reversibility in thermal physics. The relevant concept here is ‘quasi-static’:
I will refer to these curves as (approximately) representing a quasi-static processes.
In the special case of changing external parameters such as p or V, this is a helpful
concept of reversibility. But, more generally, being quasi-static is a necessary but not
sufficient as a condition on reversibility. For example, discharge of a condenser through
high resistance can be forced to happen very slowly, but nonetheless it is clearly not a
reversible process (Uffink, 2013, p. 277) .
2.4 Thermodynamics as control theory: Interventions
In the previous Section, I argued that the state of the system will only change when we
perform certain interventions on it, e.g. inserting a partition, squeezing with a piston,
placing the system in thermal contact with another, or with a heat bath... etc. For this
reason, thermodynamics has been described as a control theory (Wallace, 2014). In this
Section, I explains what this means.
Wallace uses the terminology ‘control theory’, and similar themes run throughout
the foundational literature. Myrvold (2011) discusses Maxwell’s means-relative view of
thermodynamics, whereby certain quantities are defined relative to an agent’s means.
Lavis (2017) discusses a similar control theory view, but in terms of adiabatic accessibil-
ity. In the context of quantum theory, ‘resource’ theory views of thermodynamics are
popular (Horodecki and Oppenheim, 2013b).
I believe that these foundational views bring out what is already implicit in traditional
presentations of thermodynamics. Traditionally, we discuss removing a partition, or
inserting a piston, or slowly varying a magnetic field. These are interventions on
the system by external systems (that need not be agents in any thick sense). These
interventions alter external parameters such as volume, or magnetisation — variables
that would otherwise be unchanging for a system in thermal equilibrium. Hence, “all
transitions between states, called processes, are the result of an outside intervention
using a set of control variables” (Lavis, 2017, p. 1).
This leads us to two important points concerning ‘isolation’ in TD. 1) Because external
systems are required in order to make interventions on the system under study, TD
seems different than some other physical theories, which describe isolated systems.
There must always be something else external to the system under study in order to
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implement these interventions. This ‘something’ need not be an agent, but merely some
other set of degrees of freedom (DOFs), which we can call the ‘controlling system’.
Clearly there is a range of interventions that could be performed. The system could
be flipped upside down, shaken, stirred, or sent into outer space — but presumably not
at a speed faster than light. There is a question about which interventions are possible
and this will be tackled in Part IV on the Second Law. For now it suffices to note that
the interventions we consider come in two types: isothermal and adiabatic. Spelling
out this distinction brings us back to considering ‘isolation’.
2) There is important kind of isolation particular to TD: thermal isolation. If a system
is thermally isolated, it cannot exchange heat with its environment or any external
system. Interventions on a thermally isolated system are called adiabatic.
In contrast, the system is not thermally isolated if it is in thermal contact with a heat
bath. The heat bath is an object idealised to be so large that no matter how much energy
(in the form of heat) flows to or from the system, the temperature of the heat bath
remains the same. Such a heat bath can be used to make interventions on the system,
whilst keeping the system’s temperature fixed. Such interventions are called isothermal.
To sum up: that thermodynamics can be described as a control theory sets it apart
from other physical theories which describe the space of possible states of a system
and the system’s spontaneous trajectory through that space, which is represented by
a curve in that space. In the next Section, I consider whether these issues render TD
‘anthropocentric’.
2.5 Interventions and anthropocentrism
The presence of manipulations or interventions in thermodynamics seems suspiciously
different from the rest of our physical theories. The trajectory through phase space of
a bouncing ball, or the worldline of a particle, makes no reference to which manipu-
lations and interventions can be performed on the system. Hence, one might think
these interventions are suspicious - and anthropocentric because we insert pistons and
partitions.
Indeed, Bridgman (1943) emphasises this unusual nature of TD: he writes “[...]
thermodynamics smells more of its human origin than other branches of physics — the
manipulator is usually present in the argument, as in the conventional formulations of
the first and second laws in terms of what a manipulator can or cannot do” (Bridgman,
1943, p. 214).
Does this ‘interventions are essential’ view make thermodynamics anthropocentric? I
will argue: no. But, before doing so, does this question have ramifications for reduction?
Myrvold (2011) suggests yes: if TD is anthropocentric then SM must be too.
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Regardless, interventions need not be considered suspiciously anthropocentric. If
you shift your focus, and the relevant comparison class, away from fundamental
physics to other scientific theories, then the suspicion fades. In organic chemistry,
we are concerned with questions such as which reactants form which products, and
under what conditions particular yields are obtained. Interventions abound. Different
chemicals are mixed, heated, titrated. No one is remotely worried that this, and
countless other interventions that are invoked by the theories in the special sciences, is
a (problematic!) anthropocentrism. Thus, I claim: in physics, the presence of another
comparison class — fundamental theories with spontaneous dynamics that we take
to be descriptions of the whole universe — makes ‘intervention’ seems suspicious.
But once we see that TD is more akin to a special science like chemistry rather than a
fundamental theory, suspicion fades.
2.6 Statistical mechanics construed
Statistical mechanics (SM) differs from other theories considered by philosophers of
physics. Unlike quantum theory or general relativity, there are few uncontroversial
axioms.7 Instead, the situation is considerably messier: there are many different
frameworks and schools in SM.
The discipline of SM is split into two parts: equilibrium and non-equilibrium statisti-
cal mechanics. Most of the foundational controversy centres around (a) non-equilibrium
SM and the approach to equilibrium it describes and (b) the Boltzmannian vs. the Gibb-
sian approaches to SM.
In Section 2.6.1, I discuss why I am sympathetic to a Gibbsian approach to SM. Proba-
bilities feature heavily in SM, so in Section 2.6.2 I briefly outline how probability enters
both classical SM and quantum SM — and suggest that an objective understanding of
probability in SM is, at the very least, plausible. Finally, in Section 2.6.3, I discuss the
workhorse of SM in practice: and the connection to the two main conceptual problems
of SM: (i) probabilities and (ii) time-asymmetry.
I cannot hope to do justice to the multitude of approaches: so here I outline the main
contours of the debate, but much of the content of this Section will be admitting what I
7Uffink writes “In the foundations of quantum mechanics, one may start from the von Neumann
axioms, and disregard the preceding “old” quantum theory. Statistical physics, however, has not yet
developed a set of generally accepted formal axioms, and consequently we have no choice but to
dwell on its history. This is not because attempts to chart the foundations of statistical physics have
been absent, or scarce (e.g. Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1912, ter Haar 1955, Penrose 1979,
Sklar 1993, Emch and Liu 2001). Rather, the picture that emerges from such studies is that statistical
physics has developed into a number of different schools, each with its own programme and technical
apparatus. Unlike quantum theory or relativity, this field lacks a common set of assumptions that is
accepted by most of the participants; although there is, of course, overlap” (Uffink, 2006a, p. 4).
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will not discuss.8
2.6.1 Gibbs vs. Boltzmann
The two main approaches to SM take the two key figures — Gibbs and Boltzmann
— as their labels and inspiration.9 The main difference between the Gibbsian and
Boltzmannian approaches is that the former characterises equilibrium and entropy in
terms of a probability distribution over the possible microstates of the systems, whereas
the latter characterises equilibrium and entropy in terms of the microstates directly. The
consensus — insofar as there is one — is schizophrenic: the Gibbsian formalism is the
technical workhorse but the Boltzmannian approach is preferable when considering
conceptual problems.
However, in this thesis I will take a broadly Gibbsian approach. As this is a minority
view in the philosophy of physics,10 I first give one positive reason for working with
a Gibbsian perspective and then defuse one objection to this perspective, following
Wallace (2013b).
The positive reason for adopting a Gibbsian framework is that this, rather than the
Boltzmann framework, is the one that practicing physicists use. Thus, it is important
that we make sense of the workhorse approach, rather than hiding in the conceptual
niceties of an approach that does not solve so many practical problems.
Now, to defuse an objection to the Gibbsian view. The Neo-Boltzmannian approach —
advocated, inter alia, by Albert (2000), Callender (2001), Price (1996), Goldstein (2001),
Lebowitz (2007) — is motivated by rejecting the ignorance-based understanding of
probabilities in SM, especially that espoused by Jaynes (1957). Albert rhetorically asks:
“Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary...that the particles that
make up the material world must arrange themselves in accord with what we know,
with what we happen to have looked into? Can anybody seriously think that our merely
being ignorant of the exact microconditions of thermodynamic systems plays some
part in bringing it about, in making it the case, that (say) milk dissolves in coffee?” (Albert,
2000, p. 64), emphasis in original.
As a consequence, some neo-Boltzmannians, such as Goldstein (2001), aim to replace
the probabilistic notions in SM with the concept of ‘typicality’. But I reject this project
and its motivation for two reasons: (1) I do not think that we can get away from
probabilities in SM. Insofar as the intention of the ‘typicality’ approach of Goldstein
et al. is to eliminate probabilistic concepts from SM, I believe this to be a misguided
8See Frigg (2010) for a state-of-the-art overview.
9Here I am only engaging with the contemporary debate, so following Wallace (2013b) I take an
ahistorical approach. For the history of the development of statistical mechanics, see Brush (1976).
For a historically informed approach to the conceptual issues, see Uffink (2006a).
10Other philosophical advocates of Gibbsian approach include: Wallace (2016), Maroney (2007), Prunkl
(2018).
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enterprise, since probability is required to capture fluctuation phenomena; cf. Wallace
(2015a).
(2) We need not interpret the Gibbsian framework in a Jaynesian manner: that is, as
being connected to our ignorance. Thus, whilst I agree that there is work to be done
making sense of the Jaynesian approach (cf. Wallace (2013a)), this need not block taking
a Gibbsian approach to SM. Wallace (2013b) helpfully summarises the situation as
follows: neo-Boltzmannians object to a certain justification of the Gibbsian formalism,
but that should not be confused with the formalism itself, which can be given a perfectly
objective justification.
Once the Gibbsian framework is shorn of its Jaynesian justification and the Boltz-
mannian approach embraces probabilities, the two frameworks are not so far from one
another. Indeed, Wallace (2013b, p. 2) claims that the formalism of the Boltzmannians is
a special case of the Gibbsian framework. Furthermore, in an Appendix (Section 2.34), I
show how the Boltzmann and Gibbs entropies are interderivable from one another.
I cannot go into further detail about the Gibbs vs. Boltzmann debate, but here is one
final reassurance: whilst I will take a broadly Gibbsian approach, the success of my
project does not depend on rejecting of the Boltzmannian project. Here functionalism
helps: the concepts of TD can have different realisers in different theories. So if my
hunch that the Boltzmannian and Gibbsian approaches are not far from one another
is wrong, and the two approaches are different theories, this need not undermine my
project here.
2.6.2 Introducing probability
I claimed that probabilities cannot be easily, or more importantly usefully, eliminated
from SM. Indeed, as we will see in Section 2.6.3, probability distributions are central to
the SM enterprise. Understanding and giving a comprehensive account of probability
in SM is a large task. In this Section I briefly describe how probability comes into SM
(in both the classical and quantum case) and I motivate why I think it is plausible that
probability in SM is objective — which is all I will need for the rest of this thesis.
In classical microdynamics, the state of the system is represented by a point in phase
space, Γ, which encodes the positions and momenta of the components of the system.
(So for a system consisting of N point particles, the dimension of this space is 6N).
But in statistical mechanics, “the mathematical object representing the state of the
system is no longer a point in phase space, but rather a collection of points, each one
being weighted by a certain number” (Balescu, 2005, p. 23). A probability density
function over this phase space is a function to the real numbers in the interval [0,1]
from the phase space: ρ : Γ→ R. Integrating this function ρ over the phase space will
give 1. Thus there is a weight assigned to each possible state of the system. This is
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naturally given an epistemic interpretation: the system is definitely in one (and only
one) of the possible states, but we don’t know which. But we do know that some are
more likely than others and ρ quantifies this. Often this probability distribution is given
a frequentist flavour by considering an infinite number of copies of the system as an
ensemble.11 The proportion of the ensemble in a given state corresponds to the weight,
i.e. probability, of that state.
Whilst I said that this probability distribution is naturally given an epistemic interpre-
tation in the classical case, this is perfectly compatible with the probability distribution
being objective (as argued by Myrvold (2012)). Even though the fundamental level
is deterministic, this is compatible with higher-level emergent chances, as we saw in
Chapter 1 (cf. List and Pivato (2015), Butterfield (2012)). Even if one doesn’t think
these probabilities are deserving of the name ‘chance’12, they can be considered to be
‘objectified credences’ using the method of arbitrary functions, and other technical work
in the foundations of probability, inter alia Skyrms (1977), Lewis (1986c), Butterfield
(2011b).
Furthermore, there is reason to think that probabilistic assumptions are dynamically
motivated, and so not chosen at random or in accordance with our ignorance. The
entry point for probability is the microcanonical ensemble. (Henceforth, I use the terms
probability distribution and ensemble interchangeably). The microcanonical ensemble
assigns an equal weight to each possible state of system, under the constraint that the
energy of the system is fixed: so it is confined to an energy hypersurface in the phase
space, Γ. The assumption that the system is equally likely is to be in any microstate
that is compatible with macroscopic constraints (such as fixed energy) is so central to
SM that it is called the ‘fundamental assumption’ of SM (Blundell and Blundell (2009),
Tong (2012)).
But this fundamental assumption need not be motivated by a principle of indiffer-
ence, or sufficient reason. As I will discuss in the next Section, in order to define the
microcanonical ensemble when there are continuously many possible microstates, we
require the Lebesque measure which assigns a volume, and so a probability, to a region
of phase space. There are many different measures that one could assign to the phase
space, but the measure used in SM is dynamically motivated: the volumes assigned
by this measure are invariant under the Hamiltonian flow. Thus, the way probabilities
enter SM is not through our ignorance, but through dynamical considerations.
Accordingly, I think that probability can be considered to be objective in SM. However,
one might worry that probability is nevertheless a new conceptual ingredient — and
11I think that much of the mystery-mongering about an ‘imaginary infinite ensemble’ is deflated by
considering this frequentist reading. The real issue is not the ‘ensemble’, but connecting this to the
outcomes of experiments via Gibbs phase averaging as discussed by, e.g. Malament and Zabell (1980).
12Some want to reserve the name chance for truly ‘ontic’, irreducible or fundamental probabilities:
meaning by this probability stemming from indeterminism at the ‘fundamental level’.
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historically, this has been considered to be a problem for reduction. But moving from the
classical case to the quantum case removes this worry. Probability is already inherent in
the underlying quantum mechanics: it is not an additional ingredient. This is because
the state of the system in quantum mechanics is not represented by a point in phase
space but by a density matrix ρˆ, (Baierlein, 1971, Ch. 12). As Wallace (2016) points out,
a probability distribution over the fundamental microstates of QM, density matrices ρˆ...
is just another density matrix! Thus, Wallace holds that probabilities in SM stem from
probabilities in QM — a position to which I am sympathetic. Note that this consolidates
the problem of understanding probabilities in SM into interpreting probability in QM:
thus, there is no sui generis problem of probability in QSM.
Furthermore, moving to the quantum case influences the Gibbs vs. Boltzmannian
debate in favour of the Gibbsian for two reasons. (1) One of the neo-Boltzmannian
objections to the Gibbsian framework is that entropy is a property of the ensemble, i.e.
probability distribution, rather than a property of the individual system (Callender,
2001). But in QSM, entropy is once again a property of the system, since the density
matrix is used as the fundamental description of the system. (Admittedly, there are
issues, related to the measurement problem, about understanding the density matrix ρ).
(2) The Boltzmann entropy is considerably less useful than the Gibbs entropy in the
quantum case, since it merely corresponds to the dimensionality of the Hilbert space
assigned to the system (Prunkl (2018), A. Greven (2014)).
I cannot go into the problem of probability in SM any further than this. This is
regrettable, since it is one of the two main problems in SM, and is a problem worthy of a
whole thesis. But, all I need for future chapters is that the probability can be considered
objective.
2.6.3 The Workhorse
I now describe the workhorse of SM. Earlier I claimed that probability enters through
the microcanonical ensemble. In the microcanonical ensemble, each microstate |n〉 is
equally likely and is assigned the probably ρmc(n) = 1Ω , where Ω is the total number
of microstates. But this assumes that there are a finite number of possible microstates,
and in CM, where q and p have continuous values, there are an infinite number of
possible microstates. To accommodate this, we can talk of volumes of regions of the
phase space Γ: vol(R) =
∫
R d
nqdn p, where dnqdn p is known as the Lebseque measure.
Thus far, we have only used the resources of multivariable calculus. The substantive
move is interpreting this measure of the volume as the probability that the system is in
a microstate within that volume, R.
prob(R) =
vol(R)
vol(total relevant subvolume of Γ)
(2.1)
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The probability of the total relevant subvolume of Γ that the system is constrained to
is normalised to 1: the probability that the system has a microstate within this volume
is 1.13 Of course, the volume of the entire phase space may be infinite. But physical
constraints on the system’s state will mean that not all of the phase space will be
relevant. In particular, in the microcanonical ensemble, the total energy of the system is
fixed and so, the system is confined to an energy hypersurface. For the usual case of a
system ‘in a box’ the qs are bounded and the fixed total energy means that the ps are
bounded, so that the vol(hypersurface E = k) ≤ ∞.
If we then take the system to be exchanging energy with another system (the ‘heat
bath’), and make natural assumptions about the possible microstates of the joint sys-
tem, we can deduce the canonical ensemble for the states of the given system. (The
connection between the microcanonical and canonical ensemble will be discussed in
more detail in Part III on the Zeroth law).
In the case of the canonical ensemble, the energy of the system is no longer fixed.
A weight e−βEn is assigned to each microstate n that has energy En, where β is the
Boltzmann factor 1kBT . In order that this can be interpreted as a probability, it must
be normalised. To do this, we divide by the sum of the weights of every possible
microstate, Z = Σne−βEn . Z is known as the partition function. Thus, the canonical
ensemble ρcan is defined as follows:
ρcan =
e−βEn
Z
. (2.2)
The canonical ensemble, like the microcanonical and grand canonical ensemble14,
has the special property that:
∂ρcan
∂t
= 0. (2.3)
Because this probability distribution is unchanging in time, the canonical ensemble
represents thermal equilibrium.15
The discipline of statistical mechanics splits into two parts. The first half is equilibrium
statistical mechanics. Once we have the partition function Z we can easily find many
macroscopic quantities, mainly by taking derivatives. For example, the free energy
F = −kBTlnZ, and the average energy 〈E〉 = − ∂∂β lnZ. Balescu says that the partition
13Whilst Liouville’s theorem tells us that the volume of 6N region is invariant under the Hamiltonian
flow, a (6N − 1)-dimensional region (i.e. a region on the energy hypersurface like we consider in the
microcanonical ensemble) will only have this property if the volume is scaled by 1∇H . See Thompson
(1972) for more mathematical details.
14I will not discuss the grand canonical ensemble in this thesis, but for completeness: it is the ensemble
where the particle number is no longer fixed.
15Here I am endorsing an explicitly Gibbsian perspective, but note that Werndl, a defender of a Boltz-
mannian approach, claims that the canonical ensemble is so central to SM that it cannot belong to
either camp (personal correspondence).
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function ”contains the complete solution to the problem of equilibrium statistical
mechanics. There exists, unfortunately, no such “magical” formula for non equilibrium
statistical mechanics.” (Balescu, 1997, p. 31). Non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is
concerned with establishing how and under what conditions the system will reach
equilibrium. If the system is initially not in the canonical (or microcanoncial, or grand
canonical) ensemble, how does it end up there? This is the more controversial part of
SM. Indeed, understanding the approach to equilibrium and the time-asymmetry it
brings with it, is the second main problem of statistical mechanics. Chapter 3 deals
with the approach to equilibrium in SM, but for now I leave the issue to one side.
2.7 The differing concerns of SM and TD
To sum up this part: equilibrium is central to TD; indeed its state-space Ξ is the space
of equilibrium states. Processes in thermodynamics require outside interventions on
the system: these interventions can be adiabatic or isothermal, and may proceed gently
enough so that the changes to the system’s state qualify as ‘quasi-static’. But the
concerns of SM are slightly different: equilibrium SM calculates features of the system,
using a probability distribution such as the canonical ensemble. Non-equilibrium SM
quantitatively describes the approach to equilibrium, which is a controversial topic.
TD, on the other hand, just assumes that systems will reach equilibrium: and this is
embodied in the Minus First Law. These ‘non-equilibrium’ issues will mostly be left
aside until Chapter 3. But here I conclude by noting that the concerns, and so subject
matters, of TD and SM are slightly different.
Part II. The Zeroth Law
Having outlined the general thesis that TD describes functional role properties, I now
outline the functional role of temperature, T. Following Tong (2012, Ch. 4), I show in
Section 2.8 how temperature is implicitly defined by the Zeroth law. That is, the Zeroth
law is a rich enough body of information to fix that there must exist some quantity,
temperature. Then, in Section 2.9, I discuss the quantity that plays this role in statistical
mechanics. Next in Section 2.10, I outline Batterman’s interpretation of Gibbs’ objection
(to the identification of thermodynamic and statistical mechanical quantities) and offer
a reply. In Section 2.11, I then connect my discussion to the popular example of mean
kinetic energy 〈K〉, and explain why, in general, temperature cannot be identified with
mean kinetic energy.
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2.8 Pure thermodynamics: the functional role of
temperature
Before I show how the Zeroth law implicitly defines T, I first recapitulate the required
notion of equilibrium discussed earlier. A thermodynamic description of a system
involves specifying a small number of macroparameters: in the paradigmatic case
of the ideal gas, the thermodynamic state of the system can be labelled by pressure
and volume, (p, V). This means that all other macroparameters are functions of p and
V: where the details of the function (also known as the equation of state) depends
on the type of system. A system is said to be at thermodynamic equilibrium when its
macro-parameters no longer vary in time. To see if two systems are in equilibrium with
one another, we just need to put them in thermal contact with one another, and see if
their states change. If they do not, then they are in equilibrium with one another. The
Zeroth law of TD is:
The Zeroth Law: If two systems A and B are each in equilibrium with a third
system C, then A and B are also in equilibrium with each other.
Now we can see how this implicitly defines temperature. Assume that we have three
systems A, B and C whose states are labelled by (pA, VA), (pB, VB) and (pC, VC) respec-
tively. Then equilibrium between A and C requires some special relationship between
the values of the different quantities defining the states of A and C, (pA, VA), (pC, VC).
Thus if we choose pA, VA, pC then the value VC of the volume of C is such that when A
and C are put in thermal contact, nothing happens. We can write this constraint as:
If A and C are in equilibrium then:
FAC(pA, VA; pC, VC) = 0, (2.4)
which can be solved to give:
VC = fAC(pA, VA; pC). (2.5)
And likewise, if B is in equilibrium with C:
VC = fBC(pB, VB; pC) (2.6)
So the two expressions for VC give:
fAC(pA, VA; pC) = fBC(pB, VB; pC). (2.7)
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Now we invoke the Zeroth law: if A and B are each in equilibrium with C, then A
and B are in equilibrium with one another. Thus we have the constraint:
FAB(pA, VA; pB, VB) = 0. (2.8)
Equation 2.7 implies equation 2.8, but because equation 2.8 does not depend on
pC, this means that pC must appear in equation 2.7 in such a way that it can just be
cancelled out on each side of the equation. That is, there must be functions θA and θB
and f such that
θA(pA, VA). f (pC) = θB(pB, VB). f (pC). (2.9)
When this cancellation is done, we infer a relationship between the state of system A
(pA, VA), and the state of system B (pB, VB), viz.
θA(pA, VA) = θB(pB, VB). (2.10)
The value of the function θ(p, V) is the temperature T of the system.16 Note that the
above argument does tell us anything about the form of the function θ(p, V). (The
form of T is found through the Carnot cycle). It only tells us that the property of
temperature must exist. (The usual option at this point is to temporarily use the ideal
gas law, T = pVNkB as a reference system to act as a thermometer, which then later gets
generalised when we consider the Carnot cycle.)
Hence: temperature is a property that a system has such that if it is in equilibrium
with another system (which means nothing changes when they are put in thermal
contact) then they will have the same value of temperature.
A consequence of this account of temperature is that systems with very different
constitutions can be in equilibrium with one another, and so have the same temperature.
For instance: a photon gas, a magnet, an ideal gas and a lump of graphite can be in
mutual equilibrium, and thus share the same T. This supports the earlier claim that
thermodynamics lends itself to a functionalist interpretation: the above example clearly
fits with the functionalist intuition that functional commonality is more important than
the physical diversity.
2.9 The statistical mechanical realiser
Given that the 0th law implicitly defines the thermodynamic temperature TTD, we now
need to find the microphysical realiser in statistical mechanics that plays this role. The
16The function T = θ(p, V) is the equation of state of the system.
79
2 The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
answer is well-known: the quantity that will play this role — that is, have the same
value when two systems are in mutual equilibrium is ∂S∂E =
1
T , so T is
∂E
∂S .
That ∂E∂S plays the role of T can be seen as follows.
17
The Boltzmann entropy of a statistical mechanical system with energy E1 is:
S(E1) = −kBlnΩ(E1), (2.11)
where Ω(E1) is the number of microstates of the system. If two systems are non-
interacting the number of the available states of the joint system is Ω(E1).Ω(E2).
Now we assume that the systems can interact and exchange energy.18 The total
energy remains the same so,
Ω12(Etot) = ΣEiΩ(Ei).Ω(Etot − Ei) = ΣEi exp[
S(Ei)
kB
+
S(Etot − Ei)
kB
]. (2.12)
The joint system K1+2 has fixed total energy so can be thought of as being in the
microcanonical ensemble, where the probability of being in each state is equally likely,
p = 1Ω1+2 . (This is frequently called the ‘fundamental assumption of statistical mechan-
ics’). The entropy of the joint system is greater or equal to that of the sum of the two
original systems, because the states of the two original systems are a subset of the total
number of possible states:
S1+2(Etot) ≡ −kBlnΩ(Etot) ≥ S(E1) + S(E2). (2.13)
The equilibrium argument: If the number of particles is large, we can approximate
the entropy of the joint system S1+2(Etot) as follows. Entropy S is proportional to N
(S ∼ N), because the number of microstates is Ω ∼ eN, and entropy S is ∝ lnΩ.
As seen in equation (2.12), the number of microstates of the joint system is a sum
of exponentials proportional to S (and so N). But N is itself an exponentially large
number (N ∼ 1023). Such a sum (over the different values of the energy of system 1,
Ei) will be dominated by its maximum value E? for the following reason. If there is a
particular energy En such that the entropy S is twice as big for that term in the sum, so
e2N rather than eN , then it will be eN times bigger than all the other terms. As N ∼ 1023,
e10
23
is a lot bigger. Thus, this term will dominate the sum and we can approximate the
value of the entropy of the joint system by this term.
How do we find this term, the energy E? for which S1 + S2 is a maximum? It will be
17In what follows, I use the Boltzmann entropy for convenience, but an appendix (Section 2.34) shows
how the Boltzmannian entropy can be derived from the Gibbs entropy.
18One subtlety: we assume that the energy levels remain the same (i.e. the interaction Hamiltonian is
≈ 0). But we should note that the existence of the interaction Hamiltonian is crucial to allow the
exchange of the energy.
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a maximum when
∂S1(E?)
∂E
− ∂S2(Etot − E?)
∂E
= 0. (2.14)
As above, because this term is much bigger than the others, the entropy of the joint
system is approximated well by:
S1+2(Etot) ≈ S1(E?) + S2(Etot − E?) ≥ S1(E1) + S2(E2) (2.15)
Tong (2012, p. 7) says there is no a priori reason why system 1 should have a
fixed energy E? once it is in contact with system 2, but the large number of particles
involved mean its very likely to have the energy that maximises the total number of
states available to the joint system.19 Alternatively, we could appeal to Jaynes’ MaxEnt
principle, which states that systems will spontaneously reach a state of maximum SM
entropy subject to the constraints on the system, such as fixed total energy Tolman
(1938).
Why should we think that 1T =
∂S
∂E plays the role of temperature? Two systems have
the same temperature, T1=T2, if nothing happens when they are put in thermal contact
with one another. The above argument says that when two systems are put in contact
energy will be transferred from one to the other so that the entropy is maximised and
this happens when system 1 has E?. If two systems have equal temperatures, no energy
should flow (as this counts as a macroparameter changing and so shows they are not
in mutual equilibrium). And no energy will flow if the systems are already at the
maximum entropy value, i.e. if system 1 already has E? before thermal contact. This will
be the case provided that ∂S1(E1)∂E =
∂S2(E2)
∂E .
If temperature is defined to be ∂S∂E =
1
T , then if the two systems have the same tem-
perature, nothing will happen when they are put in thermal contact, as they are already
in mutual equilibrium. Thus ∂E∂S plays the same functional role as the thermodynamic
temperature and so is the SM realiser of the thermodynamic temperature.
2.10 Batterman’s reconstruction of Gibbs’ objection
I claim that T in TD is realised by ∂E∂S in SM as it plays the same role. But Gibbs
was reticent about claiming to have found the statistical mechanical correlates of
thermodynamic quantities, instead referring to them as analogues. Have I been too
bold? In this Section I outline Batterman’s reconstruction of Gibbs’ worry and offer a
different resolution to Batterman.
Batterman (2010) suggests that the plurality of candidates—i.e. the different ensem-
bles of SM—might be one reason for Gibbs’ reticence. Note that this is a plurality
19In the Boltzmannian framework, the combinatoric argument is used here.
81
2 The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
rather than multiple realisability; it is not that the same physical quantity is realised by
distinct lower-level states in distinct systems. Rather, there is more than one candidate
lower-level realiser for the same system; as such, the contention is that the plurality is a
collection of rivals.
The key idea is that the microcanonical and canonical ensembles are different prob-
ability distributions and because the SM entropy SSM = −kB
∫
ρlnρ depends on the
probability distribution ρ, SSM differs depending on the choice of ρ. Furthermore,
T appears as a parameters in the canonical ensemble, ρ = e−
Ei
kBT /Z. Thus, there is
seemingly a range of candidates for the statistical mechanical realisers. But are they
distinct?
Batterman argues that Gibbs was unnecessarily cautious. The different ensembles are
identical in the thermodynamic limit (i.e. the limit where the number of constituents
goes to infinity) — and so Batterman claims that the reduction occurs in this limit. The
equivalence of ensembles in this limit is meant to be evidence of a kind of ‘universal-
ity’: that is, that the “same thermodynamic phenomenology occurs regardless of the
thermodynamic details” (Batterman, 2010, p.168). Thus, according to Batterman, we
need not worry about the plurality of candidates: “The existence of the thermodynamic
limit, and the demonstration of the equivalence of ensembles, provides evidence that
the question of which ensemble quantity is really to be identified with thermodynamic
entropy, say, may not even be an important question to ask” (Batterman, 2010, p.178).
Whilst Batterman claims that which of the plurality of ensemble quantities is the
realiser of the thermodynamic quantities temperature and entropy is not an important
question to ask, it is an easy question to answer. Each ensemble is appropriate to a given
physical situation the system can be in. The microcanonical ensemble is appropriate
when the system is isolated. The canonical ensemble is appropriate when the system
is in contact with a heat bath so its energy is not fixed. Thus, in any given case there
is not a plurality of candidates. Instead, only one ensemble is appropriate: it depends
whether the system is in a contact with a heat bath or not.
Admittedly, physical practice is just to use whichever ensemble renders the problem
tractable. That we can get away with using the two interchanging is explained by the
equivalence in the thermodynamic limit (and the further condition that often we are
dealing with systems approximately close to thermodynamic limit).
Nonetheless, one might worry that whether a system is in contact with a heat bath
or not, leads to conceptually different realisers. In the next Section, I outline the link
between temperature as defined via ∂S∂E and as a parameter in the canonical ensemble,
and thus show that the two are not conceptually distinct.
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2.10.1 The connection to the Canonical Ensemble
The other place that we are familiar with seeing T in statistical mechanics is as a
parameter in the canonical ensemble. However, this is not a conceptually distinct
introduction of temperature, but can rather be derived from our previous definition
∂S
∂E =
1
T .
A system S is in contact with a heat bath R which is at temperature T. The heat bath
is so much bigger than S that S can give or lose energy to the heat bath R without the
temperature of R changing. We now ask: how are the energy levels of S populated in
such a situation?
The number of microstates of the joint system is given by summing over the states n
of R,
ΩRS(Etot) = ΣnΩ(Etot − En) ≡ Σn exp[SR(Etot − En)kB ]. (2.16)
Because Etot  Es(n), we can Taylor expand the entropy in the exponent and only keep
the first two terms
ΩRS(Etot) = Σn exp[
SR(Etot)
kB
− ∂SR
∂Etot
En
kB
] (2.17)
Using our earlier definition of temperature, ∂SR∂Etot =
1
T , this becomes:
ΩRS(Etot) = exp[
SR(Etot)
kB
].Σn exp− EnkBT (2.18)
Now we apply the assumption that each joint state of the joint system is equally likely.
The number of joint states for which S has energy m isΩS(Em) = exp[
SR(Etot)
kB
]. exp− EmkBT .
Probability of the system S being in a state m with energy Em is just the number of
microstates with this energy divided by the total number of states (as we assume that
every joint state is equally likely).
p(m) =
exp[SR(Etot)kB ]. exp−
Em
kBT
exp[SR(Etot)kB ].Σn exp−
En
kBT
=
exp− EmkBT
Σn exp− EnkBT
(2.19)
Here the details of the heat bath drop out and we arrive at the familiar canonical
ensemble. Thus, the identification of ∂S∂E =
1
T can be used to derive the canonical
ensemble we are familiar with. Thus, contra Gibbs we need not worry that the plurality
of ensembles prevents us from finding an SM realiser.
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2.11 Temperature is not mean kinetic energy
I’ve claimed that the statistical mechanical realiser of thermodynamic temperature
is ∂S∂E =
1
T , and that the T parameter in the canonical ensemble is derived from this.
(Consequently, this is not conceptually distinct and thus does not provide a rival
candidate — contra Gibbs’ worries).
But the orthodoxy is that ‘mean kinetic energy is temperature’ provides the paradig-
matic case of theoretical identification: and is a keystone of a Nagelian bridge law
required to effect the reduction of TD to SM. But we seem to have lost sight of mean
kinetic energy in the above discussion — what is the connection between ∂S∂E and mean
kinetic energy 〈K〉?
In fact, the connection between T and 〈K〉 substantially predates the theory of statis-
tical mechanics with its probabilistic ensembles that Gibbs and Boltzmann developed
in the decades running up to the turn of the 20th century. Bernoulli argued in 1738 that
pressure of a box of gas is due to the bombardment of tiny particles on the walls as
follows (Tong, 2012, p. 44). Imagine a box has side length L. A collision with the wall
by a particle with velocity vx will cause a change in its momentum ∆px = 2mvx and it
will hit that wall again ∆t = 2Lvx . The force on the wall due to this atom is F =
∆p
∆t =
mv2x
L .
Summing over all the (identical) atoms, we find:
F =
Nm〈v2x〉
L
. (2.20)
Assuming that the velocity distribution doesn’t have a preferred direction, and so
〈v2x〉 = 〈v
2〉
3 〈v2x〉 = 〈v
2〉
L . As the pressure is the force per area: p = Nm
〈v2〉
3L3 = Nm
〈v2〉
3V .
At this time, the ideal gas law (the infamous pV = nkBT) was known as matter of
experimental fact. If we equate the pressure calculated by Bernoulli with the experimen-
tally measured pressure, we find 12 m〈v2〉 = 32 kBT. Thus, 〈K〉 = 12 m〈v2〉, is proportional
to temperature. This familiar case does not require the machinery of SM. Indeed, in SM
we can derive the ideal gas law. In what follows I outline how this derivation goes —
and this will then allow us to see that the connection between mean kinetic energy and
temperature only holds for the special case of the ideal gas. For other systems T 6= 〈K〉
—and so temperature and 〈K〉 cannot be globally identified.
2.11.1 Derivation of the ideal gas law
We will start with the canonical ensemble, which is a density matrix:
ρˆ =
e−βHˆ
Z
, (2.21)
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where Z is the partition function. The probability that the system is in eigenstate
φ, p(φ) = 〈φ| ρˆ |φ〉. If φ is an energy eigenstate, then equation (2.21) becomes p(n) =
e−βEn /Z. Whilst we have started from the quantum description, we can find the
classical partition function from this, e.g. for a single particle in phase space with
Hamiltonian H = p2/2m + V(q). Further for the ideal gas, we assume there is no
potential and so H = p
2
2m . The partition function for a single particle:
Z1(V, T) =
1
(2pih¯)3
∫
d3qd3pe
−β~p2
2m (2.22)
The integration of q is just the volume of the box, and the integration over ~p factorises
into px, py, each over which, ∫
e−ax
2
=
√
pi
a
(2.23)
Thus, it can shown that:
Z1 = V/λ3 (2.24)
where λ is called the thermal de Broglie wavelength λ = (mkBT
2pih¯2
)
−1
2 . (And the basic idea
from 1924 is that λ = h/p).
For N distinguishable particles the partition function is:
Z = VN/λ3N (2.25)
From this partition function, we can compute the free energy F = −kBTlnZ, and
then the pressure p = − ∂F∂V . Thus we get,
p = −∂kBTlnZ
∂V
= p =
NkBT
V
. (2.26)
Thus we have derived the familiar ideal gas law.
Additionally, from the partition function we can calculate the average energy, 〈E〉 =
− ∂∂β lnZ. For the partition function in equation (2.25) above,
〈E〉 = − ∂
∂β
lnZ =
3NkBT
2
. (2.27)
For the ideal gas we earlier assumed that there was no potential, so the average energy
is just the average kinetic energy. Here again we see that temperature is proportional to
〈K〉.
This result can be used to show why the thermal de Broglie wavelength can be
thought of as the average de Broglie wavelength of each particle. If the average energy
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is equated with the kinetic energy (as is done for the ideal gas),
〈K〉 = 〈E〉 (2.28)
For our ideal gas the right and left hand sides respectively become:
N.
p2
2m
=
3NkBT
2
. (2.29)
Rearranging we find: p ∼ √mkBT. In QM, the de Broglie wavelength λdB = h/p.
This justifies calling the earlier quantity λ = (mkBT
2pih¯2
)
−1
2 , the thermal de Broglie wave-
length.
2.11.2 “T 6= 〈K〉” in general
The above derivation of T ∝ 〈K〉 from QM now allows us to see the limited domain of
this relationship: T may well be no longer proportional to 〈K〉when certain assumptions
fail. One assumption above was the inter-molecular forces are negligible and so there is
no potential. Clearly, this is an approximation and it only holds when the density of
the gas is sufficiently low. If a gas is dense then this assumption that the interaction
between molecules are negligible will no longer hold. Indeed, strong interactions are
required for certain phenomena, such as phase transitions.
This assumption can be relaxed and a more realistic description given. Molecules in
a gas bounce off one another. This can be modelled by including a hard core repulsion
potential. The slight attraction between molecules at r  r0 can be modelled by the
Lennard-Jones potential. Incorporating these considerations leads to corrections to the
ideal gas law, which are expressed as a virial expansion in terms in powers of NV , the
density. For example, we have the van der Waals equation of state: p = NkBTV−bN − a N
2
V2 ,
where a contains the potential. This captures attraction at large distances and has the
effect of reducing the pressure of the gas (compared to the ideal gas law). Thus, T does
not depend solely on the mean kinetic energy—but also on the density, NV .
That T 6= 〈K〉 is not solely due to ignoring the potential in the Hamiltonian in our
earlier calculation. Even leaving aside inter-particle forces and the potential energy,
quantum considerations show that temperature will depend on quantities other than
kinetic energy. For instance, there is a correction to the pressure for a boson gas solely
due to quantum statistics. First I consider the case of a gas, then solids.
Gas: Roughly speaking, the classical description (of an ‘ideal’ gas) will appropriate
provided that the gas is neither too dense nor too cold. More precisely, (Baierlein, 1971,
Ch. 9):
• NV λ3  1: the classical regime.
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• NV λ3 ≈ 1: the onset of quantum effects.
N
V is the density of the gas — and is thus related to the interparticle spacing r0 ∼
(V/N)
1
3 . Earlier we saw that the thermal de Broglie wavelength λ = (mkBT
2pih¯2
)
−1
2 . Thus,
if the temperature gets low (and so the wavelength is large) or the density get high
(and so r0 is small), then the wavelength λ will be of the same order as r0. And if λ is of
the same order as r0 then we are in the familiar case of quantum diffraction: the wave
packets will spread out and so quantum effects are anticipated.
Solids: The Einstein solid model is an approximation according to which each atom
is fixed in place, but vibrates in the lattice. These vibrations are treated as harmonic
oscillations. We can treat a harmonic oscillator classically or quantum mechanically.
Classically, the totally of a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator is
Ec(x, p) =
px
2m
+
1
2
kx2, (2.30)
where k is the spring constant. The contribution of the potential energy to the total
energy is hardly negligible (as assumed in the derivation of 〈K〉 ∝ T in the previous
Section). One might try to maintain the intuitive relation between energy and tempera-
ture through the equipartition theorem, according to which the energy of each degree
of freedom is 12 kBT. According to the equipartition theorem,
〈E〉c = 〈 px2m 〉+ 〈
1
2
kx2〉 = 1
2
kBT +
1
2
kBT = kBT. (2.31)
In this way, the potential and kinetic energy equally contribute to the total energy. T
is not proportional to 〈K〉 but 〈Ec〉. In particular, details of the system at hand, such as
the mass and spring constant, fall out of the picture.
But quantum mechanically, things look different. The energy eigenstates of a one-
dimensional harmonic oscillator are
En = (n +
1
2
)hν, (2.32)
where (n = 0, 1, 2, ...∞). ν is the characteristic frequency: ν = 12pi
√
k
m . The expectation
value of the energy is:
〈E〉q = 12hν+
hν
(ehν − 1) . (2.33)
This equation (2.33) is not a form for which the equipartition theorem is applicable
(Baierlein, 1971, p. 181). The energy depends on the characteristic frequency, ν. Even
if two solids, i.e. two blocks of salt, are in mutual equilibrium and so have the same
thermodynamic temperature they will have different values for their kinetic energy.
Whilst the equipartition theorem is inapplicable, if hνkT << 1, then the denominator
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may be written:
e
hν
kT − 1 = [1+ hν
kT
+ ...]− 1 ' hν
kT
. (2.34)
So in this case,
〈E〉q ≈ 12hν+ kT ' kT. (2.35)
When hν  kT, the energy step hν is very small compared to the “typical thermal
energy kT” (Baierlein, 1971, p.185). Intuitively this means that the quantisation of energy
doesn’t matter, and so we get back the classical phenomenology. But this classical
phenomenology is a special —and not necessarily widespread— case: a diatomic
nitrogen molecule at room temperature does not satisfy hνkT  1. More generally, at
low temperatures this won’t hold and so the equipartition theorem won’t hold: here
quantum effects are again important.
To sum up: whilst the infamous ‘T = 〈K〉’ can be derived from quantum statistical
mechanics, it is only true for the ideal gas. The ‘ideal gas’ is—as its name suggests—
an idealisation. Real gases approximate the behaviour of the ideal gas under certain
circumstances (the classical regime). But for cold or dense gases and for solids: T 6= 〈K〉.
2.12 Conclusion
I have shown that thermodynamic temperature is a functional role property implicitly
defined by the Zeroth law of thermodynamics. ∂S∂E =
1
T is the microphysical realiser
in SM that plays the same role and thus should be identified with (the reciprocal of)
thermodynamic temperature—rather than mean kinetic energy, 〈K〉. As we have seen,
〈K〉 can only be identified with T for an ideal gas. For other other systems, this does
not hold. As such, T might be thought of as multiply realised (but as discussed in
Chapter 1, multiple realisability is no block to reduction). I considered Gibbs’ reticence
to identify thermodynamic T and S with SM quantities such as ∂S∂E due to the plurality
of candidates, and agreed with Batterman that this hesitance is unnecessary — but I
offered a different solution to Batterman.
I now must consider the First, Second and Third laws of thermodynamics in order
to see if the success had with temperature can be had with other thermodynamic
quantities. If this is so, then I claim: thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical
mechanics.
Part III. The First Law
The First law is seemingly trivial. Section 2.13 outlines the phenomenological statement
of the First Law. Section 2.14 briefly outlines the historical context, which explains why
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this law was such an achievement — it established the existence of a thermodynamic
quantity called energy, which is conserved.
In Section 2.15, I consider where this leaves us with respect to reduction. On the
one hand, Sklar (1993) argues that reduction is easy: heat and work are just energy.
But following Uffink (1996), I explain why the distinction between different kinds of
energy transfer is central in TD. In Section 2.16, I then describe why cashing out the
distinction between work and heat looks difficult: from the lower-level perspective,
both are ‘nought but molecules in motion’. This leads to the worry that heat and work
are ‘only defined in relation to the mind which perceives them’ (Maxwell, 1871) — that
is, the worry that anthropocentrism abounds. But Section 2.17 dispels these worries:
we can cash out the distinction in QSM without anthropocentric worries.
2.13 Phenomenological Statement of the First Law
Tong (2012, §4.2) states the First Law as follows:
The amount of work required to transform an isolated system from state 1 to state
2 is independent of how the work is performed.
No matter how the work is performed — stirring, squeezing, passing a current
through it — the change in energy of an isolated system is equal to the work done
∆E = W. Tong says that “this rather cumbersome sentence is simply telling us that
there is another function of state of the system, E(p, V).” (Tong, 2012, p. 111).
If the system is not isolated, then the energy change is not just equal to the work done.
For instance, if two systems at different temperature placed in thermal contact, the
energy of the colder temperature will increase. This transfer of energy is called ‘heat’.
Putting these components together we have: ∆E = Q +W. Importantly, heat and
work are not forms of energy, but of energy transfer. As such it doesn’t make sense to
say that the system ‘contains’, or ‘has’ a certain amount of heat or work. Consequently,
whilst energy is a function of state so that an infinitesimal change in energy can be
written as a total derivative:
dE =
∂E
∂p
dp +
∂E
∂V
dV, (2.36)
the same is not true of heat and work. Thus, we denote ‘small changes’ in heat and
work by inexact differentials as follows:
dE =d¯Q +d¯W. (2.37)
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From our modern perspective, the First Law looks trivial; it merely states the con-
servation of energy — a cornerstone of modern physics so central that violations seem
unimaginable. To us, energy dE is the quantity most well understood in equation (2.37).
It is gaining an understanding of heat and work that is the epistemic challenge.
But it was not always so. Historically, heat and work were the more well-understood,
or secure, concepts in equation (2.37). In the next Section, I describe how heat was
previously considered as an invisible fluid (and consequently a body could ‘contain’ a
certain amount of heat, contra our modern understanding). It was the interconvertibility
of heat and work which established the existence of a conserved quantity, energy, which
the First Law states is ‘fungible’.
2.14 A historic achievement
By the late eighteenth century, much had been experimentally established about the
heat capacities of different substances. Through experiments by the likes of Black
and Fahrenheit, heat had been shown to flow between bodies of differing tempera-
tures (Cercignani, 1998, Ch. 2). Furthermore, the fact that heat could be transformed
into work—paradigmatically in a steam engine— was well-known and indeed, was
powering the industrial revolution.
But the metaphysical picture of the nature of heat was vastly different than our
picture today. Lavoisier’s theory was that heat was an invisible fluid — composed
of elementary particles. This theory could explain many phenomena: the particles
of the caloric fluid repelled one another, so the fluid would spontaneously flow from
hotter to colder bodies. Furthermore, the increase in temperature of a gas that is being
compressed could be explained as the increased density of caloric fluid.
However, Lavoisier’s ideas hit a roadblock.20 Thomson, later known as Count
Rumford, was overseeing the Munich artillery whilst thinking about Lavoisier’s caloric
fluid. Boring cannons generated heat, which was explained by the caloric theory
as being due to the pressure and movement of the caloric fluid being squeezed out,
especially from the metal shards that fragmented off the cannon. But there was no
detectable differences between the shards and ordinary brass.
Moreover, the crucial part for casting doubt on the caloric theory that Rumford
emphasised is that the source of the heat seemed inexhaustible. Had the caloric theory
been correct, the expectation was that the caloric would run out: “the source of the heat
generated by Friction, in these experiments, appeared to be evidently inexhaustible”
(Rumford, 1798, p. 99). Thus heat “cannot possibly be a material substance...” and he
concludes it must be “motion”.
20Lavoisier was beheaded during the French revolution in 1794; Rumford married his widow.
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The final piece of the puzzle was established by James Joule.21 Joule discovered that
by stirring water, the temperature would increase: “the mechanical equivalent of heat”
Joule (1850). Thus, work could be transformed into heat. Thus, the inter-convertibility
of heat and work was established. Heat and work are thus seen to be different causes
of a system’s energy changing. Energy conservation, previously thought to be a mere
curiosity of particular mechanical systems with certain symmetries, was elevated to a
law of nature.22
2.15 Done and dusted?
Heat and work are both forms of energy transfer: does this mean that reduction is easily
had? Certainly there seems to be no ontological problem. Sklar (1993, p. 349) suggests
that in the same way that visible light studied by the theory of optics was discovered to
be an electromagnetic wave, heat has been discovered to be a form of energy transfer.
Is the law of conservation of energy the microphysical image of the First Law? In a
certain sense, yes: if energy is conserved, then the First Law holds. But the First Law
also draws a distinction between heat and work, in a way that mere conservation of
energy does not.
In purely phenomenological thermodynamics, there’s already an understanding
of what heat and work are — they are familiar from previous theories. Thus, from
the perspective of 1750-1840, it is the conservation of energy that was the epistemic
achievement or informative part of the First Law. But from the perspective of SM,
the conservation of energy is fairly trivial. This is because SM is constructed from
the underlying Hamiltonian mechanics by adding probabilistic concepts, as we saw
earlier.23 Energy conservation is already a feature of these microdynamics, and SM
doesn’t have to do anything to ensure energy conservation: it is already a baseline
assumption of the microdynamics underlying SM.24 The difficult problem from the
perspective of SM, is gaining an understanding of the distinction between heat and
work. In this Section I explain why this distinction — in some guise or another – is
required.
Whilst the concept of heat Q is central in the original derivation of the thermody-
namic entropy, S: dS =d¯Q/T, one might nonetheless hope to do away with heat in
thermodynamics. Indeed, Carathéodory (1909) aimed to eliminate heat as a fundamen-
tal concept in TD — precisely because he thought it could be defined in terms of energy
21Whether Joule or Meyer discovered this first is contested, see Brush (1976) for more details.
22See e.g. Elkana (1974) and Kragh (2001) for more details.
23Of course, other assumptions will be required: as will be discussed extensively in Chapter 3.
24Note that if we view the situation not from the SM perspective but from the perspective of the under-
lying Hamiltonian mechanics, then the energy conservation resulting from the time-independence of
the Hamiltonian is non-trivial.
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(Uffink, 1996). Carathéodory’s framework is far more rigorous than other formulations;
and was the historical seed of the ‘axiomatic’ approach to thermodynamics (cf. as
recently represented by Lieb and Yngvason (1999)). Whilst Carathéodory dispenses
with heat, the distinction between adiabatic and non-adiabatic is crucial: Hornix (1970)
highlighted that on Carathéodory’s approach, the term ‘adiabatic’ becomes an unex-
plained primitive in the theory (Uffink, 1996, p. 384). Previously our understanding
of ‘adiabatic’ was dependent on ‘heat’: an adiabatic processes is an thermally isolated
processes, i.e. no heat can flow to the system.
Thus, the term ‘heat’ has been eliminated, but a related distinction ‘adiabatic vs.
non-adiabatic’ is essential. Indeed, as will become apparent when we consider the
Second Law, the distinction between adiabatic quasi-static processes and non-adiabatic
quasi-static processes is crucial in TD: because the former are ‘entropy-neutral’ in a way
the latter are not. (Again, this echoes the idea that the concept of ‘thermally isolated’ as
the most fundamental to all of thermodynamics’ (Kestin, 1979, p. 72, Vol. 1) as cited by
(Brown and Uffink, 2001, p. 528)).
To see that some such distinction — that is, there is an asymmetry between heat
and work, or thermal and mechanical variables, or adiabatic and non-adiabatic, is
fundamental in TD, consider the following argument (repurposed from (Uffink, 2001,
p. 370)25). The validity of Carathéodory’s formalism is invariant under the pairwise
permutation of the meanings ‘heat/work’, ‘thermal/deformation coordinate’ and ‘adi-
abatic/without exchange of work’ (Uffink, 2001, p. 370). An analogous expression
to dS =d¯Q/T is found: d¯W = pdV. The Carathéodory framework allows us to make
sense of irreversibility in this ‘pairwise permuted’ interpretation as follows: a system
with positive pressure can, without doing work, increase the volume by expansion into
a vacuum, but one cannot decrease the volume without doing work. But the ‘pairwise
permuted’ interpretation has empirical differences from our original interpretation: “a
fluid with low pressure can very well do work on another fluid with high pressure by
means of a lever or hydraulic mechanism” (Uffink, 2001, p. 370). But a system with
a low temperature cannot transfer energy in the form of heat to a system with high
temperature. Hence, if there was no important distinction, the permutation pairwise
should not be significant. But it is significant: it leads to a concept of irreversibility that
is not empirically adequate — and thus, the distinction is important.
To sum up: there seems to be no getting away from the fact that we need to distinguish
different types of energy transfer in TD. Uffink concludes that “what we are left with is
that, in some guise or another, the distinction between types of energy transfer, whether
we call them heat vs work, or a transfer between adiabatic vs non-adiabatic walls,... is
25Uffink’s original purpose was to show that the content of the Carathéodory’s Second law is not
identical to the Planck, Kelvin or Clausius formulations of the Second Law: exchanging the meanings
retains the validity of Carathéodory’s formalism, but leads to an expression not equivalent to the
Kelvin or Clausius formulations.
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essential to the structure of thermodynamics” (Uffink, 1996, p. 384). I claim that this
means that the heat/work distinction is an essential part of the ‘energy role’ in TD —
conservation of energy is not enough. Thus, the project of finding the SM realiser is not
done and dusted — yet.
2.16 Molecules in motion
The distinction between heat and work is central to TD. But when we look at the
molecular level, finding a reflection of this distinction is not obvious; both heat and
work correspond to ‘molecules in motion’. Hence, “the distinction between work and
heat must be something like the distinction between the kinetic energy associated with
random, chaotic motion of molecules, and the kinetic energy associated with aggregate
motions of molecules. Even if we can find some way of carving these up, it’s hard to
see how this could be a natural distinction; after all, from the perspective of the kinetic
theory, it’s all just kinetic energy” (Knox, 2016, p. 56).
At this point, it might be tempting to adopt the following defeatist attitude: the
concepts of heat and work belong at the higher-level of description. What seems like a
natural carving of the conceptual landscape in the macroscopic realm of steam engines,
gases and large magnets may fail to have an obvious correlate. The worry is that
the lower-level candidates are not fit for the job; the distinction between ordered and
disordered motion does not capture the heat/work distinction.
In Section 2.16.1, I first consider whether this is because the heat/work distinction is
only applicable to the macroscopic realm — and I claim that it is not. I then consider the
worry, originally raised by Maxwell, that the distinction is anthropocentric. Ultimately,
I suggest that we can discard the disorder/order distinction as the microphysical image
of the heat/work distinction, and in Section 2.16.3 I outline why SM can do better. In
Section I outline what the image of the heat/work distinction is in statistical mechanics,
rather than merely at the ’microscopic level’.
2.16.1 Macro/micro
Dissatisfaction with the distinction between disordered and ordered motion could
suggest that heat and work are not concepts that apply to the microscopic realm.26
For instance, it seems like a category mistake to ask what the colour of an electron is.
Likewise, one might think that asking the temperature of a single molecule at an instant
of time is also a category mistake.
26If the concepts of heat and work only have a very limited domain, then it seems there will be
consequences downstream for the Second law, since it is defined in terms of terms of heat and work.
(The scope of the Second law will be considered extensively in Part IV of this Chapter).
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It does seem that we cannot state the amount of heat or work associated to a single
molecule at an instance of time. But this point is hardly surprising: we stated at the
outset that heat and work are forms of energy transfer — thus, they are defined over
a period of time.27 Temperature, heat and work — like many concepts— only apply
over certain timescales. Do they also only apply over certain length scales? That is, do
these concepts only apply to systems over a certain size. Ultimately, a concept’s domain
of applicability depends on the extent to which it is useful. Szilard imagines a one-
molecule gas: if a single molecule is confined to a box and we consider its behaviour
over a long enough period of time, then it seems like we can define its temperature
and other macroparameters. Given we can apply the concepts of heat and work to a
one-molecule gas (cf. Szilard (1929) and the ensuing literature e.g. Leff and Rex (2002)),
the concerns of this Section don’t seem to require a limitation to ‘large N’ system.
2.16.2 Anthropocentrism?
The distinction between ordered and disordered motion seems subjective: what looks
ordered and tidy to one person may look messy and unruly to another. This introduc-
tion of anthropocentrism was suggested by Maxwell:
“Available energy is energy which we can direct into any desired channel. Dis-
sipated energy is energy we cannot lay hold of and direct at pleasure, such as the
energy of the confused agitation of molecules which we call heat. Now, confusion,
like the correlative term order, is not a property of material things in themselves, but
only in relation to the mind which perceives them. A memorandum-book does not,
provided it is neatly written, appear confused to an illiterate person, or to the owner
who understands it thoroughly, but to any other person able to read it appears to be
inextricably confused. Similarly the notion of dissipated energy could not occur to
a being who could not turn any of the energies of nature to his own account, or to
one who could trace the motion of every molecule and seize it at the right moment.
It is only to a being in the intermediate stage, who can lay hold of some forms of
energy while others elude his grasp, that energy appears to be passing inevitably
from the available to the dissipated state” (Maxwell, 1878, p. 221); (Niven, 1965, p.
646) as quoted in Myrvold (2011)).
There is more than whiff of anthropocentrism here. Indeed, this is surely the type of
comment that leads to Bridgman’s view that TD “smells of its human origins more than
27Whilst there are some concepts which seem to be ubiquitous —energy, mass— these seem to be the
exception not the rule.
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other physical theories” (Bridgman, 1943, p. 214). But at which concept’s feet should
we lay the charge of anthropocentrism?
There is a question of which of the theory’s concepts look anthropocentric, according
to Maxwell. In the quote above, ‘disordered motion’ is the seemingly anthropocentric
concept. Thus, it seems that the image of the TD heat/work distinction is anthropocen-
tric — i.e. it is the lower level theory that contains an anthropocentrism, rather than TD
itself. Once again we run into the issue of the purpose/account of reduction familiar
from Chapter 1. The anthropocentrism only ‘spreads’ or ‘scales up’ to TD, if we think
that SM tells us what the TD concepts really were along. But, as discussed in Chapter 1,
I am not necessarily committed to the quantities of the higher-level theory Tt (here: TD)
being replaced by the quantities of the lower-level theory (here: SM).
Furthermore, functionalism allows that there can be certain differences between
the two theories; the quantities of the reduced theory Tt needn’t ‘inherit the natures’
of the quantities of Tb: here, the SM and TD quantities can differ over whether are
anthropocentric or not.28
Regardless, we can leave these concerns to one side, because we can do better than
claiming that the image of the heat/work distinction is the disordered/order motion
distinction in Section 2.17. The next subsection explains why we might think we can do
better.
2.16.3 More than molecules in motion
At this point, one might be tempted to ignore the heat/work distinction and side with
Sklar: SM has energy conservation and that is the image of the First Law. But Section
2.15 claimed that the heat/work distinction was an essential part of the role.
Agreed, merely looking at the ‘microscopic level’ at molecules jiggling around does
suggest that both heat and work are “nought but molecules in motion” (Maxwell 1874)
as cited in (Uffink, 1996, p. 373). But as Uffink emphasises, there are more ‘lower-level’
resources available than the bare description of the motion of molecules. “Statistical
mechanics has more at its disposal than the concepts of mechanics and the molecular
view alone, and one can reasonably expect that the distinction between heat and work
can be framed in a mind-independent way with the help of concepts from probability
theory” (Uffink, 1996, p. 344): i.e. by considering SM, we can do better than the
distinction between disordered/ordered motion.
Uffink says that it does not suffice to identify heat with a form of energy transfer: we
want to know which form of energy transfer. Here he notes the difference from Sklar’s
preferred exemplar of successful reduction, the case of optics and electromagnetism. In
that case, we can not only identify visible light with electromagnetic waves, but also
28Furthermore, recall from Part I that TD needn’t be considered anthropocentric.
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specify which part of the electromagnetic spectrum corresponds to visible light.
To sum up: looking at the microscopic realm, it seems hard to see the distinction
between heat/work — and distinction we do see looks anthropocentric. But we have
more resources available in SM than merely looking at jiggling molecules. I now
consider the realiser of the heat/work distinction in SM.
2.17 The image in SM: quantum heat and work
Both heat and work are forms of energy transfer. Earlier I claimed that the distinction
between heat and work was an important part of the nomological role of energy.
Additionally, I also claimed earlier that probability in SM would help us find a more
precise image of heat and work than disordered/ordered motion.
In classical statistical mechanics, heat is d¯Q = Eidpi and work is d¯W = pidEi. One
gloss on this: the changes to the external parameters, i.e. the work done, alter the
energy associated to state i. But the heat flow changes how those energy levels are
occupied (as it changes the probability of the system being in state i with energy Ei,
because the system has more energy and so the probability of higher energy levels
being populated is increased.)
Of course, this then raises the question: how should we understand these probabili-
ties? If they are understood to be a measure of our ignorance, then perhaps the charge
that the lower-level images of heat and work are anthropocentric returns. However, I
am going to leave aside the CSM cases, and focus on QSM. This is because I find it the
more perspicuous framework, since how the external parameter is changed comes into
the quantum Hamiltonian, e.g. the volume of the box determines the energy eigenstates,
while it is less directly obvious how changes to external parameters affect the energy of
a classical gas — as there is no potential.
Here I show how the different changes to external parameters, i.e. mechanical co-
ordinates, alter the probability distribution ρ — and thus, following Prunkl (2018) and
Maroney (2007), find the quantum expression for work. Heat flow requires that the
system not be thermally isolated; I outline how the interactions with an environment
give rise to an expression for heat.
The work done is the energy change due to interventions on the external parameters,
or mechanical coordinates, of the system, such as the volume. In contrast, the energy
transfer due to heat flow changes the thermal coordinates such as the temperature.
Of course, there are many ways to heat or cool a system. But Baierlein claims that
what they have in common is that “the external parameters remain fixed, but there is
nonetheless an interaction with the environment that leads to a transfer of heat...the
energy thus transferred we call heat” (Baierlein, 1971, p. 205).
96
2 The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
First I outline the strategy for work, and then heat. One disclaimer at the outset: as is
familiar from ordinary QM we will be dealing with expectation values of observables
such as energy given the quantum state of the system, ρ.29
Work: The mean energy of the system whose density matrix is ρ is 〈H〉ρ = TrHρ.
Changing the external parameters, such as volume, changes the Hamiltonian governing
the system. The Hamiltonian depends on the external parameters such as volume, as
follows.
A gas confined to a box can be modelled by the familiar quantum ‘infinite square
well’, for which:
V(x) =
0 −a ≤ x ≥ a∞ |x| > a (2.38)
where the length of the box is 2a (this is the one-dimensional case but it can be easily
generalised to three dimensions). This imposes the boundary condition that Ψ(−a) =
Ψ(a). This imposes that the allowed wavelengths are λn = 4an , where n = 1, 2, 3....
The volume of the box (or in this one-dimensional case: the length of the box) enters
into the allowed eigenvalues: En =
h¯2k2n
2m where kn =
npi
2a . Thus we can write that the
Hamiltonian depends on the volume H[V]. Of course, in other cases it could depend
on different external parameters.
For now, we take the system to be isolated; in this context ‘isolated’ means not
interacting with any other system, rather than a time-independent Hamiltonian. The
Hamiltonian might be varied over time, for example, through the manipulation of
external parameters. For such an isolated system, the change in the average energy is:
∂〈E〉ρ
∂t
=
〈
∂H
∂t
〉
ρ
(2.39)
where ρ is the density matrix describing the system’s state.30
Maroney (2007) and Prunkl (2018)’s analysis then integrates equation (2.39) (and
demands a cyclic variation of the Hamiltonian: H = H0 for all t 6 0 and t > τ.
W = −
∫ τ
0
∂〈H〉ρ
∂t
dt (2.40)
The term W is earns the name ‘the work done’, since the system is isolated, there is
no other energy flow to the system. So the work done is the change of the expected
29Naturally, there are interpretative issues concerning the probability inherent in this description. But to
reiterate my earlier strategy: these issues about probability are general issues in QM, rather than sui
generis issues for quantum statistical mechanics.
30I take this to be the canonical ensemble, but it is interesting to note that Maroney’s analysis does not
depend upon this assumption. For an explanation of the RHS of equation (2.39), see (Maroney, 2007,
p. 15)
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energy
W(ρ) = Tr[H(ρ(t)− ρ(0)] (2.41)
Heat: Now, let’s consider heat flow. For the energy transfer we call heat to occur, the
system must be put in thermal contact with an environment, i.e. a heat bath. Thus, there
must be an interaction term in the Hamiltonian to describe the interaction between the
system and environment. The system is no longer isolated. Baierlein says “there must
be an additional term in the quantum mechanical operator for the system, a term that
couples the system to the external world and permits an exchange of energy despite
the constancy of the external parameters” (Baierlein, 1971, p. 205).
We can describe the system and environment (or heat bath) initially as ρ = ρs ⊗ ρe:
this means that they are initially uncorrelated. This joint system is governed by the
following Hamiltonian:
H(t) = Hs ⊗ Ie + Is ⊗ He +Vse (2.42)
where Hs describes the changes to the external parameters of the system (if any),
likewise He for the environment. Vse describes the interaction between the system and
environment.
We can deduce the following expression: 31〈
∂H
∂t
〉
ρ
=
〈
∂Hs
∂t
〉
ρs
+
〈
∂He
∂t
〉
ρe
+
〈
∂Vse
∂t
〉
ρ
(2.43)
which (Maroney, 2007, p. 17) says is unsurprising: “it tells us that the rate at which the
mean energy of the combined systems changes equals the mean rate of work performed
on each of the two subsystems plus the interaction between them”.
With some re-arranging, Maroney and Prunkl define a term Q which describes the
energy change due to the interaction, rather than changes to external parameters. Thus,
they deduce:32.
ih¯
∂〈Hs〉ρs
∂t
=
〈
∂Hs
∂t
〉
ρs
+ Q[Hs]. (2.44)
And likewise for the environment:
ih¯
∂〈He〉ρe
∂t
=
〈
∂He
∂t
〉
ρe
+ Q[He] (2.45)
31This seems to involve assuming the system and environment system is not interacting with a third in
order to go from ∂〈H〉ρ∂t to
〈
∂H
∂t
〉
ρ
32See equations 26-28 in Prunkl (2018) or equations 80-82 Maroney (2007)
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ih¯
∂〈Vse〉ρ
∂t
=
〈
∂Vse
∂t
〉
ρ
−Q[Hs]−Q[He] (2.46)
where Q[Hs] = 〈[Hs, VSE]〉ρ and Q[He] = 〈[He, VSE]〉ρ. “The term Q[Hs] clearly
represents the mean rate at which energy is flowing into the system in addition to the
work performed on it” (Maroney, 2007, p. 1). 33
The two systems are taken to not to be interacting before t = 0, and to not be
interacting after τ. (This is the cyclic variation of the Hamiltonian discussed earlier).
From this, (Prunkl, 2018, p. 31) defines:
∆E =
∫ τ
0
∂〈H〉ρ
∂t
dt = 〈H(t)ρ(t)〉 − 〈H(0)〉ρ(0) (2.47)
∆W =
∫ τ
0
〈
∂H
∂t
〉
ρ
dt (2.48)
∆Q =
∫ τ
0
Q[Hs]dt =
∫ τ
0
Q[He]dt (2.49)
which then gives: ∆Es = ∆Ws + ∆Q and ∆Ee = ∆We − ∆Q: the familiar First Law. To
add to the idea that these quantum expressions do play the heat and work role, note
that there is an upper limit on how much energy can be extracted on average as work
from the system.34 This is what is known as the adiabatic accessibility: “not all of the
energy of a system is available for work” (Maroney, 2007, p. 22).
2.18 The First Law: Conclusion
The First Law states that a change in energy is the sum of the work done on the system
and the heat flow to the system. Energy can be transferred to or from the system
in forms but the total energy is conserved. Capturing the image of the conservation
of energy at the lower-level looks trivial: the conservation of energy is a baseline
assumption of the microdynamics from which SM is constructed.
But I argued that there is more to the energy role in TD than being conserved: the First
law makes a distinction between heat and work. There is no escaping the importance
of such a distinction; even in Caratheodory’s framework which eliminates the term
‘heat’, there is an essential distinction between ‘adiabatic’ and ‘non adiabatic’. Thus, the
SM realiser is not the mere conservation of energy — we also needed to find the image
of the heat/work distinction in TD.
33Here I have only provided a sketch of the extensive work of Maroney et al. For example, Maroney
extends this analysis by considering the particular forms the interaction hamiltonian can take.
34There is a further condition: the Hamiltonian must be bounded from below.
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One candidate is the distinction between ordered and disordered motion — which
Maxwell branded anthropocentric. But I argued that we can do better: I claimed that a
realiser of heat and work is found in quantum statistical mechanics.
Part IV. The Second Law
2.19 Introduction
The Second law is the most well-known law of thermodynamics: indeed, perhaps of all
of physics. Part of its celebrity status stems from its reputation as the ultimate source
of time-asymmetry, i.e. irreversibility, in the universe. But there are many different
concepts of irreversibility, which I outline in Section 2.20. And considering these details
allows me, in Section 2.21, to rebut some of the grand claims surrounding the Second
Law of Thermodynamics (henceforth: TDSL). In Section 2.22, I state the Second Law in
purely phenomenological thermodynamics.
In order to make progress with the project of reduction, we need to establish the
crucial — and the non-essential — features of the TDSL. I highlight three features
which all centre on the (different) concept(s) of irreversibility: (i) in Section 2.23.1, the
importance of the environment in TD; (ii) in Section 2.23.2, quasi-static processes; and
(iii) in Section 2.23.3, the distinction between the TDSL and the Minus First Law.
Then, in Section 2.24, I consider the “Demonic consequences” of the discovery of the
atomic nature of matter. In particular, does the possibility of a Maxwell’s demon alter
the status of the TDSL? In particular, does this reduce the scope of the TDSL? Section
2.25 distinguishes four options about the scope of the TDSL.
In Section 2.26, I consider the connections between the first three of these options,
1., 2. and 3., and the connection between fluctuations and violations of the TDSL. In
Section 2.27 I outline option 4: Maxwell’s ‘means-relative view’, before suggesting an
alternative: the means are determined by the lower-level theory, statistical mechanics
(SM). In Section 2.28 I discuss the operation of the demon, and the SM constraints.
In Section 2.29, I discuss how SM helps explain why — even if we can manipulate
individual molecules — we cannot construct an engine more efficient than a Carnot
engine. This explanation is known as Landauer’s principle, and I explicate Wallace
(2014)’s claim that this principle is ‘sound’ with respect to statistical mechanics but
‘profound’ with respect to thermodynamics; where ‘sound’ and ‘profound’ are terms
of art, introduced by Earman and Norton (1998, 1999) in their criticism of Landauer’s
principle.
In Section 2.30, I draw together these discussions about the scope of the TDSL, and
conclude that whilst one small concession must be made — the TDSL must be altered
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to include a ‘reliability’ caveat — much of the original TDSL is unaltered.
In Section 2.31, I consider what the SM realiser of the TDSL should be. Should we be
seeking the Holy Grail — a non-decreasing SM function to call ‘entropy’? I claim that
this is neither necessary nor sufficient for a SM realiser of TDSL. The SM realiser of the
TD entropy must increase in the right circumstances (namely non-quasi-static adiabatic
changes) and should remain constant during quasi-static adiabatic changes. I argue
that this is most naturally understood in Gibbsian SM, where Ehrenfest’s principle
helps us.
2.20 Concepts of Irreversibility
Figure 2.3: Quasi-static processes represented in the p-V plane of equilibrium states.
Before examining the TDSL, it is important to unravel the different concepts of
reversibility. Uffink (2013) outlines three concepts of ‘reversible’ in thermal physics:
1. Time-reversal invariance (TRI): there exists a map T — frequently assumed to
be the map t 7→ −t — that maps possible histories of the system to possible
histories. Call this reversibilityT.
2. Quasi-static processes: These ‘ quasi-static processes’ are ‘reversible’, in the
sense that the arrows can be drawn in either direction on the curves in Figure 2.3:
corresponding to expansions and compressions. But travelling in one direction
is not straightforwardly the ‘time reverse’ in the TRI t→ −t sense: you are not
performing the same interventions in a different order, but rather performing
different interventions (e.g. inserting rather than removing a piston). Furthermore,
quasi-static processes result from taking a limit; the limit of making very small
interventions so that the system stays ‘close to’ equilibrium. Thus, this ‘quasi-
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static reversibility’ is a property of a sequence of processes, rather than of a single
process (as discussed in Part 2.1.3). Call this reversibilityQ.
3. Recoverability: the process in question can be ‘fully undone’. The system can be
returned to its initial state with no effect in the environment.35 But the system
need not retrace its steps — it can take a different path to its destination. So
process P is ‘reversibleR’ i.e. recoverable, if: writing 〈Si, Ei〉 P−→ 〈S f , E f 〉 there is a
process P∗ such that 〈S f , E f 〉 P∗−→ 〈Si, Ei〉. Planck’s terminology for such a process
was ‘reversibel’ (Uffink, 2001, p. 344). 36
2.21 The source of all asymmetry?
The celebrity status of the TDSL is illustrated by grandiose such as the following:
The Grand Claim: the Second law is the source of all irreversible behaviour in the
universe (which can be described by an increasing entropy function), and so is the
naturalistic reductive base of ‘the direction of time’.
Many authors make claims that are similar to the above Grand claim. For example,
(Atkins, 2007, preface) claims: “The second law is one of the all-time great laws of
science, for it illuminates why anything — anything from the cooling of hot matter to
the formulation of a thought — happens at all.” Such a view originates with Planck:
“Every process occurring in nature proceeds in the sense which the sum of the entropies
of the bodies taking part increases” (Planck 1926, p. 463). Davies (1999) considers the
TDSL to be “nature’s way of driving systems towards equilibrium” (as cited in Brown
and Uffink (2001)). Finally, (Hawking, 1994, p. 348) makes the following strong claim:
“So the second law of thermodynamics is really a tautology. Entropy increases with
time, because we define the direction of time to be that in which entropy increases”.37
There are two components to the Grand claim, which I will rebut in turn. (i) The
TDSL is applicable to everything and it is the driving force behind all processes in
nature; in this sense it is the motor of the universe. (ii) The TDSL is responsible for the
arrow of time.
(i) In Chapter 4, I argue that the scope of thermodynamics is limited (because roughly,
you need an equilibrium state-space Ξ and not all systems are well-represented by such
35Different authors vary over whether everything must be included in the environment, or whether some
features, such as the height of a weight may be excluded. I cannot discuss this further, but see Uffink
(2001) for details.
36Luczak (2018) adds the further condition that the process P∗must be one that we can implement. Later
in this part we will see that this is part of the Maxwellian view.
37An admission: these quotes, with the exception of Atkins, do not establish that it is source of all
irreversibility.
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a space). Furthermore, we will see in Section 2.23.2, that there must be quasi-static
processes available to complete the cycle.38 But it does not seem, at least prima facie,
that there are quasi-static processes available in Atkins’ example of ‘thought formation’.
The TDSL is not the reason that (most) processes happen: indeed for the type of
quasi-static processes considering in the TDSL, external interventions are required to
make anything happen, (as emphasised in Part 1 of this Chapter). Thus, it seems fair to
say that the universe is not driven by a Carnot engine.
(ii) The second claim is that the TDSL is responsible for the arrow of time. Indeed,
some go further and claim that TDSL is not only responsible for the arrow, the arrow
is reducible to the asymmetry of entropy encoded in the TDSL (as seen in the above
Hawking quote).
But, as we saw earlier, the type of irreversibility in the TDSL is not ‘non-TRI’ but rather
irrecoverability of the initial state of both the system and the environment, especially
in non-quasi-static processes. Thus, I agree with Uffink (2006a), that the TDSL describes
the ravages of time, rather than the arrow of time. The loss of youth, the irrecoverability of
spilt milk, the fact that Humpty Dumpty cannot be put back together again — these
examples display the type of irreversibility that the TDSL describes. 39
2.22 The Second Law Introduced
In this Section, I first state two classic formulations of the TDSL. I then discuss the
idea that only a certain amount of heat can be transformed into work by explicating
the Carnot cycle. As discussed in Part II of this Chapter (on the Zeroth Law), the
Carnot cycle allows us to fix a temperature scale, as I explain in Section 2.22.1. But most
importantly, in Section 2.22.2, we have the resources to define a new quantity: entropy.
The Kelvin Statement: “It is impossible to perform a cyclic process with no other
result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir, and work is performed” (Kelvin
et al. (1882) as cited in (Uffink, 2001, p.328)).
The Clausius Statement: “It is impossible to perform a cyclic process which has
no other result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir with a low temperature
and emitted into a reservoir with a higher temperature.” (Clausius (1864) as cited
in Uffink, 2001. p. 328).
38In the subsequent Section we will see that whilst the TDSL prescribes an entropy increase in processes
other than quasi-static ones, nonetheless quasi-static processes must be available.
39Furthermore, regardless of these details, the project of ‘reducing’ the arrow of time to the entropic
arrow faces problems, cf. Earman (1974), Price (2009).
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We know the first law is: dE = d¯Q +d¯W. In a cyclic process, dE = 0. Thus, in a
reversible cycle
∮
d¯Q =
∮
d¯W, which looks as if heat is being converted into work. Why
doesn’t this violate the Kelvin statement of the TDSL?
The crucial point is that the transfer of heat into work is not the sole effect in this
reversible cycle; other things are going on. This is made clear by the Carnot cycle,
which operates with two reservoirs one at Th and the other at lower temperature Tc.
2.22.1 Carnot Cycle
There are four stages in a Carnot cycle, as shown in Figure 2.3.
1. (From A-B): the gas is isothermally expanded whilst in contact with a heat bath at
Th and heat Qh is absorbed (i.e. the gas expands against a piston whilst in contact
with a heat bath).
2. (From B-C): the thermal contact is broken and so the system is now isolated. The
gas is expanded adiabatically (i.e. whilst thermally isolated).
3. (From C-D): the system is compressed isothermally at temperature Tc and heat
Qc is emitted to the heat bath.
4. Finally (From D-A): the system is isolated and compressed until it reaches its
initial state A.
The net heat absorbed is the difference between the heat absorbed in the isothermal
expansion, and the heat emitted in the isothermal compression: Qh −Qc. This is equal
to the work done W.
The efficiency is defined by the ratio of η = WQh =
Qh−Qc
Qh
= 1− QcQh . If we could take
all of the heat from the hot reservoir Qh and turn it into work this would mean the
engine had efficiency 1: but we have to give some heat, Qc 6= 0, back when returning
the system to its initial state.
Carnot’s theorem states that the reversible cycle above is the most efficient, i.e. the
best we can do, and so the ratio Qh/Qc is the same for all reversible engines. This is
of such central importance, that sometimes presented as another version of the TDSL
(Blundell and Blundell, 2009, p. 130), known as the Carnot statement:
The Carnot Statement: No engine is more efficient than a Carnot engine: η =
1− QcQh . That is, for engine operating between two reservoirs with temperatures Th
and Tc, a reversible engine is the most efficient.
This is shown as follows. Imagine that you have two Carnot engines; one operates
between two reservoirs at temperatures T1 and T2 (where T1 > T2) and the other
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between T2 and T3, where T2 > T3. Q2 = Q1(1− η(T1, T2), Q3 = Q2(1− η(T2, T3),
so Q3 = Q1(1− η(T1, T2))(1− η(T2, T3)). Next, consider the two engines to be one
engine, where the heat given out by the first engine, Q2, is the heat absorbed by
the second engine,Q2. Then Q3 = Q1(1− η(T1, T3). Then we have 1− η(T1, T3) =
(1 − η(T1, T2))(1 − η(T2, T3)). Because T2 must drop out from the right hand side,
1− η(T2, T1) = f (T2)f (T1) . Tong (2012) says we can choose f (T2) = T2. Thus, the efficiency
of a Carnot engine η = 1− TcTh (cf. the two expressions for the efficiency above). We use
this to define a thermodynamic temperature scale — and this (fortunately) coincides
with the scale given by the ideal gas T = pV/kBN.
2.22.2 Defining Entropy
The Second Law allows us to define a new state function, entropy STD. From consider-
ing the efficiency of a Carnot engine, we find QhQc =
Th
Tc .
We now change notation so that Q represents the heat absorbed by the system: in the
isothermal compression the heat absorbed by the system is −Qc. We can also relabel as
follows Q1 = Qh, Q2 = −QC. In a Carnot cycle:
Σ2i=1
Qi
Ti
= 0. (2.50)
Figure 2.4: These diagram (taken from Tong (2012)) shows the original Carnot cycle, as
well as another smaller Carnot cycle, EBGFE.
Now consider the reversible cycle AEFGCDA in Figure 2.4. This is the original Carnot
cycle with a corner chopped out of it: the cycle EBGFE is also a Carnot cycle. We know
that QAB/Th + QCD/Tc = 0. Likewise in the mini Carnot cycle, QEB/Th + QGF/TFG =
0.
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Now we can write out the heat flow in the cycle AEFGCDA:
• The heat flow in the segment FG is the reverse of GF: QFG = −QGF.
• Thus, the heat flow in the (non-Carnot) cycle AEFGCDA is: QAE/Th +QFG/TFG +
QCD/Tc = 0.
By cutting more corners, i.e. by having many infinitesimal adiabats and isotherms,
any reversibleQ cycle in the plane can be considered. If we sum up all the contributions
Q/T along the cycle, we find:
∮ d¯Q
T
= 0. (2.51)
Figure 2.5: Two possible paths between two states in Ξ. Figure from Tong (2012).
Thus, if there are two (or more) reversible paths (i.e. quasi-static curves) between
equilibrium state A and equilibrium state B the change in
∫ B
A
d¯Q
T is independent of the
path taken.
This (along with a reference state 0) allows us to the define a new function of state
which only depends on the state variables p, V : the thermodynamic entropy STD.∫ B
0
d¯Q
T
= STD(B) (2.52)
Because entropy is a function of state it is path-independent: it doesn’t matter how
we reached state B — quasi-statically or not, or whether the system was isolated or not
— either way the entropy of state B is S(B).
Clausius’ inequality generalises away from the reversible cycle above to any cycle:
∮ d¯Q
T
6 0 (2.53)
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∮ d¯Q
T
=
∫
1
d¯Q
T
−
∫
2
d¯Q
T
6 0. (2.54)
If path 1 is an irreversible and path 2 is reversible path from state A to B, and path 1
is adiabatic (so dQ =0), then we learn that the thermodynamic entropy of an isolated
system cannot decrease:
S(B)− S(A) > 0. (2.55)
2.23 Three key features of the TDSL
In this Section I emphasis three important features of the TDSL; doing so reveals what
features the SM realiser must capture, and so is important for reduction. In Section 2.23.1
I emphasis the important of the environment, in Section 2.23.2 quasi-static processes,
and in Section 2.23.3 the distinction between the Minus First and the Second Law.
2.23.1 The importance of the environment
It is important to emphasis the ‘sole effect’ part of the Clausius statement: otherwise,
fridges would be a clear counterexample to the TDSL. Fridges transport heat from a
colder to hotter body — at a cost. Such transport is only prohibited as the sole effect.
Likewise, in the previous Section, we showed that the entropy STD of the system is only
non-decreasing during adiabatic (i.e. isolated) processes. Indeed, during an isothermal
compression, the entropy of the system decreases. This is especially obvious when we
view the Carnot cycle in the T-S plane, as shown in Figure 2.6. During the isothermal
compression from C to D, the entropy of the system decreases. Of course, during an
isothermal compression heat flows to the heat bath, i.e. the environment, and so during
this process the net entropy change ∆STD is zero.
Figure 2.6: The Carnot Cycle represented in the T-S plane.
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This is why considering the environment is crucial in the Second Law: we are
concerned with irrecoverability (in Section 2.20’s sense) of certain initial states during non-
quasi-static processes. That is, the concept of irreversibility present in the TDSL is the
impossibility of some reversibleR processes. For some transitions, 〈Si, Ei〉 P−→ 〈S f , E f 〉,
the requisite P∗ processes, 〈S f , E f 〉 P∗−→ 〈Si, Ei〉, to recover the initial state do not exist.
2.23.2 Quasi vs. non-quasi static processes
As discussed, only ‘quasi-static processes’ are represented in TD state-space. But
because entropy is a state function (i.e. is path-independent), we can calculate the
entropy change between two states in non-quasi processes, by considering the entropy
change in a quasi-static process.
But Uffink (2006a) emphasises that such quasi-static processes must be available,
and that this is not just a matter of convenience: Clausius’ proof talks about cycles and
so it requires that we can find a quasi-static process that connects the final state to
the initial state in order to complete the cycle. “Indeed if such process did not exist
then the entropy difference between these two states would not be defined” (Uffink,
2006a, p. 19). Whilst the existence of such a process may not be problematic in the
intended applications (such as fluids), but it much less clear that this is so in e.g. living
cells. “This warning that the increase of entropy is thus conditional on the existence
of quasi-static transitions has been pointed out already by (Kirchhoff, 1894, p. 69)”, as
cited in (Uffink, 2006a, p. 19).
One might be tempted to think that whilst quasi-static processes are required dur-
ing the construction of the entropy function and the above discussion of the Second
law, once we have this state function we can kick away the ladder used to construct
this function. As STD is a state function, we needn’t have a path connecting every
pair of states.40 However, the definition of TD entropy required infinitesimal inexact
differentials of heat, which is a path-dependent quantity.41
2.23.3 The Second Law vs. the Minus First Law
The spontaneous approach to equilibrium (from non-equilibrium) is distinct from the Sec-
ond Law, which describes the thermodynamic entropy differences between equilibrium
states. It is a presupposition of TD that systems do in fact reach a state of equilibrium.
Because this requirement that systems do in fact reach equilibrium is prior to the other
40From discussing with Uffink: he seemed to be more concerned with the practical question... how
would you know/be able to calculate the entropy difference? So need quasi-static to calculate?
41Whilst the existence of the integrating factor T turns the inexact differential into an exact differential
(and so no longer a path-dependent quantity), we cannot ‘kick away’ the ladder of quasi-static
processes once the entropy function has been constructed: as Uffink emphasises quasi-static processes,
i.e. curves in Ξ are used to calculate the entropy S changes between different equilibrium states.
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laws, Brown and Uffink (2001) call it the ‘Minus First Law’ (but they also suggest that it
is so central that the name ‘The Minus Infinite Law’ would also be appropriate (Brown
and Uffink, 2001, p. 529)).
The Minus First Law: An isolated system in an arbitrary initial state within a finite
fixed volume will spontaneously attain a unique state of equilibrium (Brown and
Uffink, 2001, p. 528).
To emphasis the contrast: the Second Law tells us that certain transitions/processes
render the initial state irrecoverable, where as the Minus First Law tells us that systems
spontaneously reach a state of equilibrium.
Finding the microphysical ‘underpinning’ for these two Laws are distinct projects (cf.
Luczak (2018)). The H-theorem and coarse-graining approaches in SM are concerned
with quantitatively describing the approach to equilibrium. (I will discuss my preferred
account of the approach to equilibrium in Chapter 3). These foundational projects
are concerned with establishing the circumstances under which a given system will
approach equilibrium, rather than the quasi-static interventions on equilibrium states.
2.24 Brownian motion, the Atomic Hypothesis, and the
Demonic consequences...
Imagine this caricature of history. You are a Victorian scientist, blissfully ignorant of the
constitution of matter and enthralled with thermodynamics. Yet, one day, you find out
the Atomic Hypothesis. Having an open minded temperament, you readily accept this
hypothesis (unlike Mach). But discovering that gases are composed of molecules gives
us a different description of the system according to which, violations of TDSL seem
plausible. Neither CM or QM gives us reason to to think that a system cannot return
to its earlier, lower entropy, state, as both are unitary.42 And furthermore, the lower
level theory, be it CM or QM, is more fundamental — thus casting doubt on the TDSL.
Should we still believe the TDSL to be true? (Of course, history was quite the reverse of
my caricature: the epistemic security of TD led many to doubt the atomic hypothesis,
rather than vice versa). Because there is nothing in CM/QM that suggests that (isolated)
systems cannot return to earlier lower entropy states, the TDSL is not true on the basis
of molecular dynamics alone — it is not solely a consequence of CM/QM.
But this is no surprise. Recall that there are three different levels of description
under consideration: (I) TD, (II) SM and (III) CM/QM. Thus, it is unsurprising that
the TDSL is not true solely on the basis of QM/CM. It has been appreciated since
42Modulo worries about the measurement problem of course.
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Boltzmann that additional assumptions, e.g. a Past Hypothesis, are required. But these
are the ingredients of statistical mechanics. Thus, these additional assumptions are only
indirectly connected to thermodynamics, since SM is the stepping stone which aims to
build the laws of thermodynamics from mechanics.
In this Section I discuss the implications of the atomic nature of matter for the TDSL:
is the TDSL still true in light of the these lower-level theories? Brownian motion played
an important role in the discovery of the atomic nature of matter — but it also threw
a shadow of doubt over the TDSL: as I discuss in Section 2.24.1. The possibilities of
violations of the TDSL are made especially vivid by two demons, which I describe in
Section 2.24.2 and 2.24.3. Describing the doubt cast over the TDSL by these demons
prepares the ground for Section 2.25, where I consider whether the scope of the TDSL
needs to be limited.
2.24.1 Brownian motion
Originally discovered by Robert Brown in 1827, the phenomenon of Brownian motion
can be easily viewed through a microscope. Pollen grains suspended in a solution can
be seen to be jiggling around, undertaking what is often referred to as a random walk.
The suggested explanations were diverse: Brown initially thought that the phenomenon
was intimately connected to life, and W. Stanley Jevons thought it was connected to
osmosis. But later in the 19th century the phenomenon was connected to kinetic theory:
for example, Cantoni in 1868 claimed that Brownian motion is a “beautiful and direct
experimental demonstration of the fundamental principles of the mechanical theory of
heat” (Cercignani, 1998, p. 215).
But contra Cantoni, many physicists, such as the French Physicist Leon Gouy, claimed
that Brownian motion would violate the TDSL. “This led to an important comment by
Poincare in an address at the congress of St Louis (1904): ‘if this be so, to see the world
return backward, we no longer have need of the infinitely subtle eye of Maxwell’s
demon; our microscope suffices us’ ”(Cercignani, 1998, p. 215).
Einstein’s 1905 paper was central in cementing the idea that Brownian motion is
problematic for the TDSL (Cercignani, 1998, p. 216). Popper is particularly strident
in this respect: “the entropy law, in Planck’s formulation, is simply falsified by the
Brownian movement, as interpreted by Einstein” (Popper, 1957, p. 152).43
Why do these authors think that Brownian motion is a violation of the TDSL? The
Brownian particle (i.e. the pollen grain) is much larger than the molecules it is sur-
43The Planckian formulation of the TDSL that Popper quotes is: “ There does not exist a perpetual
motion machine, of the second order, that is to say, a physical system, immersed in a heat bath, which
by cooling down (or, which is the same, by emitting heat to the surrounding heat bath), can move a
heavy body against a force, thus increasing its potential energy; or in terrestrial terms, a machine
which by cooling down, can lift a weight” (Popper, 1957, p.151).
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rounded by. The random collisions between these molecules and the Brownian particle
do not cancel out. Instead, the Brownian particle travels ∼ √N steps for every N
collisions. The random motion of the water molecules — construed as heat — can be
converted in to work — construed as the macroscopic motion of the Brownian particle.
There has been no other effect: and so this looks like a prima facie violation of the
Kelvin statement. But whilst heat has been turned into work with no other effect, it is
unclear whether this is a cyclic process in the manner than Kelvin or Clausius requires.
Another, related, way of seeing how the microscopic nature of thermal systems
causes problems: there are random thermal fluctuations and these can allow violations
of the TDSL — albeit small ones. For example, there could be a fluctuation such that a
small amount of energy was transferred from a colder to a hotter system with no other
effect: contra the Clausius statement of the second law. But once again it is unclear that
this qualifies as a cyclic processes.
Next I consider two demons, whose ability to violate the TDSL is not in doubt.
2.24.2 Loschmidt’s demon
Loschmidt’s demon will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, when considering the
reversibility objection. This objection was originally raised against Boltzmann’s H-
theorem, but it also applies to other frameworks in non-equilibrium SM for describing
the approach to equilibrium such as the coarse-graining framework that I will discuss
in Chapter 3.
The heart of the objection is that the lower-level theory, be it QM or CM, allows a
system to retrace its steps if a suitable intervention — such as reversing the momenta
of all the gas molecules — is allowed. Indeed, in the Spin Echo experiment, a spin
system can be forced to retrace its steps if the B-field is changed in a particular way (cf.
Chapter 3 and Hahn (1950)). More generally, the possibility countenanced by CM for
the system to retrace its steps was seen as problematic for the H-theorem (and similar
projects) as it suggests that ‘anti-equilibration’ processes are possible — contra the
Boltzmannian equation and other equations in non-equilibrium SM. Justifying why
these ‘anti-equilibrium’ processes are not something we experience, or are at least the
exception not the rule, is a core philosophical project in non-equilibrium SM.
But to some extent, Boltzmann’s original reply to Loschmidt, hits the nail on the head.
Boltzmann is said to have retorted to Loschmidt ‘go ahead then, reverse the momenta’!
His challenge of course rests on the fact that it is hard to see how we could implement
such an intervention, given our clumsy grip on the world. A ‘Loschmidt demon’ on the
other hand would — ex hypothesis — be able to implement such an intervention.
In Chapter 3, I will argue that Loschmidt’s objection reveals that the time-asymmetry
in SM is a feature of our perspective. If we could readily reverse the momenta we could
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reverse the trajectories and see ‘anti-equilibration’. Had we humans been more nimble,
Loschmidt could have reversed the momenta in response to Boltzmann.
Loschmidt’s demon is a problem for the construction of SM from CM/QM. But we
can also see how it could cause problems for the TDSL: a Loschmidt demon can ‘reverse
the momenta’ of all the elements of the system — thus forcing the system to retrace its
steps (to its earlier low entropy state).
An example of a Loschmidt demon: do an isothermal expansion (thus, transforming
heat to work) then press the ‘restore button’. This ‘restore button’ acts like a Loschmidt
demon and reverses the momenta in such a way as to return the system to its initial
state. But before this Loschmidt demon can claim they have violated the TDSL, they
must consider their actions. We must account for how the restore button works because
the TDSL includes the environment: does its entropy increase? (As I emphasised when
considering the essential features of the TDSL, thermodynamic entropy decreasing is
only interesting from a foundational viewpoint if the system is isolated).
2.24.3 Maxwell’s demon
Unlike Loschmidt’s demon, Maxwell’s demon has the TDSL squarely in its line of
fire. The demon is a nimble-fingered creature, which operates a trapdoor in a partition
between two gases (which are initially in the same macrostate) — and only lets the fast
molecules through from the right side to the left. Likewise, the demon only lets slow
(i.e. below average velocity) molecules from the left to the right. This leads to the left
hand side becoming hotter than the right hand side. Thus, the demon has transferred
heat from a colder to a hotter body with no other effect — a violation of the Clausius
statement of the TDSL.
Whilst Maxwell’s original demon involved an intelligent creature (the ‘intelligent
demon’), there are now a range of Maxwellian demons. Following Szilard (1929) it
has become popular to discuss a one-molecule gas. Initially the one-molecule gas can
explore the entire volume V of a container. A partition is then inserted at the centre,
so the gas now occupies V2 of the container. A measurement is made by the demon to
see which side of the partition the gas is on. A piston is then inserted through the sub
volume not containing the particle, and the gas is then isothermally expanded back to
its initial volume, by the particle pushing the piston. There has been a cyclic process
whose sole result is to have turned heat (from the heat bath) into work (by pushing the
piston), as depicted in Figure 2.7. Call this the miniature demon (not because the demon
itself must be small, but because it operates on small systems).
To connect this to Section 2.20, recall that P is ‘reversibleR’ i.e. recoverable if given a
process 〈Si, Ei〉 P−→ 〈S f , E f 〉 there is a process P∗ 〈S f , E f 〉 P∗−→ 〈Si, Ei〉; whilst the TDSL
says there exists some processes I which are not reversibleR. These processes I take
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Figure 2.7: The operation of the miniature demon: the demon inserts a piston depend-
ing on which side of the partition that gas was trapped in. The expansion at
the end is done whilst the gas is in contact with a heat bath, so that there is
a cycle whose sole effect is the conversion of heat to work.
the 〈Si, Ei〉 I−→ 〈S f , E f 〉, where the thermodynamic entropy STD associated to 〈S f , E f 〉 is
greater than the thermodynamic entropy associated to 〈Si, Ei〉. Because processes such
as I are irrecoverable there is no process I∗ which takes the system and environment
back to its initial state. But Maxwell’s demon suggests that there is a process I∗ that
takes the above system back to its initial state: the demon can implement this process.
Crucially, however, we have to consider whether the state of the demon has an
entropy change associated to it. Because it is the entire system (i.e. system, plus
demonic operations) that, according to the TDSL, must be (thermodynamic) entropy
non-decreasing. That is: I∗ must not only take S f → Si, it must also take E f → Ei,
where the demon is included in the environment.
Thus, the key caveat is: to establish that these Maxwellian, or Loschmidtian Demons
violate TDSL, we must consider the state of the environment — i.e. how the demons
operate. Yet we can see that there a certain unity to these challenges to the TDSL: they
all stem from the atomic nature of matter. Whether Brownian motion counts as an
example of a violation of the TDSL is debatable. But all agree that if it is, it is only a
microscopic violation: no one hopes to harness these ‘violations’ to build an engine more
efficient than a Carnot engine.
Yet a Maxwellian demon can harness these microscopic fluctuations to create bona
fide violations of the TDSL. Indeed, Norton (2011) argues that the demon operates by
scaling up such microscopic fluctuations into full blown macroscopic violations. This
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raises the question: what implications do these demons have for the truth of the TDSL?
2.25 Four different views about the scope of the TDSL
What should we make of Brownian motion and these demons? Do they show the TDSL
to be false? Yet the TDSL does seem to capture something true about the world: engines
more efficient than a Carnot engine are hardly a dime a dozen. Rather than out-and-out
falsity, these considerations have been suggested to alter the scope of the TDSL — so
that it is no longer strictly true.
The idea that the TDSL is not a strict law was suggested by Maxwell: “Hence the SL
of TD is continually being violated, and that to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently
small group of molecules belonging to a real body. As the number of molecules in
the group is increased, the deviations from the mean of the whole becomes smaller
and less frequent; and when the number is increased till the group includes a sensible
portion of the body, the probability of a measureable variation from the mean occurring
in a finite number of years becomes so small that it may be regarded as practically an
impossibility” Maxwell (1891) as quoted by Cercignani (1998).
Thus Myrvold (2011) distinguishes four different possible views of the scope of the
TDSL44 :
1. (The Strict view): there are never violations.
2. (The Probabilistic view): it is very unlikely that there will be large violations. (Fluc-
tuations motivate this view).
3. (The Statistical view): the TDSL only applies to large numbers of degrees of freedom
(here after DOF). (Brownian motion motivates this view — as do Boltzmannian
considerations, as we will see below).
4. (The Maxwellian view): the TDSL only applies to large numbers of DOF and
is contingent on our current, but perhaps temporary, technological inability to
manipulate individual molecules. (Maxwell’s demon motivates this view).
One crucial difference between 1.-3. and 4. is that, according to 4., the TDSL could be
flat-out false — if we found a Maxwell demon: which in the future, we may.
Considering the scope of the TDSL is part and parcel of the reductive project — rather
than prior to it, contra Myrvold.45 The demons and the difficulties for the TDSL arise
from the depths of the lower-level theories about the molecular nature of matter. As
44Myrvold (2011) raises the Maxwellian view as deserving consideration, but does not explicitly endorse
it.
45Myrvold says we should think about which version of the TDSL is correct because for the project of
reduction it matters which version of the TDSL we are trying to recover.
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such, questions about alterations to the TDSL cannot be disentangled from questions
about reduction. This is unsurprising given Chapter 1’s discussion of how reduction
might limit the domain of applicability, i.e. scope, of the higher-level theory, Tt.
In considering the scope of TD we will use resources from outside TD. Considering
fluctuations — and how the probabilistic and statistical views of the TDSL coincide
— involves studying the different ensembles of SM. Thus, some of the discussion will
stray from the original TD consideration of Carnot engines to the SM considerations of
ensembles. Indeed, sometimes it is the image of the TDSL in SM, rather than the TDSL
itself, which some authors have in mind when discussing the scope of the ‘TDSL’.
To adjudicate between options 1.-4., I will proceed in two stages. First, in Section
2.26, I discuss the way in which options 1.-3. come together: in the thermodynamic
limit they coincide. This is because fluctuations vanish in this limit. Considering the
connection between fluctuations and violations of the TDSL requires us to discuss
Maxwell’s demon, who exploits these fluctuations to create violations.
Thus, the second stage of this project is to consider Maxwell’s demon and what
implications it has for the status of the TDSL. In Section 2.27 I resist (parts of) the
Maxwellian means-relative view of the TDSL; namely that there exists no physical
principle which can rule out such a demon. This launches an extended discussion, in
Section 2.28, of Maxwell’s demon. In Section 2.29, I argue that SM provides such a
physical principle: Landauer’s principle.
Finally, in Section 2.30, I bring these two stages together to conclude that alteration
of the TDSL in light of the demons and difficulties is only slight: a caveat about the
reliability of Carnot engines must be included. Thus, I will endorse a version option 2.
— but suggest that this is very close to option 1.
2.26 Connections between options 1.-3.
In this Section, I discuss the connections between the size of the system and the fluctu-
ations that motivate option (2. The probabilistic view). But why think that fluctuations
lead to violations of the TDSL? I discuss one bad reason for downgrading the scope of
the TDSL to options 2. or 3, which involves mistaking the TDSL for its image in the
Boltzmannian framework. I will then discuss how fluctuations lead to violations with
the help of a demon.
From our modern perspective, the distinction between (2. The probabilistic view)
and (3. The statistical view) is often blurred. But as Myrvold emphasises, for Maxwell,
‘statistical’ did not mean ‘stochastic’ and so 3. is strictly weaker than 2. Of course,
the two are connected: as the size of the system increases, then the probability of
fluctuations decreases.
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This can be seen as follows. The thermodynamic limit is, roughly, the limit where the
number of particles in the system tends to infinity: N → ∞. In the thermodynamic limit,
the microcanonical and canonical ensembles coincide. This is because the probabilistic
fluctuations scale with N. This can be seen as follows. The variance in energy,
∆E2 = 〈(E− 〈E〉)2〉 = 〈E2〉 − 〈E〉2 (2.56)
can be written in terms of the partition function: ∆E2 = ∂
2
∂β2
logZ = − ∂〈E〉∂β . There is
another way to express these fluctuations. In the canonical ensemble, the definition of
heat capacity is: CV =
∂〈E〉
∂T
∣∣∣
V
. Since, β = 1/kBT, the spread of energies can be written:
∆E2 = kBT2CV (2.57)
∆E describes how the energy of the system fluctuates in a probabilistic manner, while
CV describes the ability of the system to absorb energy. Equation 2.57 is an example of
the fluctuation-dissipation theorem. It tells us that a system with a high heat capacity
(i.e. a system that can absorb a lot of energy without changing its temperature very
much) will have more fluctuations than a system with a low heat capacity.
The above equations can also be used to demonstrate how the fluctuations scale with
the size of the system. Typically E ∼ N and CV ∼ N, and this means that:
∆E
E
∼ 1√
N
. (2.58)
Thus, in the thermodynamic limit, the energy probability distribution becomes more
and more peaked around the mean value 〈E〉 so that energy can be treated as essentially
fixed, as is the case in the microcanonical ensemble. The probability of fluctuations
decreases as the size of the system increases — and this is why from our modern
perspective options 2. and 3. are often run together. And in the limit of an infinite
number of components, there are no fluctuations. Thus, in the thermodynamic limit,
(1), (2) and (3) coincide.
Yet this raises the question: why do fluctuations lead to violations of the TDSL? Is
a fluctuation on its own sufficient to violate the TDSL — so that it is downgraded to
being a either a probabilistic or statistical truth? There are two arguments that it is
downgraded: one bad, one good.
The bad argument is as follows. Thus far I have discussed this issue in a Gibbsian
framework. But whilst the Boltzmannian framework is not the focus here, there is
one issue which is so central that it is worth discussing. The idea that the TDSL
is a ‘statistical truth’ has its roots in the Boltzmannian framework. According to
the Boltzmannian framework, the system can fluctuate away from the equilibrium
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macrostate, and in doing so the Boltzmann entropy, SB, decreases. However, the larger
the system the more infrequent these fluctuations away from equilibrium will be. Thus,
‘the Boltzmann entropy is non-decreasing’ is only a statistical truth.
But notice: the Boltzmann entropy, SB, is a SM concept, and so unless the STD is
identified with SB, it is not immediate what the consequences are for the scope of the
TDSL. Instead, a putative image of the TDSL at the SM level is only a statistical truth. I
will set this aside because: (a) I will later discuss why a decreasing SM entropy need
not always have implications for TDSL, when I consider the realiser of the TDSL in
SM in Section 2.31; and (b) as stated earlier, I am going to focus on the Gibbsian, rather
than Boltzmannian framework.
The good argument is as follows. Fluctuations are central to considering violations
of the TDSL because, as Norton (2011) says, a demon uses fluctuations in their schemes
to create violations of the TDSL. The fluctuations can happen in a random direction. In
the case of the one-molecule gas, the volume is likely to spontaneously decrease to the
right or to the left hand side. As these changes are fluctuations, they are unpredictable.
But the miniature demon finds out the system’s state, and acts according to create a
cycle that violates the TDSL.
But there is an ‘ignorant. demon: call this is the lucky demon (if indeed he is worthy
of the name ‘demon’). The direction of the fluctuations cannot be predicted, and so
the demon cannot predict which side to insert the piston in order to then be able to
isothermally expand the gas back to its original state (thus turning heat entirely into
work). This lucky demon is ignorant, unlike the miniature demon: it doesn’t find out
which side of the partition the gas is on. Instead this lucky demon just guesses — and
gets it right! Thus, even if this is a one-time occurrence, we have still got one cycle
more efficient than a Carnot cycle. Of course, this lucky demon is hardly reliable and so
cannot be used to consistently violate the TDSL.
Yet, even this unreliable demon would not be able to operate on an infinite system —
as in such a system, there are no fluctuations. Many of the macroscopic systems that TD
considers are ‘approximately infinite’. To get a sense how unlikely fluctuations are for
systems of the order 1023, Tong (2012, p. 8) points out that the timescales over which we
would expect to find the system with an energy other than the equilibrium value, are
of the order of exponentials of exponentials. Such numbers are so large that it makes
little difference which system of units we use.46 Hence the lucky demon does not seem
to pose a severe threat to the scope of the TDSL.
But the intelligent demon and the miniature demon, on the other hand, use their
knowledge of the system’s state in order to reliably and consistently violate the TDSL.
46Tong (2012) says that number of microstates for a two-state system of 1023 components as 210
23
which
is a number so large, that imagining it as a distance — it would not matter whether you measure it in
microns or lightyears.
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The importance of the fluctuations — and so the assessment of options 2. and 3. for the
scope of the TDSL — depends on whether a demon can harness these fluctuations to
create violations. It is to these fully fledged demons to which I now turn.
2.27 The Demons and the Maxwellian means-relative
view
Loschmidt’s demon reveals that the time-asymmetry in SM is a feature of our perspec-
tive. If we could readily reverse the momenta we could reverse the trajectories and
see ‘anti-equilibration’. Is Maxwell’s demon like Loschmidt’s demon? Maroney (2009)
suggests that Maxwell thought so, he says: “The operation of Maxwell’s demon is
simply a matter of scale and the statistical nature of the second law is not probabilistic,
but due to our inability to discriminate the exact state of a large number of particles
(similar to our inability to exploit Loschmidt’s reversibility objection)” (Maroney, 2009,
§1.1).
If we were able to manipulate individual molecules, would we expect to see violations
of the Second Law? Maxwell thought so: “For Maxwell, no matter of physical principle
precludes the operation of a Maxwell demon; it is only our current, but perhaps
temporary inability to manipulate molecules individually that prevents us from doing
what the demon would be able to do” (Myrvold, 2011, p. 2).
Because we can only manipulate ‘large aggregates’ rather than individual molecules,
we cannot perform demonic manipulations. Thus, according to the Maxwellian view,
the validity of the TDSL is limited to these ‘large aggregates’, i.e. macroscopic realm.
As such, Maxwell held that the TDSL was only applicable to systems with large no.
of DOF. Myrvold (2011): “if there were an agent capable of manipulating individual
molecules, then according to Maxwell, the distinction between heat and work would
break down”. According to this Maxwellian view, we should never have expected the
TDSL to apply to a one-molecule gas: it is outside the scope of the TDSL.
To sum up: Myrvold ascribes a ‘means-relative’ view of thermodynamics to Maxwell.
If our means were to change, then we might be able to engineer violations of the SL, thus
decreasing its scope even further — in order to exclude these situations. (To continue
the analogy with Loschmidt’s demon: later physics revealed that we can sometimes
reverse the momenta — in the spin echo experiment). If the TDSL just stems from
our inability to manipulate microscopic systems, then the irrecoverability of certain
states is just down to us. A process I∗ is available after all, but not to us — only to a
Maxwell demon. Myrvold (2011) suggests that if the TDSL stems from our inability,
then perhaps anthropomorphising the demon might not be a mistake, contra Earman
and Norton (1998, 1999, p. 4).
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2.27.1 The difference between Maxwell’s demon and Loschmidt’s
demon: resisting the Maxwellian view
I motivated the Maxwellian view by claiming that Maxwell’s demon had the same
status as Loschmidt’s demon. But I think these demons differ in an important way: and
this undermines the Maxwellian view. (But much of the spirit of the Maxwellian view —
minus the anthropocentrism — is found in the control theory view of thermodynamics
as explicated in Part 1 of this Chapter).
Maxwell claimed there was no ‘physical principle’ that there could be no Maxwell
demon — and this is much like Loschmidt’s demon. Indeed, there is nothing in physics
that rules out a Loschmidt demon (indeed, the spin echo experiment is an example).
This is because there are no physical theories to consider between the level of CM
and the level of SM, which could supply such a ‘physical principle’.47 But unlike
Loschmidt’s demon, there is a physical principle why we cannot have a Maxwell
demon. Or weaker: there’s a physical theory at an intermediate level of description
we can consider to see whether it is possible to have an Maxwellian demon: statistical
mechanics.
The Maxwellian view claims that whether certain processes (i.e. I∗) are possible,
depends on the means available. Of course, the ‘means’ are constrained by our epistemic
and cognitive limitations — whether we are too clumsy to manipulate individual
molecules. (An example of an epistemic limitation: if the two gases on either side
of partition are different, but if you don’t know this then you can’t exploit this fact
to do work. Indeed, this phenomena lies behind the entropy of mixing, cf. Gibbs
(1878).48 But ultimately, our means are also constrained physically: i.e. by the lower-
level theory. According to the CM/QM level, there seems no reason to suggest that
a Maxwell demon is impossible. But our means might also be constrained by the
intermediate theory: statistical mechanics. The question is whether this theory can
provide a ‘physical principle’ to rule out a Maxwellian demon — and thus suggest that
technological advances will never allow us to violate the TDSL.
Maxwell conceived of the demon in 1867 - over 150 years later, it is common practice
to think of manipulating single molecules (cf. single shot quantum thermodynamics, as
discussed inter alia Horodecki and Oppenheim (2013a), Del Rio et al. (2011), Brandao
et al. (2013)). But, in the next Section, by considering SM we will see that having the
ability to manipulate individual molecules will not mean that we can violate TDSL —
47As I will discuss in Chapter 3, the ‘non-SM’ behaviour of the Loschmidt demon is due to special initial
conditions, but there is no principled way to rule out such initial conditions. According to lower-level
theories of QM/CM, these initial conditions look like all other initial conditions and are not special.
Yet SM itself doesn’t have the resources to explain why these initial conditions are problematic, since
the displayed behaviour is outside the jurisdiction of SM.
48Whilst the Gibbs paradox is another, distinct motivation for the Maxwellian view, I cannot discuss it
further here.
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and so we can’t construct an engine more efficient than a Carnot engine. (Of course, as
we will see in Section 2.29.3 this involves some weak assumptions within SM). Indeed
this conclusion should be unsurprising: if it were just our clumsy fingers that were
getting in the way of an engine more efficient than a Carnot engine, it would be hive of
research.
2.28 Statistical Mechanics and Maxwell’s demon
In this Section I first consider what it is means to talk of physical possibility — and why
thermodynamics does not have the resources to remove the demon. In Section 2.28.2, I
then consider what is at stake with the demon, and what it is that needs to be explained.
In Section 2.28.3 I discuss the key component required for an Maxwell demon to operate:
controlled operations (also known as feedback). Performing certain interventions on
the system that depend on the system’s state, generically allow violations of the TDSL.
But I discuss how we can analyse feedback processes as physical — within statistical
mechanics.
2.28.1 Thermodynamics and possibility
Is a Maxwell demon physically possible? Whether something is possible depends on the
constraints on ‘possibility’. No doubt there are metaphysically possible worlds where
Maxwellian demons dwell. But are there nomologically possible worlds containing
such demons? It depends on which theory’s laws we consider: whether we consider
SM or TD — or another theory.
According to TD, for example, a Maxwell demon is not possible. According to TD, if
the demon is bounded by the TDSL, then there must be a compensating thermodynamic
entropy increase somewhere. But why think that a Maxwellian demon obeys the laws
of TD? Plenty of much less exotic systems do not obey TD, as I will discuss in Chapter 4.
Given my complaints about the narrow scope of TD, the assumption that a Demon/any
putative demon should obey the SL is unwarranted. At the very least an argument
needs to be given that the TDSL applies to everything, in order for this strategy for
considering whether a Maxwell demon is possible to succeed.
A better strategy for stopping the demon is to point out the importance of the
environment in thermodynamics. The entropy of a system decreases in an isothermal
compression, but this is not a violation of the TDSL as heat flows to the environment,
whose entropy thus increases. Is the demon only an apparent violation, because we
have failed to take into account the state of the environment?
But the demon is disanalogous to the isothermal compression example, since —prima
facie— the demon does not need to be in thermal contact with the system to operate.
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Just assuming that TD is applicable to the demon and that there will be the appropriate
heat flow so that that TDSL is not violated seems like an unsatisfactory tactic without
some explanation of how the demon works. Clearly, we need to consider the demons
operation in more detail (as will be done in Section 2.28.3). But first I consider: what is
the explanandum about Maxwell’s demon at stake?
2.28.2 The explanandum
What is the aim of considering Maxwell’s demon? In what follows I do not ‘aim to
save the TDSL’. Such an aim is the motivation in much of the literature — and a similar
dialectical move is made in the controversial realm of black holes: the ‘Generalised
second law’ is sometimes claimed to be needed in order to ‘save the ordinary SL’ (cf.
Bekenstein (1973)). In Section 2.21, I deflated some the grand claims surrounding the
TDSL. If the TDSL does not have the grand status that Planck and others attributed to
it, why worry if it is violated? After all, it would be much more interesting if the TDSL
were violated and we could solve the world’s energy crisis.
Yet the TDSL seems to capture something true about the world. Thus, the aim of
my discussion of here is explain how the TDSL can capture something true, in the face
of the demons. Of course, if we cannot find such an explanation, then it may be that
the Maxwellian view is right: the TDSL is a contingency based on our current lack of
technological ingenuity. We have already seen that TD itself does not provide much
satisfying insight into the possibility of a Maxwell demon. According to QM or CM, the
existence of such a demon looks plausible. But in order to go beyond mere plausibility
and to consider whether the demon is possible according to the lower-level theory, we
need to translate TD into CM/QM — which practically speaking means looking at SM.
Thus, my aim is to consider whether a Maxwell demon is possible according to SM.
2.28.3 Details of the demon: controlled operations
I think there is a feature common to all Demons: how the demon acts, i.e. which inter-
ventions it performs on the system, depends on the state of the system. For Maxwell’s
‘intelligent’ demon, whether a molecule was let through the trapdoor depends on the
state of the molecule, i.e. how fast it is moving. For the ‘miniature demon’ (that operates
on a one-molecule gas turning heat-solely-to-work), which side of the partition the
piston was inserted, depends on the state of the gas: was it trapped on the lefthand or
righthand side?
Sometimes this ‘how the demon acts depends on the state of the system’ is called a
controlled operation, since the state of the system ‘controls’ which processes happens.
As a general definition, a controlled operation is as follows: if the control system is
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detected to be in state X, then perform process pX on the target system Z. If the control
state is detected to be Y, then perform process pY on Z. Another word for this type of
process is ‘a feedback’ process.49
Knowing the state of the system is crucial here: controlled operations massively
increase the states the target system Z can be transitioned into. Norton (2005, 2011)
gives lots of examples where, once the state is known, the possibilities of manipulations
seem unlimited. For example, if we know which side of the box the one-molecule
gas is on, we can frictionlessly swivel the box so that a box with a gas on the RHS
becomes a box with the gas on the LHS (or vice versa). Thus I claim: feedback or control
operations are essential to a Maxwell demon that assuredly violated the TDSL.
Now, we need to consider the situation from the perspective of SM. The idea that
feedback processes are key can be explicated formally, following Wallace.
Take a system, such as a gas in box in thermal equilibrium. This system can be
given a SM description: ρcg(V1), and a SM entropy, SG. Different interventions can
then be performed on the system. If these interventions are adiabatic or isothermal
changes to external parameters, then it can be shown that the system can be transitions
into any state ρcg(V2), provided that ∆SG > 0.50 That is, these isothermal /adiabatic
interventions can alter the system’s state, but there is a constraint: SG cannot decrease
(cf. (Wallace, 2014, p. 704)).
But if the toolbox of interventions is expanded to include feedback processes, then
the system can be transitioned into any state — in particular, it can be transitioned into
a state with lower SG. Hence, Wallace’s control theory with feedback shows in a very
general way that ‘feedback’ massively increases our control of the system.
If the ‘means’ are the interventions that we have access to, then there is a clear sense
in which the means relative approach ties in here. Here there is something that the
‘means-relative’ view of thermodynamics gets right. The means-relative view is right
in that we can clearly show that expanding the range of possible interventions on the
systems — the ‘means’ — to include feedback (controlled operations), this drastically
expands the possible transitions the system can be forced to undergo. In particular: it
seems that the TDSL can be assuredly violated.
But I believe that the means-relative view is wrong, since there are ‘in principle’
constraints on the available means — contra Maxwell. Maxwell leaves the possibility
of a Maxwell demon open to future technology. But there are some constraints placed
by the lower-level theory, which I now consider.
The first, and key, assumption is that the system (which could be a demon) imple-
49In Wallace’s terminology, ‘control process’ refers to any intervention on the system, and ‘feedback
process’ refers to a control operation in the sense above.
50How SG relates to STD will be considered later in Section 2.31. Note that Wallace’s demonstration
that isothermal and adiabatic interventions cannot transition the system to a state with a lower SG,
requires ‘parameter stability’: roughly, a condition that systems reach equilibrium.
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menting the feedback process, or controlled option, is itself “physically analysable”
(Wallace, 2014, p. 719). There can be no ‘deus ex machine’ in Feyerabend (1966)’s words
— the controlling system must be able to be treated as a physical system. We have
the controlled system, the controlling mechanism, and the usual array of heat baths,
pistons and partitions. If the controlling mechanism is also a physical system, then we
can draw a line around it and the controlled system and treat them together, as one
large ‘thermal object’ — which can be intervened on – but without feedback/controlled
operations. This ‘automation constraint’ means that the demon cannot be a god outside
the system, whose intelligence is essential to its tricks — instead, the demon is treated
like a computer. The controlling system performs different operations depending on
the state of the system, but the mechanism to decide which processes is implement
must be ‘includable’ in the whole system.51
Now, for the second assumption — and this is where is SM provides an insight.
Having included the feedback mechanism into the system, we now have one large
system, which does not have a controlling system, i.e. without feedback processes. This
system is a no-feedback system, the only interventions are the familiar adiabatic and
isothermal interventions. And so we know for this total system, SG cannot decrease.
Thus, if the controlled sub-system’s SM entropy SG decreases, there must be a compen-
sating increase in the controlling sub-system. Here the part of SM that we are invoking
is the preservation of phase space volume: the underlying microdynamics of CM/QM
are unitary, and so the phase space volume associated to ρ is constant.
But the question now is: how does such a compensating increase come about? Why
should we think that SG of the controlling mechanism should increase? And here is
where Landauer’s principle comes in.
2.29 Landauer’s principle
Roughly speaking, Landauer’s principle (LP) states that there is an entropy increase of
SG = kBln2 associated to resetting one bit of data. Why are we considering resetting? As
above, the demon implements a ‘controlled operation’ and consequently, as I explain in
Section 2.29.1, this requires the demon to have a ‘memory’. In Section 2.29.2 , I motivate
why the demon needs to reset its memory. In subsection 2.29.3 I sketch the quantitive
content of Landauer’s principle.
51In the work of Ladyman et al. (2008, 2007), this idea is captured by an ‘L-machine’, but I cannot discuss
this further here.
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2.29.1 Why the demon needs a memory
The demon is going to perform a controlled operation — the process implemented on
the target system will depend on the the state of the control system. So the state of the
system has to be measured and stored.
In abstract terms, a controlled operation is a logical transformation that maps an
input state of at least 2 bits to an output state of at least two bits in such a way that
how one of the bits, the target bit, is transformed depends on the value of the other
bit, the control bit. The most commonly discussed example of such an operation is
CNOT which is defined by the following table, where bit1 is the target bit and bit2 is
the control bit.
Input1 Input2 Output1 Output2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
But a crucial point is that the control bit must be represented by a distinct degree
of freedom from the target bit. For physical degrees of freedom to represent different
bits they must be independent of each other. This is because, for a physical system to
represent a set of n bits it must have sufficient, i.e. 2n, different configurations of its
degrees of freedom. For example, if the only two alternative states for a one molecule
gas are ‘BL’: the molecule trapped on the LHS, or ‘BR’: the molecule is trapped on RHS,
then it does not make sense to say this represents 001010, since this string represents 6
bits of information for which the system would need at least 26 different configurations.
If this were not so the different bits could not vary independently of each other.
The demon will implement different processes/interventions depending on the
system’s state. The system (i.e. the one-molecule gas) cannot be the target system and
the control system: Ladyman et al. (2007) are explicit that “the same bit cannot be both
the control and the target of a controlled operation" (Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 23).52
There is another reason why different bits cannot be represented by the same physical
state at different times, namely that to allow them to do so completely trivialises the
physical implementation of logical transformations. For example, consider the logical
transformation, COPY. If relabelling is allowed, then no physical change in a system is
52This point is considered further in Ladyman and Robertson (2013). The key clarification about
controlled processes, in that paper, serves to show why Norton (2011)’s objections to Ladyman et al.
(2007) fail. The heart of Norton’s objections lies in the fact that he thinks that a controlled operation
can be implemented by a physical system that has only one degree of freedom: which must therefore
be used to represent both the target bit and the control bit. But, as above, Ladyman et al. (2007) are
explicit that “the same bit cannot be both the control and the target of a controlled operation".
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required for it to implement COPY: because we can simply stipulate that whatever state
the physical degree of freedom happens to be in now represents the state being copied.
For example, the four different rows of the CNOT table could be physically rep-
resented by a pin on four different places on a chess board (here we do not have
independent degrees of freedom). Since there are two different positions corresponding
to the single value of the control bit, which physical process acts on the system depends
on the value of both bits, not just the control bit. Of course, the physical implementation
of logical processes is a vast and fascinating topic, but I cannot delve any further into it
here.
The key point is: the demon needs to have a memory, which stores the state of the
target system, and controls which process is implemented on that system.
2.29.2 Why the demon needs to reset its memory
Often it is claimed that the demon needs to reset its memory so that the process is
truly cyclic. But why should we care that the process is cyclic? Agreed, the original
formulations of the TDSL talk of cycles, but if we can make an engine more efficient
than Carnot - and solve the energy crisis - why worry about sticking to the exact letter
of the original formulation? But, the motivation for considering cyclic processes is not
merely pedantry. The demonic strategy needs to be reliable: if it is going to be more
interesting than the ‘lucky’ demon of Section 2.26.
2.29.3 How reset leads to entropy increase
Discussion of RESET: reset is a logical irreversible operation. That is, it is a many-
to-one function. We say that a logical transformation, L, is logically reversible if and
only if L : X → Y is a one-to-one (injective) mapping. Hence, with a reversible logical
transformation, we can uniquely reconstruct the input state from the output state. If
L is not a one-to-one mapping, we say that it is logically irreversible. (And this is why
Landauer’s principle is sometimes discussed in isolation from Maxwell’s demon; there
is a debate over whether there is a connection between logical and thermodynamic
irreversibility. Naturally this debate involves considerations from information theory.
One ‘cheap connection’ that could be made: reset involves throwing away information
— and this is the ‘throwing away of information’ sometimes associated with increasing
entropy. But settling whether this is more than superficial connection would involve
considering the relationship between information theory and thermodynamics — in
particular to give a quantitative analysis to show that not only is there an increase in
entropy, but an increase by the right amount — and this is beyond the scope of this
thesis.)
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Why RESET leads to entropy increase: The memory consists in N DOFs, and these
N DOF represent N bits. The Hilbert space for each DOF has two subspaces which
represent ‘0’ and ‘1’ (and for simplicity are assumed to be of the same volume). A
binary measurement (of the form: is the molecule on the righthand side of the box?)
takes the memory DOF which is initially in the 0 subspace to 1 if YES, by implementing
Tˆ. But it remains in the ‘0’ if NO, by implementing the identity operator, Iˆ.
Vˆ = Pˆ⊗ Tˆ + (1ˆ− Pˆ)⊗ 1ˆ (2.59)
where Pˆ is a projective measurement on the system (‘is it on the rightside?’). Then the
controlled operation on the system can be represented by the following unitary:
Uˆ = Uˆ0 ⊗ Pˆ0 + Uˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ1 (2.60)
where P0 is a projection on the 0 subspace — so if the memory is not in the 0 subspace
this branch of the unitary gets killed off, thus just implementing the other operation on
the system.
Now to consider RESET of the memory. The entropy associated to a memory register
with N DOF (or n systems), where the 0 subspace has volume V and the 1 subspace is
also V: is Nln2V, because the distribution is uniform over all the available space. 53
Before the reset operation, the entropy of the N bit is Nln2V — and afterwards it is
NlnV, so there has been an entropy decrease of ln2 per bit. But the assumption was that
the total evolution of the demon and all the systems were unitary — and thus, phase
space preserving. The memory device’s entropy decreases and so the environment (the
demon computer and all other systems) must have an associated increase in entropy.
But “if the computer is to carry out the reset operation repeatably, its own entropy
cannot increase without limit. So a repeatable reset process dumps at least entropy ln2
per bit into the environment. In the special case where the environment is a heat bath
at temperature T Landauer’s principle becomes the requirement that reset generates
Tln2 per bit” (Wallace, 2014, p. 721).
To sum up: Whether something is physically possible, depends on which physical
theory we look at. According to thermodynamics, a Maxwell demon is not possible.
According CM/QM, it looks like a Maxwell demon is possible. But we need to consider
how the Demon operates, because a crucial part of the Second Law is considering how
53But one might object: if the memory is either in 0 or 1 — which has the same phase space volume
as after reset to 0. i.e. in both cases the accessible phase space is V. But if we know the state of the
memory device, i.e. if it 0 or 1, then the reset can be implemented without entropy cost, because this
is reset of known data (cf. (Feynman, 1996, p. 144): “if we know the atom’s position, we expend no
energy in resetting, irrespective of where the atom starts out”. (See (Ladyman and Robertson, 2013, p.
267) for more details). But this would require the state of the memory device to recorded elsewhere
in the total system — and this would need to be reset — and so the problem gets pushed back a stage.
So we can’t know whether the memory device in 0 or 1.
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the environment is affected by a given thermodynamic process. Insofar as the total
system (i.e. the system including all control mechanisms) is a statistical mechanical
system, we know that the Gibbs entropy is non-decreasing. Thus LP explains where
the compensating entropy increase comes from.
2.29.4 The Status of Landauer’s principle
Earman and Norton (1998, 1999) have sharply criticised the literature on ‘saving the
SL’ with LP.54 Much of their critique I agree with. For example, I completely agree that
arguments aiming to show that thermal fluctuations will frustrate the mechanism of a
particular Maxwell demon, still leave it open that there could be another realisation of
the demon. But here I dissent from their rejection of LP.
Earman and Norton point that proofs of LP either assume TDSL or do not. If they
do, these are ‘sound’ and merely of pedagogic value. That is, these proofs have shown
how TD is internally consistent, but haven’t established that the TDSL is not violated
sometimes — this has just been assumed from the outset. Alternatively, a proof may
not assume SL —- and thus has a chance of ‘saving it’. In this case, they call the proof
‘profound’. But such a proof would need a new physical principle — which they claim
is not forthcoming.
But there is an ambiguity in the phase ‘a new physical principle’; does ‘new’ mean
‘never before’ or just ‘external to TD’? I think the latter reading suffices, since the
Maxwell’s demon was conjured up to probe a theory we already have: TD. No one
thinks Maxwell’s demon is a battle cry for a new fundamental physics, but rather it is
a device for illuminating our current theories. Thus, whether an argument for LP is
sound or profound depends on whether the resources used are external to TD or not.
I think this explains Wallace (2014)’s claim that LP is (a) Sound with respect to SM,
yet (b) profound with respect to TD. (a) In Section 2.29.3, we just assumed that the
controlling system + controlled system, i.e. the demon (including its memory), the
system it acts upon and the surrounding environment, all evolved unitarily. This had
the implication that overall Gibbs entropy won’t decrease. (b) But this dynamical
assumption is not identical to the TDSL. (In Section 2.31.2, I will argue that the TDSL
should not be identified with ‘SM is not decreasing’. The main idea is: these unitary
dynamics also imply that the entropy non-increasing so this dynamical assumption
doesn’t play the same role as the TDSL). Thus, we have not assumed the TDSL straight
up, instead we have used resources from outside of TD, and so in this sense LP is
profound with respect to TD.
54Feyerabend’s, and Popper’s critique is similar in spirit to Earman and Norton: all involve charges of
circularity. “To sum up: the attempt to save the second law from systematic deviations, apart from
being circular and based upon an ambiguous use of the term ‘information’, is also ill-conceived, for
such deviations are in principle possible” Feyerabend (1966).
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Thus, we should think of LP as explaining why we can’t reliably make the TD entropy
decrease, or construct an engine more efficient than a Carnot engine— given the
assumption that phase space volume can’t decrease. This is enlightening because
it is not immediate what the connection between SM and TD entropy is (and will
be discussed throughout this Chapter). There is a danger that LP is taken to say: if
we assume entropy (SM) is non-decreasing, then entropy (TD) is non-decreasing. Of
course, this is unenlightening until we see that ‘entropy’ in the antecedent refers to
the SM entropy, and in the consequent ‘entropy’ refers to the TD entropy. Thus, LP is
informative, and not superfluous.
2.30 Conclusion about the scope of the TDSL: the verdict
on options 1-4.
To conclude, I have rejected option 4. (the Maxwellian view). We saw that Landauer’s
principle explains why—despite our improved control of individual molecules since
Maxwell’s day— we still can’t build an engine more efficient than a Carnot engine to
solve the world’s energy crisis.
We saw that options 1., 2., and 3. come together in the TD limit. Given that macro-
scopic systems have vastly many constituents (∼ 1023), we can see why the TDSL
captures something true about our world, despite the initial doubts cast by the atomic
nature of matter in Section 2.24. But does this have the implication that the TDSL only
applies to macroscopic systems? No, because a demon cannot harness the fluctuations —
no matter how small the system is. Instead, it is an open question whether TD applies to
small n systems: ultimately, this will depend on whether TD is useful in these domains.
In the case of Brownian motion it is unclear whether the concepts of heat and work
are applicable to individual particles. But much recent work, e.g. that of Linden et al.
(2010) on the smallest possible thermal machines, suggests that TD is useful for small
systems.
If we are not compelled to restrict the TDSL to large systems, then we do not have
to endorse 3. (the Statistical view). So, what should we conclude about the scope of
the TDSL? My verdict respects the motivation for option 2. (the Probabilistic view) but
emphasises how close this is to the strict view.
Probabilistic fluctuations allow spontaneous differences in temperature, pressure
and other macrovariables. But there is no way to harness these fluctuations without
feedback processes, or controlled operations, to make an engine more efficient than a
Carnot engine. Even with a small system, we cannot create an engine with an efficiency
greater than a Carnot engine: because to do so would require feedback or control
processes. And LP tells us that such processes have an entropic cost. Thus, given weak
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assumptions at the SM level (roughly the preservation of phase space volume) we see
why despite our ability to manipulate individual molecules we cannot construct an
engine more efficient than a Carnot engine.
Nonetheless we still need the ‘reliability’ caveat: we cannot have the strict TDSL
unaltered — there is one counterexample. Earlier I suggested that there could be
an ignorant yet ‘lucky demon’ that doesn’t perform a controlled operation, but just
guesses which side to insert the piston. Whilst this will not be a reliable method, we
have still had one cycle more efficient than Carnot. Indeed, this is the motivation for
the ‘probabilistic’ version: we are very unlikely to get lucky.
Hence, my (uncontroversial) verdict is: the TDSL must be altered to say that we
cannot reliably transfer heat from cold to hot, or turn heat into work. But perhaps this is
not really an alteration of the TDSL. This is because the cyclic component of the TDSL
already captures this: one way to ensure that a process can be implemented reliably is
if the final state is the same as the initial state (i.e. a cycle) — because the process can
then just be repeated (cf. Wallace (2014)).
2.31 The Image of the TDSL in SM
What is the ‘image’ of TDSL in SM? Given the difficulty, or unnaturalness, of the
distinction between heat and work (discussed in Part I on the First Law), the Kelvin
formulation does not have an obvious correlate. Indeed, cyclic processes and Carnot en-
gines do not have the starring role in SM that they do in TD. Transferring heat between
bodies of different temperatures is also not the main concern of SM either. Instead (as
discussed extensively throughout this thesis), non-equilibrium SM is concerned with
qualitatively describing the approach to equilibrium (from non-equilibrium states).
And equilibrium SM calculates various macroscopic quantities from an equilibrium
probability distribution, such as the canonical ensemble (and the partition function
Z plays a starring role). This is the sense in which SM and TD have different subject
matters.
Thus, the natural way to connect these two subject matters in order to find the image
of the TDSL within SM is this: the TDSL has the implication that the TD entropy cannot
decrease (for an isolated system). Hence, finding the realiser of the TD entropy in SM
seems key to finding the ‘image’ of the TDSL in SM. Indeed, Callender (1999) calls this
the search for the ‘The Holy Grail’: find a SM function to call ‘entropy’ and establish
that it is non-decreasing.
Traditionally, the search for the Holy Grail has led to strife — there are (at least) two
SM entropies vying for the position: the Boltzmann entropy and the Gibbs entropy. In
the next Section I briefly outline why this is so, before rejecting the traditional Holy Grail.
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I argue that these considerations are besides the point for the TDSL because I claim that
‘non-decreasing SM entropy’ is neither necessary nor sufficient for a criterion of the
SM realiser. Instead I offer a different criterion which emphasises the importance of
quasi-static processes in TD, and will happily fit my overall endorsement of a Gibbsian
view.
2.31.1 The Strife and the Holy Grail
The search for the Holy Grail — a non-decreasing SM function to call the ‘entropy’ —
has led to strife because neither the Gibbs nor the Boltzmann entropy match the TD
concept exactly. The Boltzmann entropy, SB, can decrease (as we saw in Section 2.26).
The Gibbs entropy, SG, differs from the TD entropy because it is not a property of an
individual system, but a property of the ensemble.55
Debate then ensues about which SM entropy is the ‘right’ microphysical entropy.
Callender (2001) argues that the virtues of the Boltzmann entropy outweigh its vices;
the fact SB can decrease unlike STD should not militate against choosing SB.
But it seems to me that the traditional strife is misguided for three reasons. (1): It is
not clear that Gibbs and Boltzmann entropies must be considered as rivals on my view
of inter-theoretic relations. If these entropies are truly distinct (cf. the appendix) contra
the discussion in Section 2.6, then they need not be rivals — but different realisations in
different theories.
(2): Differences between the TD and SM concepts of entropy should be expected.
As I discussed extensively in Chapter 1, two theories will inevitably employ different
concepts. They are different theories, after all. Furthermore, in order to secure a
reduction, the lower-level theories’ quantities must only capture the relevant, or crucial,
features of the higher-level theories quantities. I spelt this out as the SM realiser
fulfilling the TD role. (The idea being that some features of the TD concepts will not be
crucial, and so not part of the role). Thus, if being a categorical, rather than probabilistic
property is not a crucial part of the TD entropy role, then this problem can be dismissed.
(3): Of course, this raises the question: which differences are important, i.e. prevent
a SM entropy from playing the TD role? Boltzmannians might argue that being a
property of the individual system is an essential part of the TD role. But I think that the
TD role of STD as defined by the Holy grail does not capture the right features of the
TDSL: I now argue that a non-decreasing SM function is neither necessary or sufficient
condition for playing the STD role.
55But, as discussed earlier, this difference arguably disappears in the quantum case; the distinction
between the ensemble and the individual system is blurred when the density matrix is taken to be
the fundamental description of the system.
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2.31.2 Non-decreasing SM entropy is neither necessary nor sufficient
Why should we think that a non-decreasing SM entropy function is the SM realiser of
the TDSL? ‘SM entropy is non-decreasing’ isn’t a necessary condition for an SM realiser:
sometimes the SM entropy can decrease, but additional assumptions are required for
this to raise any issues for TDSL.
The ‘thermodynamic entropy law’ is a corollary of the TDSL: if TDSL, then STD is
non-decreasing. Thus, if the STD decreases, then the TDSL is violated. (If NOT-STD
non-decreasing, then NOT-TDSL). But unless the STD is identified with the SSM, it is
unclear what the consequences of a decreasing SSM function are for the TDSL. The
thermodynamic entropy STD is only defined at equilibrium: as many have emphasised,
it is silent about what happens away from equilibrium. 56 Thus, if a candidate SM
entropy decreases sometimes, this needn’t be problematic. Hence, ‘non-decreasing SM
entropy’ is not the right desiderata for microphysical realiser of the TDSL. Instead, the
SM entropy must not decrease in certain situations: a decreasing SM function only
conflicts with the TDSL if the SM entropy decreases between isolated equilibrium states.
In particular, we saw in Section 2.23 that the STD is non-decreasing in quasi-static
adiabatic processes — thus, this is the behaviour that an SM realiser must capture. This
is the true Holy grail.
Whilst I am advocating a Gibbsian view of SM, the fact the SG is non-decreasing
does not suffice. The dynamical fact that SG is non-decreasing was a key assumption
in LP, which makes it tempting to claim that SG plays the role of STD. But whilst the
fine-grained Gibbs entropy is non-decreasing — but it is also non-increasing, and thus
doesn’t display the same behaviour as the thermodynamic entropy, STD. Thus, being
‘non-decreasing’ is not sufficient: I now discuss an essential part of the STD role – its
behaviour in quasi-static and non-quasi-static changes.
2.31.3 Quasi-static changes in SM
In this Section, I explicate the image of the TDSL in SM. As I have emphasised through-
out this Part of the Chapter, slow changes to external parameters are required. This can
be understood in quantum SM in the Gibbsian framework, but fits less naturally into a
Boltzmannian picture.
The TDSL claims that there is an important difference between quasi-static adiabatic
changes and non-quasi-static adiabatic changes to a system: the latter is STD increasing,
whereas in the former STD is constant. How do we see this distinction in SM? If it is to
mirror the TD situation, the SSM must be constant when an external parameter is slowly
altered, but increase when the external parameter changes quickly. In this Section, I
56Indeed Uffink points out that the Kelvin and Clausius formulations don’t say that the entropy must be
monotonically increasing.
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outline how slow (quasi-static) and rapid (non-quasi-static) changes are considered in
quantum statistical mechanics.
In quantum mechanics, if the system is isolated:
|ψ(t)〉 = ei
∫
Hˆdt |ψ(0)〉 . (2.61)
Alternatively we can describe the systems state with the following density matrix:
ρ(t0) = Σi pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| . (2.62)
In (Gibbsian) SM, thermal equilibrium is represented by the canonical distribu-
tion.57 The canonical distribution represents the probability of the system being in a
given energy eigenstate φj(t1) (|ψi(0)〉 = |Ei(0)〉). Each state evolves under the time-
independent Schrödinger equation (and so is unchanging). As such, the density matrix
is unchanging in time too:
ρˆ = Σiωii |Ei(0)〉 〈Ei(0)| (2.63)
But once we change an external parameter at t > t1 (such as the volume of the
box), we have a time-dependent energy operator. Thus, the state of the system will be
changing over time: |ψi(t)〉 6= |Ei(0)〉. In what I follows I first consider what happens
when the external parameter is changed quasi-statically, and then when it is changed
rapidly.
Slow change: As discussed extensively earlier, a quasi-static process is one where
the external parameters are changed so slowly that the system is approximately in
equilibrium. Taking this expectation from TD, the hope is that if the external parameter
is changed slowly enough, the system will remain approximately in the canonical
ensemble, i.e. ‘close to equilibrium’. And this expectation is correct, provided we can
establish:
1. φj(t) is an energy eigenstate of H(t) for t > t1, i.e. |ψi(t)〉 = |Ei(t)〉
2. The probability distribution has the form of the canonical distribution: i.e. an
exponential dependence on the energy eigenvalue.
1. is established by Ehrenfest’s principle:
57The microcanonical and grand canonical distribution can also represent thermal equilibria. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, in principle, the choice of distribution depends on certain features of the situation:
can the system exchange energy with the environment? Can the particle number change? But for
all practical purposes, in large N situations, the distributions can be used interchangeably, and the
canonical distribution is often the workhorse of equilibrium SM.
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Ehrenfest’s Principle: If the energy eigenstates of H(t) are non degenerate for
times t > t1, if φj(t1) is an energy eigenstate of H(t1), if φj(t) is the state evolved
from φj(t1) according to the Schrödinger equation, and if the external parameter
changes very slowly, then φj(t), for each time t > t1, is very nearly an energy
eigenstate of H(t) at the corresponding time. In the mathematical limit of a finite
change in the external parameter occurring over an infinite time interval, “is very
nearly” becomes “is” (Baierlein, 1971, p. 380).
For this ‘slow change’ in an external parameter, ρˆ = Σiωii |Ei(t)〉 〈Ei(t)| (where
elsewhere ωii = pi). This means that the energy eigenstates change over time, but
the changes to the Hamiltonian do not take earlier energy eigenstates to later non-
eigenstates.
2. Whilst there is no general proof of 2., Baierlein (1971) motivates why it is a
reasonable assumption, as follows.
Each state φj(t) alters in the interval t > t1, but the probability pj assigned to it
stays the same: in this way, a given eigenstate carries its probability with it. As the
energy eigenstates shift, the distribution shifts (as seen on the right hand of the figure
2.8). The question is: does this new distribution have the canonical form? For the
distribution to re-arrange into a gaussian distribution, the eigenstates would need to
cross (i.e. the originally high probability lowest energy eigenstate must be shifted to a
much higher energy eigenstate, in order to be the peak of the gaussian distribution).
But as Baierlein says, if there is no degeneracy no vertical lines will cross each other,
and so such radically different distributions are not possible.
But we might think that even if such radical changes to the distribution are not
possible, why think the new distribution is ‘suitably close’ to the canonical distribution?
Whilst a hard and fast proof is not available, there are two heuristic reasons to think
it will be: 1. temperature at the later time is chosen using constancy of SG, and thus
exponential curve placed at the right height. 2. Even if the distribution differs from
the canonical distribution for some energies (‘out in the tails’), only the states near 〈E〉
are important for estimating the macro properties, so provided that the distribution
matches the canonical distribution near 〈E〉 , this approximation will be successful.
Rapid change: when an external parameter changes rapidly, the system does not
remain close to equilibrium, and there is no reason to expect a probability distribution
of canonical form to apply during the change of the external parameter. In this case,
ρ(t) = pi |ψi(t)〉 〈ψi(t)|, where |ψi(t)〉 6= |Ei(t)〉. If we were to write ρ(t) in the energy
eigenbasis, we would see that the density matrix is not diagonal in this basis: ρ(t) =
Σijωij |Ei(t)〉 〈Ej(t)|.
But when the external parameter is no longer varying, we expect the system to reach
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Figure 2.8: The exponential approximation. Diagram from (Baierlein, 1971, p. 385).
a new equilibrium, i.e. canonical distribution. Of course, justifying this is controversial,
and is part of finding the underpinning to the Minus First Law. Discussing the topic of
the approach the equilibrium (and the associated entropy SG increase) is the project
of Chapter 3. For now, we follow the pragmatic move of Baierlein, and leave the
justification of this practice until the next Chapter.
The pragmatic move is just to adopt a new canonical distribution with energy eigen-
states appropriate for the new volume. In other words, we coarse-grain:
ρ = Σijωij |Ei(t)〉 〈Ej(t)| → ρcg = Σiωii |Ei(t)〉 〈Ei(t)| , (2.64)
where we assume that the off-diagonal terms wij, i 6= j are small so Σijωij |Ei(t)〉 〈Ej(t)| ≈
Σiωii |Ei(t)〉 〈Ei(t)|, where t is a long time after the external parameter has stopped
changing.
Change in Entropy: In the slow change, the probability distribution evolves accord-
ing to the microdynamics, and so SG = −kB
∫
ρlnρ is constant. In the rapid change,
we just adopt a new probability distribution, ρcg, which is distinct from the evolved
distribution, ρ: this adopted distribution has discarded all the information about the
initial conditions and correlations, and so SG has increased.
Whilst it is tempting to claim that the original distribution ρ is the true distribution,
and so SG has not really increased, in the next Chapter I will argue that this is not the
case: ρcg is not a ‘distorted’ or false distribution.
Thus, we can find the image of the TDSL in QSM, by considering the canonical
ensemble and the quantum adiabatic theorem, but we still need to rely on certain
controversial issues in non-equilibrium SM (i.e. that during the approach to equilibrium
the Gibbs entropy increases).
The above discussion employs a Gibbsian picture of SM. I now attempt to connect
this discussion to the Boltzmannian framework, but conclude it is less natural. In the
Boltzmannian picture, the measure is defined over the available energy hypersurface.
In a TD process, such as a quasi-static adiabatic expansion, the available energy hyper-
surface changes — and so the area of which the measure is defined changes. Insofar as
the Boltzmannian measure is just one of the Gibbsian ensembles, perhaps the above
account can be carried across. But the above account drew a crucial distinction between
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just redefining the ensemble (or in Boltzmannian terms: the measure) and the ensemble
evolving according to the microdynamics. On a Boltzmannian picture, both sides of the
distinction just look as if we are redefining the measure — and so it is hard to see how
import this account into the Boltzmannian framework. In this respect, this account tells
in favour of a Gibbsian account.
2.32 Conclusion
The project of this part of the thesis has been to see if TD can be reduced to SM: which
means — is there an SM realiser of the TD role? The first Sections of this part worked on
articulating this role: I emphasised three things (i) the different types of irreversibility
in play (ii) the distinction between the Minus First Law and the Second Law and (iii)
the importance of the environment.
The discovery of the atomic nature of matter might have lead to the belief that the
TDSL is false — because of the demons arise from the depths of the lower-level theory.
I considered in what sense a Maxwellian demon is possible. Of course according to TD,
such a demon is not possible, whereas the existence of such a demon looks plausible
according to CM/QM. Yet Landauer’s principle shows that — provided the mechanism
of the demon obeys SM assumptions — such a demon is not possible.
Whilst the TDSL is not false, one might have nonetheless thought its scope needed to
be limited, as a result of fluctuations. I argued that the considerations about the scope
of the TDSL and whether it is a mere ‘statistical truth’ were often concerned with the
Minus First law — the approach to equilibrium, rather than the TDSL. The fluctuations
which throw a shadow of doubt on the TDSL disappear in the thermodynamic limit,
suggesting that provided we are talking about macroscopic systems, the TDSL applies.
The scope of the TDSL only had to be altered to include a ‘reliability’ caveat.
Because of the different concepts — most importantly heat and work — in ther-
modynamics, finding a correlate to the classic formulations of the Second Law is not
straightforward. The natural tendency is to try to find a non-decreasing entropy func-
tion: what Callender dubs the search for the Holy Grail. In the literature, the concern is
then whether the Boltzmann or the Gibbs entropy is the right candidate. But I argued
that this is neither necessary nor sufficient: instead we need an entropy function that
is constant during quasi-static adiabatic processes and increasing in non-quasi-static
processes.
In order to find a SM realiser of this TD entropy role, I took a Gibbsian approach.
By using Ehrenfest’s adiabatic principle, we found that the Gibbs entropy is constant
during a quasi-static adiabatic process, but increased during a non-quasi static, i.e.
rapid, process.
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Part V. The Third Law
There are many formulations of the Third Law. Here I will not discuss the unattainability
principle: the claim that it is impossible to lower the temperature of a system to T = 0
in a finite number of steps (Masanes and Oppenheim, 2017). Instead, I focus on the
‘heat theorem’ also known as The Nernst Postulate. According to this formulation, the
Third Law states that:
limT→0S(T, X) = 0 (2.65)
where X represents the variables, other than T, that S depends on. This law says that as
the temperature tends to absolute zero, the entropy tends to zero. Often this statement
is weakened: the entropy need not be zero, just some finite constant. For example, the
requirement becomes that the entropy density S/N vanishes as T → 0 and N → ∞
(and so a finite S is permitted). Thus: S/N → 0 as T → 0 and N → ∞.
All hands agree that the Third Law, also known as Nernst’s postulate, has less bite
than the other laws — unlike those, it does not implicitly define a new quantity. Instead,
the Third Law defines an absolute scale for entropy, as the Second Law only defined
entropy differences. (Recall from Part IV that the entropy was only defined relationally,
with respect to a given reference state.) Why think that defining an absolute scale for
entropy is an important thing to do? This question is especially pressing given that
there is much debate over the physical content of the Third Law — and whether it is
violated. For example, Wald (1997) disputes whether the Nernst postulate should even
be considered to be a real law.58
Defining an absolute scale for entropy, which is what is achieved if the TD entropy
is zero at T = 0, means that entropy is no longer a relational quantity as it is now
absolute.
Why is this significant? It means that we can compare entropies across disparate
systems. As we saw in Part IV, there has to be a quasi-static process connecting
two states in order to define an entropy difference between them. Thus, the entropy
difference is only defined between states in the same state-space, Ξ.59 Because of this, it
is hard to see how to compare the TD entropy of a system such as a gas with the TD
entropy of a magnet — their respective states live in different spaces and so there is
no common reference state. The significance of this point is opaque to me: do we ever
need to compare the TD entropies of a gas and a magnet? Practically speaking, perhaps
not. But if we cannot compare across the entropy of disparate systems, this tells against
TD entropy as being a universally applicable property.
A consequence of the Third Law is that the heat capacities must tend to zero at T = 0.
58Wald (1997, p. 1) says that “the main of this paper is to attempt to lay to rest the “Nernst theorem” as a
law of thermodynamics.”
59I am grateful to Erik Curiel for this point.
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This is because:60
S(B)− S(A) =
∫ B
A
dT
Cv
T
(2.66)
which comes from
∂S
∂T
=
∂S
∂E
.
∂E
∂T
=
Cv
T
. (2.67)
If the entropy at T = 0 is finite, then the lefthand side of equation (2.66) must be finite
— implying that the righthand side must be too: the integral must converge, and so Cv
must head to zero at least as quickly as T does. Thus, as T → 0, Cv → Tn for n ≥ 1.
We can examine individual cases to check whether this is true. First let us take the
ideal gas. Since E = 32 kBT , Cv =
3
2 kB. Because this is a constant, it obviously does not
tend to zero. But this is unsurprising: we already saw that the ideal gas model breaks
down at low temperatures (as seen in Part II). Yet the low temperature problems are not
limited to the ideal gas case. Other classical models, such as the Dulong-Petitt model
have a constant heat capacity, and so face the same problem.
But the condition T → 0, Cv → Tn for n ≥ 1 does hold in quantum models. For
example, the Deybe model of solids models the phonon contribution to the heat capacity
in such a way that Cv ∝ T3. The electrons in a metal can be treated as a Fermi gas, for
which Cv ∝ T. Thus, Tong (2012, p. 134) claims that “the Third Law is an admission
that the low temperature world is not classical. It is quantum.” That is: there is a QSM,
but not CSM realiser of the Third Law.
Of course, now the question is whether the Third Law always holds for the quantum,
beyond the examples I have cited. Wald claims that whilst the Third Law holds for
many quantum systems, there are nonetheless counterexamples. But the QSM realiser
of the Third Law need not be exceptionless. Nonetheless, Tong (2012) gives some
generic reasons for thinking that QSM can explain the Third Law, as follows.
If the ground state is degenerate, there will be many microstates corresponding to
the same energy eigenvalue — and so S is non-zero. (If there were only one microstate
corresponding to the ground state, where E = E0, then the entropy is zero: S =
−kBlogΩ = −kBlog1 = 0). For a degenerate ground state, there is more than one
energy eigenstate corresponding to the lowest energy eigenvalue E0. But is worrying?
After all, we considered the weakened Third law, where S → k as T → 0. Does
a degenerate ground state violate this weakened Third Law? It could do. It is not
guaranteed that the entropy will tend to a constant as T → 0: the ground state could
be more degenerate than the other energy eigenstates. And so rather than S → k, the
entropy could increase as E→ E0 tends to the ground state.
But Tong (2012, p. 134) claims there are generic mathematical reasons to think that
the ground state will not be degenerate for a large system. It is hard for large matrices
60Equation 2.66 provides the link between theory and experiment — if we can measure the heat capacity
at different temperatures then we can work out the entropy changes.
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to be degenerate, as any nonzero off-diagonal term — no matter how small — will
lift the degeneracy. Thus, if the ground state is non-degenerate, there will be only one
microstate associated to it, which ensures that S→ 0, as T → 0.
2.33 Conclusion: TD reduces to SM
I claimed that TD would be reduced to SM if a SM quantity could be found that plays the
nomological role of the quantities implicitly defined by the laws of TD: (i) temperature,
(ii) energy and (iii) entropy.
(i) For the case of temperature, I claimed that ∂E∂S plays the role of temperature: it is
the property which two systems have in common if they are in equilibrium with one
another.
(ii) The case of energy looked deceptively easy, since the conservation of energy
is a basic feature of the microdynamics underlying SM. But I argued that the SM
realiser must also capture the distinction between heat and work. Within QSM we
found the realiser of the First Law: ∆Es = ∆Ws + ∆Q, where ∆W =
∫ τ
0
〈
∂H
∂t
〉
ρ
dt, and
∆Q =
∫ τ
0 〈[Hs, VSE]〉ρdt where VSE represents the interaction between the system and
the environment.
(iii) Finding the SM realiser of the thermodynamic entropy required that first we
deflate some of the hype surrounding the TDSL. In particular, I emphasised the im-
portance of quasi-static processes in TD: ‘slow’ or ‘gentle’ interventions, rather than
uncontrolled interventions on the system. I claimed that the essential role of STD
is that it is constant during a quasi-static adiabatic process but increases during a
non-quasi-static process. I argued that the Gibbs entropy SG =
∫ −kBρlnρ plays this
role.
One general theme of this Chapter is that it is often perspicuous to consider quantum
rather than classical SM — breaking with tradition in much of the philosophy of physics
literature, which often only considers the classical case. Arguably, this is because much
of the literature focuses on the approach to equilibrium (considered in the next Chapter).
There, the problem (and its solution) of the approach to equilibrium takes the same
form in both QSM and CSM.
But TD describes what happens once the system is in thermal equilibrium. Consider-
ing external interventions on a thermally isolated system is naturally understood in
QSM as intervening on the external parameters, such as volume, in the Hamiltonian
which then defines the available energy eigenstates. But in classical case, there is no
potential term in the Hamiltonian of the ideal gas, so it is less clear how to think about
such interventions. The ideal gas is — as the name suggests — an idealised system, but
one that can be derived from the quantum partition function under various assump-
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tions. Considering this derivation allowed us to see when this idealisation broke down:
when the gas is cold or dense.
A second, related, general theme: SM and TD have —to some extent— different
subject matters. The above example of quasi-static processes is a case in point: neither
equilibrium nor non-equilibrium SM focuses on quasi-static processes, and so connect-
ing these different subject matters required some work: merely finding a non-decreasing
entropy function would not suffice.
Finally, insofar as we can say that there is a ‘received view’ of the reduction of TD to
SM, one might caricature it as follows: TD reduces to SM through bridge laws such as
T =< K >. Yet I have claimed that we can find the realisers of the functional roles of
TD quantities in SM and thus: TD reduces to SM — in my sense of the word — but not
in the way commonly assumed.
2.34 Appendix: Gibbs and Boltzmann entropy
The Boltzmann and Gibbs frameworks are undeniably conceptually different. There
are (at least) three ways in which they differ: (i) their definitions of equilibrium, (ii)
their definitions of entropy and (iii) their object of study (Lavis, 2005). Nonetheless,
their entropies are numerically identical at their respective equilibria. Furthermore,
the two entropies are inter-derivable, as I now show. The philosophical significance
of their inter-derivability explains why there are no ramifications for the physicists’
lackadaisical attitude to these conceptual differences.
The Boltzmann entropy measures the number of microstates compatible with the
current macrostate the system is in:
SB(E) = kBlnΩ(E), (2.68)
where Ω(E) is the number of microstates of the system with energy E. This is often
motivated by considering the combinatorics of, e.g. coin flipping: there are 45 possible
ways to get 2 heads in 10 coin flips. Likewise, there are various arrangements of
molecules. But often the possible states are not discrete like coin flip case, and so a
measure µ is defined on the phase space. The Boltzmannian definition of equilibrium is
the largest macrostate 61.
In contrast, the starting point for Gibbs entropy is a probability distribution. Hence,
the object of study is claimed not to be the individual system (as in the case of Boltz-
mann) but the ‘ensemble’, i.e. the probability distribution.62 This probability will be
stationary at equilibrium: ∂p∂t = 0.
61However, see Werndl and Frigg (2015a,b) for an alternative definition.
62Again, this distinction between the state of the individual system, and the probability distribution is
deflated if ρ is taken to be the density matrix and to represent an individual system.
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SG(pi) = −kBΣn pilnpi (2.69)
In textbook presentations, the two frameworks are blurred together by the so-called
fundamental assumption of statistical mechanics: each microstate is equally likely. The
probability that the system with fixed energy E is in a given state |n〉 is then simply:
p(n) =
1
Ω(E)
(2.70)
This is the microcanonical distribution: i.e. the uniform distribution over the available
energy hypersurface.
From Gibbs to Boltzmann: The Boltzmann entropy can be recovered from the Gibbs
formula:
S(p) = −kBΣn p(n)lnp(n) (2.71)
Using equation 2.70,
S(p) = −kBΣn 1Ω ln
1
Ω
= kB
n
Ω
lnΩ (2.72)
n labels the number of possible states |n〉 and we know the number of states is Ω:
thus we recover equation 2.68.
From Boltzmann to Gibbs: We can also go from the Boltzmann entropy to the Gibbs
entropy (without the assumption that each state is equally likely, i.e. that the probability
distribution to be used is the microcanonical distribution).
Assume we have W identical copies of the states, where W is very large.63 We then
can say that the number of systems in state |n〉 is p(n)W. How many ways are there to
put p(n).W systems into state |n〉 for each n? This gives us the number of microstates.
Ω =
W!
∏n(p(n)W)!
(2.73)
We then use Stirling’s formula:
lnN! = NlnN − N + 1
2
ln2piN +O( 1
N
) (2.74)
We will only use the first two terms of this approximation.
S = kBln
W!
∏n(p(n)W)!
= kB(WlnW −W − ln∏
n
(p(n)W)!) (2.75)
S = kB(WlnW −W − Σn(p(n)Wln(p(n)W − p(n)W) (2.76)
63In this case, the ‘large N’ assumption allows us to go from probabilities to actualities.
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Σn p(n)W = W so the second and fourth terms cancel.
S = kB(WlnW−Σn(p(n)Wln(p(n)W) = kB(WlnW−Σn[p(n)Wlnp(n)+ p(n)WlnW)]
(2.77)
For the same reason, the first and third terms now cancel. Thus we end with an
expression for the entropy S of the ensemble of W systems.
S = −kBΣn p(n)Wlnp(n) (2.78)
Because S is extensive, we can now divide by W to get the entropy of the individual
system:
S = −kBΣn p(n)lnp(n). (2.79)
This is the familiar Gibbs entropy.64
Thus, Boltzmann and Gibbs entropies are, in a sense, interderivable but conceptually
distinct.
64More generally, when the probability distribution can be representing anything, this is the Shannon
information entropy.
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3 Asymmetry, abstraction and
autonomy: justifying coarse-graining
in statistical mechanics
3.1 Introduction
Many processes occur in only one direction of time. People age, buildings crumble,
eggs smash and gases spontaneously expand — towards the future. Rewinding a film
of such processes displays an unphysical sequence of events: eggs cannot unsmash and
people cannot become younger. A more technical way of describing the ‘directedness’
of such processes is to say that the laws governing these processes are not time-reversal
invariant (TRI). That is, the time-reversal operator T does not send solutions of the
equations — i.e. histories of the systems at issue — to solutions. (The time-reversal
operator varies across theories, but here I take T to be the map t 7→ −t.)
In stark contrast, the laws of fundamental physics are TRI.1 The two sequences
of events displayed by a film playing forwards, and in rewind, are both physical
possibilities. That is, they are both solutions to the laws of fundamental physics. This
leads to a traditional problem: given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin
all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the
asymmetry manifest elsewhere?
It is not only the processes of our everyday experience that are irreversible; many
equations within physics are also irreversible.2 In particular, many equations in statisti-
cal physics are irreversible, such as the Boltzmann equation, the Langevin equation,
the Pauli master equation...the list goes on.
But within statistical mechanics (SM), much progress has been made with this tra-
ditional problem. The irreversible behaviour exhibited in non-equilibrium SM can be
described by equations collectively called ‘master equations’, which give ‘a purpose-
fully incomplete account of the conservative evolution of some underlying microscopic
1Well almost: the relevant symmetry is the CPT-invariance. But the failure of TR-invariance in subatomic
physics doesn’t underpin the asymmetries discussed here. For the subtleties of TRI, cf. e.g. Roberts
(2013, 2017).
2Throughout this chapter I take ‘irreversible’ to mean non-TRI: in the terminology of chapter 2,
irreversibilityT rather irreversibilityQ or irreversibilityR.
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systems’ (Liu and Emch, 2002, p. 479). This chapter focuses on one framework, originat-
ing in the work of Zwanzig (1960). The idea is that the irreversible equations of SM can
be constructed from the reversible equations (of either classical or quantum mechanics).
I will dub this the ‘Zwanzig-Zeh-Wallace’ (ZZW) framework, since Zeh and Wallace
are prominent later authors who have developed this framework.
However, this framework depends upon the procedure of coarse-graining, which has
been heavily criticised. Redhead describes coarse-graining as “one of the most deceitful
artifices I have ever come across in theoretical physics” (Redhead, 1996, p. 31) as
quoted in (Uffink, 2010, p. 197). Amongst the list of accusations against coarse-graining
are: protests of empirical inadequacy, subjectivity and incompatibility with scientific
realism. So, if this construction method is to solve the puzzle of time-asymmetry in SM,
a justification for coarse-graining is needed. The project of this chapter is to give such a
justification.
3.1.1 Prospectus
I will answer two objections to coarse-graining in statistical mechanics. In Section 3.2,
I expound the ZZW framework and in Section 3.3, I consider why this framework
works. Then I discuss two objections to coarse-graining, namely that the asymmetry
resulting from coarse-graining is illusory and/or anthropocentric. Section 3.4.1 outlines
these two objections in detail. Section 3.4.2 describes the most prevalent —and I argue
unsatisfactory— justification of coarse-graining in the literature, the measurement
imprecision justification, which lies behind these objections. In Section 3.5, I outline
my alternative justification of coarse-graining which can answer the two objections:
these answers are given in Section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. In Section 3.8, I draw some
broader consequences from this alternative justification: the coarse-grained asymmetry
is weakly emergent.
3.2 The ZZW framework
The ZZW framework provides a recipe for constructing irreversible dynamics from
the underlying reversible dynamics. This framework works with both quantum and
classical mechanics (Zwanzig, 1961), although I mainly discuss the classical case. It is
clearest to see the framework as constructing an irreversible equation in three stages.
First: move to the ensemble variant of the underlying microdynamics. Second: pick a
coarse-graining projection Pˆ, whose nature will be described below. Third: two moves
are required to find an irreversible and autonomous equation for the coarse-grained
probability density.
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Stage 1: In classical SM, the state of an individual system is represented by a point in
a phase space, Γ-space. (For N particles without internal degrees of freedom, Γ-space
is 6N-dimensional). The system’s evolution is determined by Hamilton’s equations.
However, there is also an ensemble variant of this description. Here probability densi-
ties over Γ-space, ρ, evolve according to Liouville’s equation, which, like Hamilton’s
equations, is TRI.3
Stage 2: The concept of coarse-graining was originally introduced in a specific form
by Gibbs (1903) which I first recall, before describing the generalised coarse-graining
projections used by the ZZW framework.
Gibbs proposes that the accessible phase-space Γ is partitioned into small, finite vol-
ume elements ∆Vm. The coarse-grained density ρcg(q, p) is then defined by averaging
the original probability density ρ(q, p) in each of these boxes. So coarse-graining throws
away the information about how exactly the ensemble is distributed across each box.
Gibbs describes the evolution of the probability density by analogy with an ink drop.
Dropping blue ink into a glass of water results in the whole glass appearing light blue.
However, a drop of ink is an incompressible fluid and so its volume is constant. Upon
examination under a microscope, we would see the drop of ink has just fibrillated
into thin filaments across the whole glass: cf. Figure 1. So Gibbs’ idea is that like an
incompressible fluid, ρ often fibrillates over the accessible phase space, as it evolves
under the Liouvillean dynamics.
But because ρ behaves like an incompressible fluid, its volume is constant despite
its fibrillation; and hence its Gibbs fine-grained entropy, S f g = −kB
∫
Γ ρ ln ρd
3Nqd3N p
where kB denotes Boltzmann’s constant, is constant. Traditionally, this has been consid-
ered problematic, as the thermodynamic entropy increases. However, in a coarse-grained
description, the density spreads smoothly throughout the available space, and this
is well modelled by the coarse-grained probability density, ρcg. This density has a
different entropy, the Gibbs coarse-grained entropy,
Scg = −kB
∫
Γ
ρcg ln ρcgd3Nqd3N p. (3.1)
Unlike its fine-grained counterpart, Scg can increase.
Again, the ink analogy illuminates the discussion of time-evolution. From a macro-
scopic perspective, the ink smoothly spreads throughout the glass. In the SM case, this
‘smooth spreading’ of the coarse-grained density ρcg is described by a ‘coarse-grained
dynamics’, defined as follows. ρcg evolves forward according to the usual Liouvillean
dynamics for a small time interval ∆t; and then it is coarse-grained; and this two-step
3Throughout this chapter I leave the interpretation of such probability densities open; but admittedly,
their connection to the behaviour of individual systems is an urgent issue in the philosophy of SM
(see e.g. (Sklar, 1993, ch.3)).
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Figure 3.1: A drop of ink in a glass of water fibrillates throughout the whole volume,
making the water look blue on a coarse-grained level (pictured on the left
hand side). Likewise, a probability density initially concentrated in one
corner fibrillates across the available phase space (Sklar, 1993).
process is iterated. This gives what Wallace (2011) terms the coarse-grained forward (C+)
dynamics (a label I henceforth adopt).
Note, however, that we could equally well have defined the coarse-grained backwards
(C−) dynamics according to which ρcg is evolved backwards for ∆t by the Liouvillean
dynamics; and then coarse-grained, then evolved backwards again; and so on. However,
this C− dynamics describes anti-thermodynamic trajectories (where entropy increases
into the past) and so is “empirically disastrous”. The extent to which the success of the
coarse-grained forwards, but not backwards, dynamics can be explained (in particular
by appealing to cosmological considerations, such as postulating a ‘Past Hypothesis’)
is controversial (see Earman (2006); Wallace (2011); Albert (2000, Ch. 4)). But in this
chapter, it will suffice to admit that the asymmetry has been added in here ‘by hand’
and thus that this project does not involve locating the ‘ultimate source’ of the time-
asymmetry. For as announced in Section 3.1, I aim only to defend coarse-graining from
various objections.
So far, I have only described Gibbs’ original coarse-graining. But in the ZZW frame-
work, a more general notion of coarse-graining is used. A coarse-graining projection, Pˆ,
acts on the space of possible probability density functions.4 The important function of
Pˆ is to split ρ into a relevant part ρr and an irrelevant part ρir.
Pˆρ =: ρr, (1− Pˆ)ρ =: ρir so that ρ = ρr + ρir. (3.2)
Here are three examples of a coarse-graining projection Pˆ defining a relevant density
ρr. In these examples, the density is defined over a reduced number of degrees of
freedom of the systems. Hence we speak of relevant degrees of freedom, as well as relevant
4Pˆ is idempotent: Pˆ2 = Pˆ. Pˆ is usually linear and time-independent and so commutes with ∂∂t .
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densities.
1. The archetypal Gibbsian coarse-graining discussed above can be written as a
projection, Pˆcg. Pˆcg averages over small, finite volume elements ∆Vm (m = 1, 2...)
which cover the 6N-dimensional phase space Γ. These volume elements ∆Vm are
sometimes referred to as ‘coarse-grained boxes’ or ‘cells of a partition’. (I write
‘∆Vm’ both for the region, and its volume.) Thus for (q, p) ∈ ∆Vm, i.e. the mth cell,
we have
Pˆcgρ(q, p) := ρcg(q, p) :=
1
∆Vm
∫
∆Vm
ρ(q′, p′)dq′dp′ =: ρm
∆Vm
, (3.3)
so that for a general (q, p) we sum over the cells with characteristic functions
Pˆcgρ(q, p) := ρcg(q, p) :=∑
m
χ∆Vm (q, p).
ρm
∆Vm
(3.4)
The action of Pˆcg is to smooth the density ρ to be uniform across each box, whilst
leaving the probability of being in any single box invariant; for all m,
∫
∆Vm
Pˆcgρ =∫
∆Vm
ρ.
2. Correlations between particles are discarded by appropriate integration, i.e. by
taking a marginal distribution. And this can be thought of as applying a projection
Pˆµ. This projection takes you from a probability density on the full phase space, Γ-
space (6N-dimensional for N point particles), to the one-particle marginal density,
which describes the probability that particle i will be at a particular point in
(6-dimensional) µ-space, i.e. have a given (~q,~p) ∈ R6. Thus, the mapping from
Γ-space densities to µ-space densities destroys information about the correlations
between different particles and cannot be inverted.
More generally, in the BBGKY hierarchy we define a system of correlation func-
tions, where fs gives the probability that s particles have a given position and
momenta. Generally the evolution of fs depends on fs+1, and fs+1 depends on
fs+2... all the way to fN (where N is the totally number of particles). But —under
certain physical conditions— this chain of equations can be truncated at a given
point, i.e. all correlations beyond the three-particle correlations can be thrown
away (Huang, 1987, p. 65).
A projection akin to Pˆµ is used in constructing the Boltzmann equation (see
Wallace (2015b, p. 292), (Zeh, 2007, p. 59) and, for an explicit construction of the
Prigogine-Brout equation—a cousin of the Boltzmann equation—see (Zwanzig,
1960, p. 1340)).
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3. The diagonalisation projection Pˆdia applies to quantum systems and removes
off-diagonal elements of the density matrix (with respect to some chosen basis).
This partitioning into diagonal and off-diagonal matrix-elements (relevant and
irrelevant respectively) is used in the derivation of the Pauli master equation
(Zwanzig, 1960, p. 1339), where discarding the off-diagonal elements amounts to
ignoring interference terms.
Given a coarse-graining projection Pˆ, the next aim is to find an equation for just the
relevant degrees of freedom described by ρr. By re-arranging the Liouville equation in
terms of the two densities, ρr and ρir, we find the pre-master equation (see (Zwanzig,
1960, §2) for the steps to the pre-master equation);
∂ρr(t)
∂t
= Fˆρir(t0) +
∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′), (3.5)
where Fˆ := PˆLe−it(1−Pˆ)L and Gˆ(t′) := PˆLeit′(1−Pˆ)L(1− Pˆ)L. L represents the Liouvil-
lean evolution.
This pre-master equation is formally exact and so the time-reversibility remains. The
first term on the RHS depends on the irrelevant degrees of freedom, ρir. The second
term is non-Markovian; the evolution of ρr at t depends on the history of the system
between t0 and t as evidenced by the integral between t′ = t0 and t. This is unlike
classical mechanical trajectories for which, given the current state, the future evolution
is determined without any information about the system’s history.
Stage 3: Next, two assumptions are used to arrive at an autonomous and irreversible
equation for the relevant degrees of freedom. ‘Autonomy’ requires that the dynamical
evolution of ρr has no explicit dependence on ρir or t.5 The reversible pre-master
equation (3.5) is of the form ∂ρr(t)∂t = f (ρr(t), ρir(t), t) and so is not a time-independent
or autonomous equation.
In general, an autonomous dynamics for ρr is in no way guaranteed; since ρ can be
decomposed any way we like, the aspects of ρ we have dubbed ‘relevant’ (ρr) need not
be dynamically autonomous or independent from the irrelevant aspects. Two steps are
required:
1. The initial state assumption states that the first term vanishes. This is achieved
by stipulating that ρir(t0) = 0.6 When ρir(t0) = 0, equation (3.5) becomes a closed
equation for ρr(t).
5The condition for an equation to be autonomous, familiar from mathematics, is that “t does not occur
explicitly in the equation, as in dydt = f (y)” (Robinson, 2004, p. 13). This is required so that
∂ρr(t)
∂t has
no ‘covert dependence’ on ρir.
6This is a sufficient but not necessary condition for this term to vanish; the action of PˆLe−it(1−Pˆ)L on a
non-zero ρir(0) could also be such that the term disappears.
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2. The Markovian approximation requires that Gˆ(t′) decreases to zero over a cer-
tain timescale, the ‘relaxation time’, τ. Thus, for times t′ greater than the relaxation
time τ, Gˆ(t′) = 0. Furthermore, it requires that ρr does not vary much over this
timescale τ, and so Gˆ(t′) drops off more rapidly than the timescales over which
ρr evolves. To sum up: the key physical idea of the Markovian approximation is
that there is a relaxation time τ over which the integral kernel drops off and over
which ρr does not vary much (Wallace, 2015b, p. 292).7
Provided that these physical features hold, then the following mathematical
moves can be made:
a) If the integral upper limit t is greater than τ extending the integration interval
to ∞ makes no difference to the value of the integral;
∫ ∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′) '∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′).
b) If ρr varies very slowly over τ, ρr(t− t′) ≈ ρr(t) for t′ < τ. (If t′ > τ this
approximation does not hold, but since ρr(t− t′) is multiplied by Gˆ(t′) which
is ≈ 0 for t′ > τ, we can replace ρr(t− t′) by ρr(t).)
c) Thus, if the Markovian approximation holds, we can replace the second term∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′) of equation (3.5) by
∫ ∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t).
Provided that the initial state assumption and the Markovian approximation hold, we
thus arrive at an autonomous equation —the master equation— for the relevant degrees
of freedom, ρr:
7This general assumption of ‘different timescales’ is of course used much more widely than just in
the ZZW framework. For example, in Reif (2009, Ch. 14) the derivation of the Boltzmann equation
requires a similar assumption: that f (~r,~v, t) does not vary appreciably during time intervals of the
order of the collision time, nor over spatial intervals of the order of intermolecular forces.
I now offer an intuitive explanation of the general situation, by extending Zeh’s discussion using a
metaphor of a forest. Within the irrelevant information, Zeh (2007, p. 65) distinguishes the ‘doorway’
from ‘deep states’, which are in different ‘channels’. So there are three ‘channels’: (A) ‘relevant’,
(B) ‘doorway’, (C) ‘deep’ — and these are analogous to (A) a clearing in a wood, (B) the sunny
woodland surrounding the clearing, (C) the dark woods. Zeh gives the following example: (A) is a
one-particle marginal density, (B) encodes two-particle correlations and (C) encodes three-or-more
particle correlations (cf. the BBGKY hierarchy). Now, the non-Markovian term in the pre-master
equations gives the contributions to ∂ρr(t)∂t at t from the part of ρr that became irrelevant at t− t′ and
remained irrelevant until time t: at which point it becomes relevant again.
This ‘information becoming irrelevant’ is like people in the clearing (A) wandering into the sunny
woodland (B). Thus, the relaxation time τ is the time taken for the people who arrived in the
sunny woodland (B) to wander either back to the clearing (A) or into the dark woods (C). The key
assumption is that once in the dark woods (C), no one can find their way back to the clearing (A)
again. In less picturesque terms: the three-or-more particle correlations are not dynamically relevant
for the one-particle marginal density.
This metaphor also encompasses the famous recurrence theorem. If you wander around a (finite)
woodland for an incredibly long (i.e. recurrence) time, you will eventually find your way back to the
clearing. As I will discuss in Section 3.3.1, on recurrence timescales the ‘deeply’ irrelevant states (C),
e.g. three-or-more particle correlations, become relevant (A) again.
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∂ρr(t)
∂t
≈ Dˆρr(t), (3.6)
where Dˆ :=
∫ ∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′).
This completes Stage 3. For our purposes, there are three comments to make.
(1) This schematic equation (3.6) has specific forms for specific systems (Penrose,
1979, p. 1986); “various particular cases of it include the (empirically verified) equations
of decoherence, of radioactive decay, and of diffusion and equilibration in dilute gases”
(Wallace, 2015b, p. 292).
(2) We can now describe the irreversible behaviour using a generalised version of the
Gibbs coarse-grained entropy. The coarse-grained Gibbs entropy Scg (in equation 3.1)
can be written as a functional of ρ and Pˆcg:
Scg[Pˆ; ρ] = −kB
∫
Pˆcgρ(q, p) ln Pˆcgρ(q, p)d3Nqd3N p. (3.7)
And similarly more generally: we define, for any ZZW projection Pˆ, obeying equations
(3.5) and (3.6), the entropy:
S[ρr] := S[Pˆ; ρ] := −kB
∫
Pˆρ(q, p) ln Pˆρ(q, p)d3Nqd3N p. (3.8)
This quantity can increase — like Scg, as noted after equation (1). Thus Zeh writes: “if
Pˆ only destroys information, the master equation describes never-decreasing entropy”
(Zeh, 2007, p. 65):
dS[ρr]
dt
≥ 0. (3.9)
For a proof, see Tolman (1938, p. 171), Huang (1987, p. 74), Reif (2009, p. 624) and for
the quantum context, see Landsberg (1990, p. 145).
(3) Finally, and most importantly for our interests: this closed equation 3.6 is irre-
versible (Zwanzig, 1960, p. 1340).
3.3 Why does this method work?
Why does the ZZW framework lead to empirically successful equations? This success
is surprising because, after all, the coarse-graining projection (and the ensuing C+
dynamics) cannot be implemented by the “official” microdynamics. Given Liouville’s
theorem, the microdynamics of the closed system cannot really cause the velocity
correlations to be erased (in the case of the Boltzmann equation), or really delete the
off-diagonal density matrix elements (in the case of the Pauli master equation). In
short: the TRI microdynamics of the closed system cannot dynamically implement the
coarse-graining projection.
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In order to explain the success of irreversible equations in SM there have been three
broad strategies:
• (1) Interventionists, e.g. Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955); Blatt (1959); Ridderbos
and Redhead (1998), argue that perturbations from the environment cannot be
neglected. Thus, the system cannot be treated as closed. (In the ZZW terminology,
the environment dynamically implements the projection, so that ρr, rather than ρ,
is the correct description of the subsystem.)
• (2) Others advocate changing the underlying microdynamics so that the coarse-
graining projection is dynamically implemented. Albert (2000) and Prigogine and
Stengers (1984) advocate non-TRI microdynamics in the quantum and classical
case respectively. (In the ZZW terminology, the non-TRI dynamics yields ρ 7→ ρr.)
• (3) Some, such as Wallace (2012a), propose that under special conditions the
irreversible SM dynamics will give the same density over the relevant degrees of
freedom as the microdynamics.
For the remainder of the chapter, I only focus on the third of these strategies, which
I call ‘the special conditions’ account. In Section 3.3.1, I consider this account and
the required ‘meshing’ condition. Section 3.3.2 considers when a density satisfies
this condition and reports Wallace’s proposal. This will lead into the idea of a ‘Past
Hypothesis’; (although, as mentioned in Stage 2 of Section 3.2, an in-depth discussion
of the controversial Past Hypothesis is beyond the scope of this chapter).
3.3.1 The special conditions account
The third strategy claims that under certain conditions the microdynamics will induce
the same probabilities for the relevant degrees of freedom, as the C+ coarse-grained
dynamics governing ρr. On this view, the generalised coarse-graining projection is not
dynamically implemented. Thus, ρ and ρr are two distinct densities.
How do we find ρr at a given time T? There are two “routes”. As discussed in Section
3.2, the C+ dynamics for a period t0 < t < T is defined by evolving the density by
the microdynamics Uˆ for a very short time ∆t, then applying the projection Pˆ, then
evolving under Uˆ for ∆t, then Pˆ... etc. This means that irrelevant details are thrown
away at every step. In contrast, the Liouvillean microdynamics Uˆ evolves the full
density ρ for the period t0 < t < T; and then one finds the relevant part of the density
by applying Pˆ at T; so on this “route”, coarse-graining occurs only once at the end of
the time-period. Thus, the condition that these two different dynamics give the same
density ρr(T) can be expressed by the diagram in Figure 3.2 commuting.
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Figure 3.2: ρ and Pˆ are forwards-compatible if the two routes to ρr(t) give the same
answer.
Following the terminology suggested by Wallace (2011), let us call those states ρ
for which diagram 3.2 commutes forwards compatible with coarse-graining Pˆ. So
forwards compatibility means that it does not matter whether you coarse-grain at every
time step ∆t or just once, at the end. Note that forwards compatibility is relative to a
particular choice of coarse graining Pˆ. Thus this is a condition of ‘harmony’ between
the evolution of ρ and the coarse graining Pˆ. For example, had the size of the coarse-
graining boxes ∆Vm averaged over in Gibbs’ original example been chosen to be very
large, then ρ might well not be forwards-compatible with this coarse-graining, Pˆcg. In
the wider literature on inter-theoretic relations, such a forwards-compatible scenario is
sometimes described as ‘meshing’ dynamics (e.g. Butterfield (2012), List (2016)).
However, we cannot expect harmony to “reign supreme”. Not all densities ρ will
satisfy Figure 3.2’s meshing condition: Loschmidt’s reversibility objection vividly
reminds us that if we were to reverse the momenta of the components of a fibrillating
ink drop, it would coalesce back in a manner incompatible with the ‘smooth-spreading
out’ coarse-grained dynamics. (More specifically: the time-reverse of a density ρ
initially forwards-compatible and on a trajectory of increasing entropy will not itself be
forwards-compatible.)
And due to Poincaré’s recurrence theorem, nor will any ρ satisfy the meshing condi-
tion for all time. (More specifically: in the ZZW framework, recurrence implies that the
integral kernel Gˆ in equation (3.5) must increase again so that at the recurrence time
it has returned to its original value. Therefore the upper limit of the integral in the
Markovian approximation strictly cannot be taken to ∞, but at most to some large —
but sub-recurrent — time T. Consequently, the Markovian approximation is only valid
for sub-recurrent times.)
3.3.2 When is a density forwards-compatible?
Characterising those densities ρ which are forwards-compatible is a harder job than
ruling out candidate densities. A density ρ will be forwards-compatible provided that
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the density ρir (and the details such as correlations encoded in it) that are thrown away
by Pˆ do not matter for the forwards-evolution of ρr. One clear case where this is not
true is Hahn’s spin-echo experiment (Hahn, 1950). The application of a radio-frequency
pulse causes dephased spins (precessing in a magnetic field) to realign and thus emit
an ‘echo’ signal (for a recent philosophical discussion see Frigg (2010, §3.5.1)). The
correlations — that are ignored from the coarse-graining perspective — are crucial
for the later ‘echo signal’. Indeed, the spin-echo experiment has been described as a
‘Loschmidt demon’ which reverses the velocities v 7→ −v.8
Given the above discussion of the Loschmidt reversibility objection, here too the
density ρ is clearly not forwards-compatible. Consequently, the spin-echo is not a
surprising counterexample to the coarse-graining framework — which we can only
expect to be successful when Figure 3.2 commutes: i.e. when the information (in this
case, correlations) thrown away by the coarse-graining projection Pˆ are not crucial —
unlike the spin-echo case.
Ridderbos and Redhead (1998, p. 1237) and Blatt (1959, p. 749) generalise from
the spin-echo case to reject the coarse-graining framework altogether.9 However,
rather than claiming that the spin-echo case reveals coarse-graining to be empirically
inadequate, it seems fairer to say the density ρ is patently not forwards-compatible and
so we do not expect coarse-graining methods to apply.10
Naturally, the following question arises: why should we expect the spin-echo
(‘correlations-are-crucial’) type of case to be the exception rather than the rule? To
this, the reply can only be that ‘nature is kind’: often — i.e. in the irreversible equations
of SM — ρir is irrelevant for the evolution of ρr.
Nonetheless, one might ask: what informative condition can be used to pick out the
forwards-compatible scenarios? Since the presence of ‘crucial correlations’ was the
problem in the spin-echo case, perhaps removing them is the answer: ensuring there is
no irrelevant information at all is one way to avoid the failure of compatibility. Indeed,
this is what the initial state assumption ρir(t0) = 0 in Section 3.2 achieved — and
alongside the Markovian approximation, this was used to construct the C+ dynamics.
In similar vein, Wallace stipulates that ‘Simple’ initial densities ρ will not have crucial
conspiratorial correlations encoded in their irrelevant degrees of freedom; he defines
“a Simple distribution as any distribution specifiable in a closed form in a simple way
without specifying it as the time evolution of some other distribution” (Wallace, 2011,
8More accurately, the spin’s velocities are unaltered, but the order of the spins is altered by reflection in
the x-z plane. However, “the grain of truth in the standard story is that a reversal of the ordering
with unaltered velocities is in a sense ‘isomorphic’ to a velocity reversal with unaltered ordering”
(Frigg, 2010, p. 64).
9Blatt concludes that “it is not permissible to base fundamental arguments in statistical mechanics on
coarse-graining" (Blatt, 1959, p. 749).
10Lavis (2004, p. 686) further defends coarse-graining.
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p. 19).11
Note, however, that such a condition — the initial state assumption or Wallace’s
Simplicity condition — can only be applied once.12 The initial state A in Figure 4.1
— confined to four Gibbsian cells, or, in the analogy, the ink drop’s initial state — is
Simple (or equivalently it satisfies the ZZW initial state assumption). However, it then
fibrillates over the available phase space and thus is no longer Simple. Whilst initially
at t0 there was no irrelevant information, this is no longer the case: ρir(t1) 6= 0. Yet —
we hope! — nonetheless ρ(t1) is still forwards-compatible. Accordingly, the ‘Simple’
states are a subset of the forwards-compatible states. Thus, given the microdynamics,
imposing such an initial condition is a sufficient but not necessary initial condition
for ensuring that ρ is forwards-compatible. The plausibility of such initial conditions
on probabilities densities will depend on one’s interpretation of probability in SM.
‘Simplicity’ fits especially well with a Jaynesian account: Jaynesians interpret ρ as
encoding our ignorance of the system. If all we know is the system’s macrostate, then
claiming that ρ is uniform across this state ensures that ρ is Simple.
Given that such an initial condition can only be applied once, when should we apply
it? Practising physicists apply it at the beginning of the time of interest, t0 (option 1).
But this leads to a problem akin to that facing Boltzmann’s combinatoric argument. By
parity of reasoning, this licences the construction of the C− dynamics prior to t0, and the
C− dynamics yields anti-thermodynamic trajectories prior to t0. Such parity problems
motivate the ‘Past Hypothesis’; in the Boltzmannian case that the initial macrostate
of the universe had a ‘low entropy’ (Albert, 2000, Ch. 4). Here, this parity problem
motivates Wallace (2011, p. 22) to apply the initial state assumption to the beginning
of the universe (option 2). An in-depth analysis of the Past Hypothesis —and the
different possible forms it could take cf. Wallace (2011)— is not possible here, but I can
allay one worry: provided Markovian approximation holds good, the choice between
applying this condition in the manner of physicists (option 1) and a Past Hypothesis
(option 2) will not lead to dramatic empirical differences. The difference between t0 for
options 1 and 2 is dramatic: 13.7 billion years. One might think that this should lead to
equally dramatic differences in the constructed equations, as t0 appears in the premaster
equation. And thus one might hope to adjudicate between options 1 and 2 on these
empirical grounds. But the key physical insight behind the Markovian approximation
explains why despite the dramatic difference between t0 for options 1 and 2, there
11One might object that this definition is vague. Instead consider this ‘Simplicity’ condition as: an
overarching condition to capture what is similar across those densities which satisfy the initial state
assumption for different Pˆs. A given ρ satisfying the initial state assumption at t0 will ensure that –
with respect to a given Pˆ and thus a given definition of ‘irrelevant’ — ρ is ‘Simple’ at t0. But of course
there are many densities that count as ‘Simple’ in some sense, but not in the respect required for the
initial state assumption (ρir(t0) = 0) for a particular Pˆ.
12Wallace points out that it would be excessive to apply it more than once: the microdynamics are
deterministic and so fixing ρ at one time fixes ρ for all times.
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need be an accompanying dramatic empirical difference, as follows. Provided that the
Markovian approximation holds good and —as is uncontroversial— the recurrence
time is much much greater than 13.7 million years, if we apply ρir = 0 at the beginning
of the universe, there will not be 13.7 billion years’ worth of ‘irrelevant information’ (e.g.
correlations encoded in ρir) that is liable to be about to become dynamically relevant
for ρr (and so causing empirical differences between option 1 or 2). The only potential
difference will be the information τ seconds ago. (See Zeh (2007, p. 64) for more details).
In summary: When the forwards-compatibility condition fulfilled, C+ dynamics
gives the same values for relevant ρr as the microdynamics. Not all densities ρ are
forwards-compatible and nor is any density forwards-compatible for all times: as
shown by the reversibility and recurrence objections respectively. When considering
how to determine whether a given ρ is forwards-compatible or not, one suggestion
was that a probability density will be forwards-compatible if it satisfies the initial state
assumption at t0 (or in Wallace’s terminology is ‘Simple’ at t0). However, whether t0
should be taken to be at the beginning of time of interest (option 1) or the beginning of
the universe (option 2) is a contentious matter.
3.4 Anthropocentrism and illusion: two objections
If coarse-graining is empirically successful (as I have claimed) then perhaps no further
justification is required. This would be a tempting line to take, were it not for the
literature’s containing a barrage of criticisms of coarse-graining. For example: coarse-
graining ‘seems repugnant to many authors’ (Uffink, 2010, p. 197) and is even claimed
to be ‘deceitful’ (Redhead, 1996, p. 31). The coarse-grained time-asymmetry is also
called ‘illusory’ (Prigogine, 1980) and potentially ‘subjective’ (Denbigh and Denbigh,
1985, p. 53).
This purported subjectivity of coarse-graining leads to concerns about the status of
the time-asymmetry. According to Davies, ‘it is indeed a matter of philosophy rather
than physics to decide if the coarse-grained asymmetry is ‘real’ or not’ (Davies, 1977,
p. 77). Furthermore, the potentially unusual or subjective status of the coarse-grained
asymmetry within physics leads Grünbaum (1973) to discuss whether scientific realism
is incompatible with coarse-graining approaches in SM. More broadly, determining this
status of the asymmetry is part of a wider philosophical project of untangling ‘what
is genuinely an aspect of reality from what is a kind of appearance, or artifact, of the
particular perspective from which we regard reality’ (Price, 1996, p. 4).
Summing up, it seems to me that these objections can be divided into two camps:
(Illusory): First, the asymmetry is a mere artifact of coarse-graining and so is illusory.
(Anthropocentric): Secondly, it arises from our perspective and so is anthropocentric.
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Given these concerns and objections, coarse-graining requires some conceptual, not
just empirical, justification. I propose that this task can be split into two:
(Choice): What is the justification for the choice of coarse-graining projection?
(At all): Why is it legitimate to coarse-grain at all?
A justification for coarse-graining may of course purport to answer both questions.
And the answers may be linked. For example, if the justification for the choice of coarse-
graining projection was deemed to be unacceptably subjective, then this might lead one
to believe that coarse-graining at all is unacceptable. However, the two issues can also
come apart. For example, a justification for coarse-graining might only motivate why it
is an acceptable procedure in general, but remain silent on how to choose a particular
coarse-graining projection.
In Section 3.4.2, I will consider and reject the ‘measurement imprecision’ justification
and discuss how it lies behind the (Illusory) and (Anthropocentric) objections: before
giving, in Section 5, my favoured justification. But first, I consider the two objections in
more detail — in Section 3.4.1.
3.4.1 The two objections in more detail
The claim that the coarse-grained asymmetry is an “illusion” (Prigogine, 1980): as cited
in Denbigh and Denbigh (1985, p. 56) is rooted in the action of Pˆ. The contention is
that Pˆ ‘distorts’ ρ and the gap between ρ and ρr is the source of the coarse-grained
asymmetry. Every time we apply Pˆ we edge away from the correct density ρ — in
particular we edge away from the correct value of the Gibbs (fine-grained) entropy
by a certain amount: “the required increase in the coarse-grained entropy is obtained
by disregarding the dynamical constraints on the system” (Ridderbos, p. 66). By
repeatedly coarse-graining (as is done in the C+ dynamics), we generate the coarse-
grained asymmetry. “The repeated coarse-graining operators appear to be added ‘by
hand’, in deviation from the true dynamical evolution provided by Ut” (Uffink, 2010,
p. 197). That is, the coarse-grained asymmetry exists merely in virtue of the continual
coarse-graining in the C+ dynamics — each coarse-graining increases Scg by some small
amount so that eventually an asymmetry is produced. “Perhaps most worrying, the
irreversible behaviour of Scg arises almost solely due to the coarse-graining” (Callender,
1999, p. 360). Thus, since the asymmetry stems from the infidelity of coarse-graining, it
is illusory.
This (Illusory) objection has the following form:
• P1. The action of Pˆ is to deliberately distort the correct density ρ.
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• P2. The asymmetry only arises from the repeated coarse-graining every ∆t in the
C+ dynamics.
• Conclusion: The coarse-grained asymmetry is an illusion.
Next I consider the (Anthropocentric) objection. According to this objection, the
coarse-grained asymmetry, in particular the coarse-grained entropy, is not an objec-
tive physical quantity, like energy or mass but rather is ‘agent-centric’. For example,
Wigner and Jaynes have called entropy ‘anthropocentric’ (Jaynes, 1965). The terms
‘subjectivity’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ are used interchangeably in this debate. Den-
bigh and Denbigh (1985) helpfully distinguish two kinds of objectivity (and thereby
of subjectivity). Objectivity1 is intersubjective agreement. Objectivity2 is stronger. It
requires the phenomena in question to be independent of human cognition. In the
debate about coarse-graining, intersubjective disagreement is not the issue. Rather it is
the second kind of subjectivity (¬Objectivity2) that is at stake, which I earlier dubbed
‘anthropocentrism’.
The reason for this charge of anthropocentrism is as follows. In the case of the
archetypal Gibbsian coarse-graining Pˆcg the size of the boxes is chosen by us. “There
are no laws of physics which determine the size of the [cells]” (Denbigh and Denbigh,
1985, p. 51): merely our preference determines the choice. Furthermore, “the increase of
entropy and the approach to equilibrium would thus apparently be a consequence of
the fact that we shake up the probability density repeatedly in order to wash away all
information about the past, while refusing a dynamical explanation for this procedure”
(Uffink, 2010, p. 196). In addition, the partition is chosen by us: “the occurrence and
direction of a temporal change of the entropy... depends essentially on our human choice
of the size of the finite equal cells of boxes into which we partition... phase space ”
(Grünbaum, 1973, p. 647, emphasis in original). The objection extends to all instances
of Pˆ; “a Zwanzig projection (describing generalized coarse-graining) can be arbitrarily
chosen for convenience” (Zeh, 2007, p. 67).
Grünbaum (1973) points out that the charge of anthropocentrism here differs from
the more general claim that scientific theories are human constructs. It seems that the
Standard Model could describe the world, even if there were no (human) observers.
Yet, according to the Anthropocentric critique, this would not be the case for entropy,
and the coarse-grained description.
Lying behind these objections is a particular justification of coarse-graining: the
measurement imprecision (MI) justification: to which I now turn.
156
3 Justifying coarse-graining in statistical mechanics
3.4.2 Against the justification by measurement imprecision (MI)
In the literature, the most common justification for coarse-graining is that our measure-
ments have limited precision. “The coarse-graining approach makes essential use of the
observation that we only have access to measurements of finite resolution” (Ridderbos,
2002, p. 66). Thus, we can never locate a system precisely in phase space; we only
know p and q to a certain degree of accuracy. The cells over which we average with the
Pˆcg for the archetypal Gibbsian coarse-graining have a size which corresponds to “the
limits of accuracy actually available to us” (Tolman, 1938, p. 167). Because we could
never, ex hypothesi, measure the system accurately enough, we are unable to distinguish
between the coarse and fine-grained distributions ρ and ρr. Thus, according to this
measurement imprecision (MI) justification, the answer to (Choice) is that we must
pick the coarse-graining Pˆ that matches our observational capacities. For those coarse-
grainings Pˆ whose selection is justified by the indistinguishability between ρ and ρr,
the MI justification also answers why (for those particular projections) coarse-graining
(At all) is justified — because we cannot tell the difference.
Appealing to appearances originates from Gibbs’ ink analogy. Whilst the ink drop’s
volume is constant, it fibrillates throughout the water, and so it appears to us to be
uniformly distributed. Our limited powers of observation cannot distinguish between
the fibrillated case and the locally uniform distribution resulting from coarse-graining.
A similar argument arises in the Boltzmannian approach to SM, where phase space
is partitioned into ‘macrostates’. Every microstate corresponds to one macrostate. A
particular macrostate is defined by values of macrovariables, such as volume, tem-
perature and pressure. These macrostates are sets of microstates that are ‘empirically
indistinguishable’. Thus, an appeal is once again made to our observational capacities.13
The (Illusory) and (Anthropocentric) objections arise from this justification of coarse-
graining (rather than coarse-graining itself). The claim that the coarse-grained asymme-
try is illusory is bolstered by the MI justification, since it implies that if we were to be
able to measure the system more precisely (in the idiom of Gibbs’ analogy to see the thin
fibrillating tubes of ink rather than the smooth spreading) then the asymmetry would
disappear. The coarse-grained asymmetry would thus be an illusion stemming from the
imprecision of our measuring devices. The claim that the asymmetry is anthropocentric
is also underwritten by the MI justification. If the coarse-grained ρ distribution is
indistinguishable from the fine-grained ρ distribution to us and thus the choice of Pˆ
depends our capabilities, then the asymmetry would be anthropocentric.
However, the MI justification is unsatisfactory. This is not (only) because it leads to
the illusion and anthropocentric objections, but also, even on its own terms: it is both
insufficient and unnecessary for justifying coarse-graining. (However, other purposes
13But the Boltzmannian partition is not necessarily the same as the Gibbsian cells.
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for which measurement imprecision may be important will be briefly discussed in
Sections 3.7 and 3.8.1).
The imprecision of our measurements is not a sufficient justification for implementing
a coarse-graining projection Pˆ, since choosing a projection that fits with the limits of
observation will not always lead to autonomous irreversible dynamics of the type
given by the ZZW framework. “Observability of the macroscopic variables is not
sufficient... It is conceivable (and occurs in practice) that a particular partition in terms
of observable quantities does not lead to a Markov process” (Uffink, 2010, p. 196).
That is, a coarse-graining could reflect our measurement precision but not lead to an
example of useful dynamics: in particular, to autonomous C+ dynamics. Therefore,
measurement imprecision is not sufficient for answering (Choice).
Furthermore, appealing to measurement imprecision is not necessary for explaining
why we should choose any particular coarse-graining Pˆ. If it were, we would in
every case have to ascertain the imprecision of particular measuring devices and
accordingly choose a coarse-graining Pˆ. Yet, in Section 3.2, this is not how coarse-
graining projections were chosen; and the details of particular measuring devices (or
the resolution of our eyes) are in fact never used in constructing equations in the ZZW
framework. It seems unlikely that advances in the science of microscopy will lead to
different choices of Pˆ.14
Thus appealing to the limited precision of our measurement devices is incapable of
justifying the choice of coarse-graining projections (Choice). The MI justification only
answers (At all) in virtue of answering (Choice) in particular cases, and thus its failure
to answer to (Choice) means that it automatically does not answer (At all). With MI thus
rebutted, I now outline my proposed alternative justification.
3.5 An alternative justification
Applying Pˆ throws away details. Why would throwing away details ever be a good
move? One motivation for moving to the coarse-grained description is that modelling
the evolution of ρ under the Liouvillean dynamics is computationally intractable,
because solving the equations of motion for some 1023 particles is infeasible.
Were this the only motivation for coarse-graining, one might be misled into believing
that in an ideal world where we were equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer
and the initial states of each of 1023 particles, the coarse-grained description would be
14My rebuttal of the necessity of the MI justification takes its proponents at their word. But perhaps this
is uncharitable, for in reality, typical discussions of the construction of autonomous equations are
often schematic— they merely assume there is such a projector that satisfies the required assumptions,
without a detailed demonstrations that the projector does indeed fulfil these assumptions. As I have
not investigated such demonstrations, it is an open question whether for that project —rather than
the construction of autonomous dynamics— measurement imprecision is necessary.
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dispensed with. Yet something would be lost, if upon receiving all the information
and extraordinarily powerful computers, we ditched the discipline of SM: and this
reveals a general point about the assumptions in SM. Namely: as I argue in Section 3.5.1,
computational intractability is not the only motivation for such approximations and
assumptions. In Section 3.5.1, I distinguish between Galilean idealisation and abstrac-
tion, and then classify coarse-graining as abstraction to a higher level of description.
This, plus the desideratum that the dynamics at this level be autonomous, allow me to
justify coarse-graining. Then, in Section 3.5.2, I illustrate these ideas of abstraction and
autonomy with the Game of Life.
3.5.1 Abstraction and autonomy
There are two reasons that such leaps in our computational capacity would not make SM
‘superfluous’. Firstly, it is unclear in what sense solving some 1023 coupled equations
would constitute an explanation of the behaviour of the gas.15 Secondly, a statistical me-
chanical system such as a gas “exhibit[s] perfectly definite regularities in its behaviour”
(Tolman, 1938, p. 2). Such regularities would be lost amongst the morass of detail at
the fundamental (or lower) level. This difference in levels of description is particularly
vivid in the case of coarse-graining; by moving to the lower-level Liouvillean dynamics,
we not only lose explanatory power but also some very useful equations that determine
transport coefficients and relaxation times.
At this point, we need to distinguish different strategies for simplifying scientific
descriptions. This is a large topic and the words at issue —idealisation, abstraction
and approximation— are terms of art that different authors construe differently, but I
will crudely categorise strategies as Galilean idealisations or abstractions. A Galilean
idealisation introduces ‘deliberate distortions’ (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006), familiar
from the standard examples of frictionless planes and perfectly rational economic
agents. A common way to think about such idealisations is by analogy to a perturbative
series. The behaviour of the target system is veridically described by the full series,
but a successful idealised description is akin to the first term of the series. Adding the
higher-order terms renders the idealised description more accurate and furthermore,
explains the success of the idealisation even if these terms are not actually calculated
(Batterman, 2009, p. 17). Often Galilean idealisations are used in order to render a
problem more tractable — and in an ideal world, we would remove the idealisation
(and so add all the terms of the series in) — and this would lead to a more accurate
representation.16
15Some might argue that whilst the solution of the 1023 equations might not be the best explanation, it is
nonetheless an explanation. However, the details of the vast debate about explanation are not needed
for what follows.
16In Weisberg’s terminology, the ‘representation ideal’ would be to remove the idealisation (Weisberg,
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In contrast, I take abstraction to be the omission, or throwing away, of certain pieces
of information (Knox, 2016; Thomson-Jones, 2005). This corresponds to a broad category
in the literature: Weisberg (2007)’s minimal modelling, Cartwright’s abstraction and
Aristotelian idealisation (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006). This category involves ‘throwing
away details, stripping away, keeping only the core causal factors’.17
Thus I claim: coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation. If it were, there would be
certain details those inclusion would improve the coarse-grained description. Yet, in the
ZZW framework, this is not so. Indeed, we know exactly which details would need to
be added to render a more complete description — the information about the irrelevant
degrees of freedom that we threw away! But clearly if we were to add ρir back in, we
would no longer have the coarse-grained, and useful, equations found in Section 3.2.
Instead, coarse-graining is abstraction. ρr omits irrelevant information, which has
been discarded by Pˆ. For instance, in the archetypal Gibbsian case, the action of the
coarse-graining projection Pˆcg is to omit exactly how the probability varies across the
coarse-graining cell as only the probability of the entire cell is relevant: “how full
the cell is, rather than how it is filled”. Some projections take a density in a given
equivalence class to be an exemplar of that class (Wallace, 2011, p. 9). In such cases,
only the fact that the density is in the equivalence class is relevant, not which member
of the class it is.18 In the case of Pˆµ, information about the correlations between particles
is omitted.19
Thus ρr is a new variable germane to this higher-level of description implicitly defined
by a given Pˆ: rather than a distorted replacement of ρ, which is how an idealisation
conception of coarse-graining would interpret ρr. As ρr forms part of a higher-level of
description it need not be in tension with ρ, just as descriptions in biology need not
be in tension with descriptions in psychology. (In the terminology of chapter 1, these
descriptions are about different subject matters). ρr is not an ‘idealised’ version of ρ
containing false elements, as omission need not get in the way of telling a true causal
story (Strevens, 2008; Lewis, 1986a). Thus, coarse-graining at all is justified because it
allows us to abstract to a higher-level of description. This is my proposed answer to
Section 3.4’s (At all).
2007, p. 642).
17Of course, there are other categorisations - e.g. McMullin (1985) has six types of idealisation. Norton
(2012) discusses approximation and idealisation in a different sense. Notably, different Pˆs might be
(sub)-categorised differently according to a more fine-grained classification. However, all that matters
here is that coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation.
18To link to chapter 1: clearly this is an example of one of List’s abstraction maps, σ.
19Of course, adding in some correlations (i.e. adding in the third tier of the BBGKY hierarchy) may lead
to a more empirically successful autonomous equation than the autonomous equation describing the
evolution of the one-particle marginal density. Indeed, e.g. doing so can provide corrections to the
Boltzmann equation. But of course, we wouldn’t want to add in all the correlations in the BBGKY
hierarchy — in the limit, doing so would take us back to the reversible dynamics. And indeed,
truncation at first or second equations in the hierarchy is the key benefit of the BBGKY approach — it
is useful because we can get away with only considering the lower hierarchy.
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Pˆ abstracts to a higher level of description. Yet we don’t just want to abstract to a
higher level: we want a theory of the goings-on at this level. For example, suppose Pˆcam
coarse-grains the position and mass distribution of people in Cambridge to the centre of
mass of this population. The information about the masses and locations of individuals
has been thrown away, leaving a more abstract description of the population. However,
discussing the centre of mass of Cambridge’s population is not going to be useful, if the
only way to find out how this centre of mass moves is to consider the movement of all
the individuals and then re-average. If we cannot say anything about what is going on
a higher level of description without invoking information from the lower level, then
the higher level of description is not going to be useful.20
But not having to refer to the lower-level details in describing the goings-on at
the higher level of description is precisely what the autonomy condition in the ZZW
framework captures. Recall that the dynamics are autonomous if they were of the
form f (ρr) rather f (ρr, ρir); the dynamics for the relevant degrees of freedom have no
functional dependence on ρir. In other words, ρir is not a ‘difference-maker’ for the
evolution of ρr (Woodward, 2005; Strevens, 2008, Ch. 3). Note, however, that whilst
the idea of different descriptions is contained in the concept of autonomy, no notion of
hierarchy is implied. There could be different descriptions without one being ‘higher’
than another (cf. List and Pivato (2015, p. 150, fn. 41). Thus the ‘higher-level’ aspect
of this justification comes from taking Pˆ as abstracting from irrelevant details. The
terminology of ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ degrees of freedom is highly appropriate;
for if the dynamics weren’t autonomous then the so-called ‘irrelevant’ details would
indeed be relevant.
Now, by taking this cue from the ZZW framework, it is clear what justifies the choice
of any particular coarse-graining map. Whilst any coarse-graining map can be used
to find a pre-master equation, not every Pˆ will lead to coarse-grained irreversible
dynamics. Only those coarse-grainings of a system that satisfy the two conditions
(in Stage 3 of Section 3.2) will lead to autonomous dynamics.21 Thus, the choice of
coarse-graining map is determined by whether it results in successful C+ dynamics. I
agree that this criterion will not help physicists discover new, useful maps. The class
of successful Pˆs will not look especially unified. But this is to be expected; each case
requires details of the particular system at hand. Thus as Uffink (2010, p.195) says: “it
is ‘the art of the physicist’ to find the right choice, an art in which he or she succeeds
in practice by a mixture of general principles and ingenuity, but where no general
20List and Pivato (2015, p. 135) go further. In their framework, the lower-level language is by definition
unavailable at the higher level.
21Autonomy in the sense of ‘not referring to ρir’ is achieved by the initial state assumption. But for
autonomy in the sense of not depending at all on t, the Markovian approximation needs to be
satisfied.
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guidelines can be provided”.22
To summarise, this alternative justification answers Section 3.4’s two justificatory
questions as follows:
? (Choice) - The choice of a particular map is determined by the desideratum of
finding autonomous dynamics.
? (At all) - Applying a map Pˆ abstracts to a higher level of description.
3.5.2 An illustration: the Game of Life
The key ideas of autonomy and abstraction are vividly illustrated by Conway’s Game
of Life: a standard example of the complexity science, and emergence, literature (see
e.g. Bedau and Humphreys (2008, Ch. 8,9,11,16,17)). The Game of Life is a cellular
automaton that operates via a simple rule: at each time-step, whether a cell of the Grid
is ON or OFF is determined by how many of its eight neighbours are ON. Despite the
extreme simplicity of the dynamical rule, a rich variety of patterns can evolve in the
grid. These stable shapes have characteristic movements and so are given vivid names:
glider guns spawn gliders moving across the grid, eaters destroy other shapes they
‘encroach’ on, and puffer trains move across the grid leaving behind debris in their
wake — to name but a few. Whilst the sheer variety of the Game of Life cannot be
easily conveyed in words (and is best appreciated by viewing a video of the evolution
of a Life Grid), to give an idea of the complexity that can arise: the Universal Turing
machine has been constructed in the Life Grid (Poundstone, 2013, p. 213).
When discussing the Life Grid, we can abstract to a higher level of description and, as
done above, describe the goings-on in terms of the menagerie of ‘gliders’ and ‘blinkers’
rather than in terms of the cells. For example, the glider moves across the grid with
velocity c/4, where c is the ‘speed of light’ (in the sense of being the ‘speed limit’ — this
maximum speed is one cell per unit time). This alternative description of gliders “has
its own language, a transparent foreshortening of the tedious descriptions one could
give at the physical level” (Dennett, 1991, p. 39). Discussing the gliders’ motion in this
way is predictively successful. Furthermore, often these descriptions are autonomous:
we need not keep referring back to the lower-level, i.e. cell-level, details.23 But, of
course, theoretically we could have calculated the evolution of the grid at the cell-level
and then, at the end, abstracted to the higher-level, e.g. glider-level, of description.
22Of course, in individual cases, there will be the further explanatory project of showing that the two
required assumptions are satisfied by a chosen Pˆ — and this will give us further insight into why in
these particular cases autonomous dynamics are possible, i.e. why our desideratum is fulfilled. But as
a general answer to (Choice) — the only rationale for picking any Pˆ is that it leads to an autonomous
dynamics.
23This is akin to autonomy in the SM case, although not literally as there are no differential equations.
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Thus, as in the ZZW framework, there are two routes to predictions about later times:
cf. Figure 3.2.
In both cases —ascending to the glider level of description from the cell level of
description and ascending to a coarse-grained level of description (ρr) from the fine-
grained description (ρ)— new and surprising features emerge.24 In the Game of Life
at the glider-level of description, there is ‘motion’. At the cell-level there is no motion.
Likewise in SM: at the coarse-grained higher-level of description, many features are
different. The coarse-grained probability density ρr, the C+ dynamics and the coarse-
grained entropy Scg are very different from their fine-grained counterparts: the fine-
grained distribution ρ, the microdynamics, U(t), and the fine-grained entropy, S f g.
In the paradigmatic case of N particles in a box, the two descriptions give different
answers regarding whether the dynamics is reversible or not: in particular, about
whether the Gibbs entropy increases over a period of time or not.
Admittedly, there are differences: in the SM case, there are no patterns that can be
‘seen at a snapshot’. And because SM describes the evolution of probability densities
there is no clear ontology at the higher-level description like Life’s menagerie.25 The
pattern is the non-decreasing value of a particular quantity: the coarse-grained entropy,
Scg. This is not a synchronic pattern but a dynamical pattern. Furthermore, unlike the
Game of Life case this is not a visual pattern. However, patterns at higher levels of
description need not be “visual patterns but, one might say, intellectual patterns” that
are “there for the picking up if only we are lucky or clever enough to hit on the right
perspective” (Dennett, 1991, p. 41).
Yet, this in no way undermines its credentials as a pattern. One criterion for a
higher-level pattern is predictive success: and betting that the coarse-grained entropy
associated to an irreversible process will increase is a safe bet. Consequently, there ‘are
macroscopic patterns running through those very microscopic interactions’ (O’Connor
and Wong, 2015, 1.4) in both the SM and Game of Life cases.
To summarise: the important consequence of coarse-graining, i.e. of abstracting, is
that autonomous dynamical patterns —structural features— once obscured by irrele-
vant details are revealed. Equipped with this alternative justification, I can now give a
reply to the (Illusory) objection in Section 3.6; and to the (Anthropocentric) objection
(in Section 3.7).
24Of course, in both cases, finding these features will depend sensitively on how the higher-level
variables are defined, i.e. on how we abstract: cf. Knox (2016, p. 45).
25Note, also, that Life differs in another way: the patterns in Life are noise-intolerant — ‘debris’ can
easily destroy the menagerie.
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Figure 3.3: Route 1: to find the coarse-grained distribution ρr at any given time, evolve
the full-distribution under the microdynamics U(t) until this time and then
apply the coarse-graining map Pˆ.
Figure 3.4: Route 2: to find the coarse-grained distribution ρr at any given time, evolve
ρr under the C+ dynamics until that time. Recall the C+ dynamics is com-
posed of applying U for ∆t, applying Pˆ, applying U for ∆t.., where ∆t is
much smaller than t1 − t0.
3.6 Reply to (Illusory)
Recall that two premises were required to establish the conclusion that the asymmetry
is illusory. According to the (Illusory) objector’s P1: coarse-graining distorts the correct
density ρ. Furthermore, the coarse-grained asymmetry exists merely in virtue of the
repeated coarse-graining every ∆t in the C+ dynamics (P2). Thus, as the asymmetry is
rooted in the infidelity of coarse-graining, it is illusory.
The immediate reply to (Illusory) is surely — the irreversible equations of SM are
empirically adequate. If the asymmetry were illusory then we could not expect such
success. Whilst this removes much of the force behind (Illusory), the illusory objector
might deny our assumption of empirical adequacy. In any case, in this Section I argue
that P2 is false and this refutes (Illusory). Furthermore, the considerations of Section
3.5 reveal that P1 is also false.
Contra to P2, the asymmetry is not generated merely in virtue of the continual coarse-
graining — provided that the forwards-compatibility condition is met, the asymmetry
is robust with respect to the number of applications of Pˆ. Even if we eschew the C+
dynamics, we could determine ρr at particular times t1, tn by evolving ρ under the
microdynamics then projecting up to ρr at tn. Call this route 1 (as shown in Figure 3.3,
a version of the forwards-compatibility diagram in Section 3.3.1). Taking route 1, we
would still find that the coarse-grained variables, ρr increase in entropy toward the
future; S(ρr(t0)) 6 S(ρr(t1)) 6 S(ρr(t2)). As such, we find an asymmetric pattern in ρr
without using the C+ dynamics. Thus, the asymmetry is not solely due to the repeated
coarse-graining in the C+ dynamics and so, P2 is false.
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P1 claims that the action of Pˆ is to deliberately distort the correct density. That is,
coarse-graining is a Galilean idealisation. On such a conception, ρr and ρ are analogous
to the first term and full series respectively. According to (Illusory), neglecting these
higher-order terms is the source of the asymmetry. However, Section 3.5 revealed
that coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation but rather an abstraction. ρr is not
a distorted replacement but a new variable germane to a higher-level of description.
Consequently, P1 is false.
Ultimately, however, the falsity of P2 is key to rebutting (Illusory). The forwards-
compatibility condition shows that the irrelevant degrees of freedom do not matter as
they do not influence the evolution of the relevant degrees of freedom; they are not
‘difference makers’. As such, the coarse-grained asymmetry would be robust — even if
coarse-graining were a Galilean idealisation.
3.7 Reply to (Anthropocentric)
The anthropocentric objection is that no law determines the size of the cells and so we
have a choice over which Pˆ to pick, and thus the coarse-grained quantities such as Scg
are anthropocentric. The concern was that this marks SM out as a theory worryingly
different from the rest of physics.
However, my proposed alternative justification (Section 3.5.1) claims that the choice
of coarse-graining map depends upon whether it uncovers successful autonomous
dynamics, not our limited capacities. Thus it is not that we have a choice over which
Pˆ to pick (and consequently the resulting equations and Scg are ‘tainted’ by anthro-
pocentrism). Rather it is a matter of whether ρr and ρir dynamically decouple and “we
are lucky or clever enough to hit on the perspective” — Pˆ — that reveals the patterns
that are “there for the picking up” (Dennett, 1991, p. 41). There is no freedom in the
choice that makes it depend upon our cognition (in a way that differs from the rest
of the scientific enterprise). Only for particular choices of Pˆ is there an autonomous
dynamics — the choice needs to be “just right” (Uffink, 2010, p. 195). And this situation
is not special. Like countless moves in physics —in particular, countless definitions
of good variables— the use is justified by its success: where here ‘success’ means that
autonomous dynamics are found.
Consequently, coarse-grained features need not be anthropocentric in a way different
from other physical quantities and so in this matter, SM has the same status as any other
scientific theory. Hence, coarse-graining does not lead to a specific anthropocentrism,
which one might have been concerned would render SM incompatible with scientific
realism. (Of course, there is another potential source of subjectivity or anthropocentrism
specific to SM: the use of probability. But as I stated in Chapter 2, this is beyond the
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scope of this thesis).
However, as discussed in Section 5, different levels of description are useful for
different purposes and what is deemed useful may be relative to our human interests.
Here our measuring capacities and imprecision are certainly relevant. Were we the
size of a Maxwell demon and endowed with an ability to manipulate gas molecules,
violations of the second law of thermodynamics might seem plausible. From their
microscopic perspective, the second law might not seem like an obvious regularity in
nature.
In addition, which patterns are uncovered might depend upon our limited human
capacities — whether we can ‘hit on the right perspective’. For instance, there may be
regularities in the movement of the centre of mass of Cambridge’s population, but our
cognitive abilities may make us unable to pick up these patterns. Which variables we
find useful depends on which variables we can access, i.e. measure and manipulate.
Thus, our measuring capacities will clearly influence the construction and confirmation
of our scientific theories. But — crucially — the details of our measuring limitations are
not needed to justify coarse-graining in SM.
The above considerations highlight a potential general anthropocentrism: our scien-
tific theories may be irrevocably entwined with our cognitive abilities and pragmatic
interests. But this is not the return of the earlier (Anthropocentric) objection, which
was specific: that the coarse-grained features are anthropocentric in a way that differs
from the other putative physical quantities. The alternative justification shows that
coarse-graining need not mark out SM as subjective and so different from other theo-
ries, but this conclusion is nonetheless compatible with scientific theories in general
containing some element of anthropocentrism.
3.8 The wider landscape: concluding remarks
In Section 3.4, one of the concerns about coarse-graining was whether the coarse-
grained asymmetry is ‘real’ or not. Recall that Davies claims that this was “a matter of
philosophy”; and indeed, in Section 3.8.1 I explain why this is so: briefly, whether the
asymmetry is real or not depends on one’s views about inter-theoretic relations. Then
in Section 3.8.2, I consider what my proposed justification reveals about the nature of
irreversibility in SM.
3.8.1 Inter-theoretic relations
To some extent, the ZZW framework provides a case study in inter-theoretic relations;
SM is a distinct, higher-level theory from either classical mechanics (CM) or quantum
mechanics (QM). In the wider literature on inter-theoretic relations, one key issue is
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the nature of the connections between the different levels. For instance, biology and
psychology could be disunified descriptions operating at different levels of generality:
in addition to not being ‘reducible-in-practice’, they might not even be reducible-in-
principle (Bedau and Humphreys, 2008, p. 215). That is, there may be disunity between
the psychological and biological levels of description. Cartwright (1999), for example,
advocates such a patchwork view of the scientific enterprise.
Different philosophical accounts of reduction make different requirements on the
notion, and some are more stringent than others. (For instance, there is debate about
whether any bridge laws invoked by the reduction must ensure the lower-level theory
explains the higher-level theory). Here I will not return to the details of different
accounts of reduction, since in chapter 1 I advocated ‘reduction-as-construction’. This
case study is clearly an application of that account in practice. After all, the ZZW
framework allows us to construct the equations of one theory (SM) from another (CM
or QM).
But there is a further issue concerning inter-theoretic relations: what attitude should
one have to the higher-level entities — realism or instrumentalism? Hence, as Davies
says, whether one believes the coarse-grained asymmetry is ‘real’ is a matter of philoso-
phy: it depends on your prior philosophical convictions about higher-level entities in
the special sciences. But my conclusion in chapter 1 was that reduction vindicates the
higher-level entities, and so I claim the higher-level asymmetry is real.
Furthermore, such philosophical convictions may also have a general impact on
one’s views about the nature of the asymmetry. Had the MI justification been the
best justification of coarse-graining, then the coarse-grained asymmetry would have
been revealed to be inescapably subjective or anthropocentric. Whilst I hope to have
established (in Sections 3.6 and 3.7) that one is not compelled to consider the asymmetry
to be anthropocentric, motivated by general themes in inter-theoretic relations: one
might still want to conclude that it is, in fact, anthropocentric. For example, an instru-
mentalist about higher-level theories might maintain that the instrumental value of
these descriptions is inextricably bound up with our measuring and cognitive capacities
and thus, all higher-level entities are anthropocentric. The key message of this chapter
is that the justification of coarse-graining need not mark SM out from other scientific
theories as regards that general debate (as we saw in Section 3.7).
Next, there is a final philosophical issue about the nature of the coarse-grained
asymmetry to discuss: its emergent nature.
3.8.2 The nature of irreversibility
Finally, I turn to irreversibility. As a foil for this discussion, I choose a passage from
Sklar (1993), which puts very well a general doubt: whether a strategy such as the
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one outlined in this chapter, can really succeed in reconciling the time-symmetry of
micro-processes with the asymmetry of macro-processes.
“Do the procedures for deriving kinetic equations and the approach to
equilibrium really generate fundamentally time-asymmetric results?” (Sklar,
1993, p. 217, emphasis added).
However, contra to Sklar’s phrasing, the ZZW construction method does not generate
a fundamental time-asymmetry. The coarse-grained asymmetry is a feature of a higher-
level description. Higher-level descriptions can have features that differ substantially
from the lower-level descriptions (without there being a contradiction). Often these
features are described as emergent.
Agreed, ‘emergence’ is a murky word and is used in many different ways (see
Silberstein (2002) for a survey). Very roughly, emergent entities or processes ‘arise’ out
of more fundamental entities or processes and yet have ‘distinctive’ features in their
own right. It is contentious what the ‘distinctive’ features are: proposals in the literature
include ‘novelty’ (Butterfield, 2011b, p. 1065) and being ‘unexpected’ (Chalmers, 2006,
p. 244).26 Furthermore, how substantively a phrase such as ‘in their own right’ must
be read also varies across authors — some maintain that emergence is the failure of
reduction whilst others (e.g. Butterfield (2011b)) deny this. The menagerie of the Game
of Life, such as gliders and blinkers, are often cited as key examples of emergent entities
that have certain emergent properties and evolve under certain emergent processes
(Bedau and Humphreys, 2008).
The sense in which I use ‘emergent’ is mild; it is merely that there is ‘novel and
robust behaviour with respect to some comparison class’ (Butterfield, 2011b, p. 1065).
(Butterfield’s account is especially apt for this case, since he shows his definition
to be compatible with inter-theoretic reduction, and as discussed above, the ZZW
construction is a case of reduction).
Of course, as mentioned above, there are many accounts of emergence that one
could favour. An alternative account that might seem apt here is Wilson (2009). Her
key idea is that some phenomena are “weakly ontologically emergent from physical
phenomena” (Wilson, 2009, p. 280) when some degrees of freedom are eliminated. Note
that eliminating functional dependence of one set of degrees of freedom from another
was exactly the autonomy condition of the ZZW framework. Furthermore, her accounts
fits well with the general topic of abstraction and talk of levels of description. However,
26Both of these examples are definitions of ‘weak emergence’ (a use of the word ‘emergence’ popular
with scientists and philosophers of physics) as opposed to the philosopher’s ‘strong emergence’,
which is a logically stronger notion. Although authors vary about exactly what the distinction
between weak and strong emergence is, the idea is that this stronger sense implies a lack of reduction
or supervenience of the emergent phenomenon on the lower level. See Chalmers (2006) for more
detail on the weak/strong distinction.
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Wilson’s focus is on weakly emergent entities and as mentioned at the end of Section
3.5.2, one of the disanalogies with the Game of life is that is unclear in our case what the
candidate emergent entities would be. Thus, I will not pursue Wilson’s account further
here. Instead: I submit that the broad gist of Butterfield’s account captures the main
intuition common to all accounts of ‘emergent phenomena’: robust, because a putative
case of emergence must not be too flimsy in order to count as a bona fide phenomenon
and novel, in order to earn the name ‘emergent’.27
Thus, my response to Sklar’s concerns above is as follows: the irreversibility gener-
ated by these methods is not fundamental but emergent. Irreversibility emerges when
one abstracts from the fine-grained level of description to the coarse-grained level of
description by applying a Pˆ that leads to autonomous dynamics.
Note finally that this mild conclusion that the coarse-grained asymmetry is weakly
emergent is not “toothless”. It is in direct opposition to Prigogine and Stengers (1984,
p. 285) who claim: “Irreversibility is either true on all levels or on none: it cannot
emerge as if out of nothing, on going from one level to another”. Whilst the lower-level
dynamics is reversible, the coarse-grained dynamics at the higher level of description
is irreversible. True, this emergent irreversibility does not arise “as if out of nothing”.
Time-asymmetric assumptions were required when constructing the C+ dynamics (and
when ruling out the C− dynamics) in Section 3.2. But this is to be expected; if no
asymmetry is put in, then we cannot expect asymmetry out.
Since the time-asymmetry is not fundamental and was “put in by hand” (as discussed
earlier), this project won’t satisfy those seeking to locate the source of time-asymmetry.
To the extent that this project answers that question, it claims the asymmetry arises
because of particular initial conditions (the initial state assumption). Some want an
explanation of such initial conditions, especially when in the guise of a ‘Past Hypothesis’
(cf. Callender (2004); Price (2004)), especially since such initial constraints seem ad
hoc or unnatural from “the mechanical world-view” (Sklar, 1993, p. 368). Moreover,
there is a debate over whether such an initial state is a law or a ‘de facto’ condition
(Reichenbach, 1991; Grünbaum, 1973; Sklar, 1993, p. 370). Some such as Krylov (1979),
are unhappy with the centrality of such initial conditions in explaining irreversibility.
But I believe my conclusion about the emergent nature of the asymmetry helps us
to see which explanatory projects are likely to be fruitful. In particular, my conclusion
eases the worry that the initial conditions required do not look especially natural nor
form a unified class. Because these higher-level patterns are weakly emergent, they
are unexpected from the lower-level mechanical perspective. Thus, the moves required
at the lower-level in constructing SM equations may often look unnatural: otherwise
27As an aside: Wilson’s aim in her account of emergence is defend non-reductive physicalism — I leave it
to future work to consider how non-reductive physicalism relates to the non-eliminative reductionist
picture painted in this thesis.
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the higher-level pattern would have been expected. (This point was also discussed
in chapter 1: the lower-level resources might not suffice for determining which states
form an equivalence class, not least because there are so many possible abstractions, or
coarse-grainings. Hence, the theoretical moves required to construct the higher-level
theory from the lower-level theory might be surprising).
To sum up: the ZZW framework constructs the irreversible equations of SM from
the underlying reversible microdynamics: thus, reconciling the higher-level asymme-
try with the lower-level symmetry. The procedure of coarse-graining — key to this
reconciliation but thought to be suspicious by many — was justified provided that
coarse-graining allows us to abstract to a higher-level autonomous description (in a
manner illustrated by the Game of Life). I used my justification of coarse-graining to
show that the coarse-grained asymmetry is neither illusory nor anthropocentric, but
instead: weakly emergent.
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4 Stars and steam engines: to what
extent do thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics apply to
self-gravitating systems?
4.1 Introduction
The foundations of thermal physics are riddled with controversy. The keystone of
the philosophical debate is the old issue of whether thermodynamics (TD) reduces in
some appropriate way to statistical mechanics (SM). This issue involves analysing the
thermodynamic limit (i.e. roughly the limit of an infinite number of microconstituents);
and so leads immediately to the topic of infinite idealisations. Namely: how should we
understand this limit given that any physical system to which we successfully apply
thermodynamics and/or statistical mechanics contains in fact a finite number of atoms
(or other microconstituents)? The debate in thermal physics has centred around phase
transitions. The SM description of phase transitions requires the thermodynamic limit,
unlike the TD description, which seemingly makes the TD description superior and
so—some argue—non-reducible to SM. In this chapter, I consider a different case in
thermal physics where, I will argue, statistical mechanics has the upper hand. This case
further differs from the usual phase transitions case: I will argue that the philosophical
interest of this field of physics, and the light it sheds on the thermodynamics/statistical
mechanics relation, turns on the fact that here, the thermodynamic limit does not exist.
This field is often called ‘gravitational thermal physics’ — and so the tangles of
thermal physics reach beyond our terrestrial sphere. But even if we set aside black
holes, the claim that thermal physics successfully applies to Newtonian astrophysical
contexts has been disputed. Such an enterprise involves applying the ideas of thermal
physics to vast collections of stars: both globular clusters with ca. 105 stars and galaxies
with ca. 1011 stars. The key idea is to think of such a collection as like a gas: just
as the molecules in a gas are its microconstituents, the stars in such a collection are
its “microconstituents”. This is obviously a very striking, indeed bold, idea: both
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physically and philosophically. Physically, because we expect disanalogies between
the idealisations made for a collection of molecules and those made for a collection
of stars. In particular, stars interact by gravity, which is systematically set aside in
terrestrial applications of thermal physics. Philosophically, because our epistemic
access to (our warrant for believing in) molecules and stars are so very different. Stars
are epitomes of the observable; since the ancients turned their eyes heavenwards, we
have believed in them — though of course what we have believed about them has
altered immensely since ancient times, especially since 1850 with the application of
spectroscopy to starlight through to today’s stunning observational knowledge of stars’
lifecycles. This philosophical disanalogy between molecules and stars will play out in
what follows, especially in connection with (1) the relationship of thermodynamics to
statistical mechanics and (2) Einstein’s distinction between constitutive and principle
theories. And as we will see, the question of the existence and the nature of the
thermodynamic limit — the infinite idealisation of infinitely many stars — will be
central.
Whilst such philosophical and physical disanalogies abound, ultimately the question
is whether (Newtonian) gravitational thermal physics is a successful enterprise. Thus
Callender asks whether “the stars in such systems or even the galaxies themselves,
when idealised as point particles, admit a thermodynamic description” (Callender,
2010, p.44). Does thermal physics apply to these Newtonian self-gravitating systems?
Is this an extension of the domain of applicability? Indeed, does this case give further
weight to the idea that thermodynamics is universal?
On the one hand, it seems that thermal physics applies to self-gravitating systems
(SGS). For instance, in certain circumstances the evolution of the distribution of stars in a
galaxy can be modeled using the collisionless Boltzmann equation or the Fokker-Planck
equation (see e.g. Binney and Tremaine (1987)). On the other hand, self-gravitating
systems exhibit many unusual features, sometimes called the ‘gravitational paradoxes’,
as discussed in section 4.2 .
There is a prima facie dispute in the scientific community. Some express Optimism
over the applicability of thermal physics: “Statistical mechanics of gravitating systems
is a controversial subject. However, our modern understanding of statistical mechanics
and thermodynamics does handle gravitational interactions rigorously with complete
satisfaction” (Kiessling, 1999, p. 545). Other express Pessimism: “[Thermodynamics]
is essentially a human science; it started with steam engines and went on to describe
many physical and chemical systems whose size is of the order of a metre. They clearly
are inapplicable to the solar system or to galaxies. Clearly classical thermodynamics
is not a useful branch of science in cosmology; we have extrapolated too far from its
human-sized origins” (Rowlinson et al., 1993, p. 873).
Of course, one might be tempted to ‘hedge your bets’ and claim that whilst gravita-
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tional thermal physics has some successes, this success is qualified by the paradoxes.
That is, one might claim, as is often the case with optimism and pessimism, that there
are shades of grey: the truth lies in between.
But I think we can do better than merely hedging our bets in this dispute. My goal in
this chapter is to make peace between the Optimists and the Pessimists, by deflating
the debate between them. I argue that: if we are careful in distinguishing statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics, then no reconciliation is required. Both sides can live
in harmony because whilst statistical mechanics applies, thermodynamics does not.
This position differs from Callender (2011), who brought this dispute to the attention
of the philosophy of physics community (Callender, 2010). He notes the successful
features emphasised by the Optimists, whilst not minimising the difficult features that
a Pessimist might stress. But — motivated by his broader position in the foundations
of thermal physics, namely: we should not take thermodynamics too seriously and so
advocates a more flexible, and so more liberal, view of thermodynamics — Callender
subscribes to a (cautious) Optimism. That is, he holds that the problems facing SGS
do not “spell the end for gravitational equilibrium thermodynamics” (Callender, 2011,
p.962).
A disclaimer at the outset: my reply to Callender will not hinge on bringing new
physics to bear on the dispute, but rather a different perspective on the foundations of
thermal physics. Thus the main message will be: the example of self-gravitating systems
need not necessitate having a broader or more flexible view of thermodynamics.
In section 4.2 , I recapitulate Callender’s discussion of the thermal physics of self-
gravitating systems: the difference from ordinary systems, the successes and the un-
usual ‘gravitational paradoxes’. Section 4.3 outlines my strategy of delineating SM and
TD, and connects such a strategy to the reduction debate, and to Callender’s position.
In section 4.4, I argue that thermodynamics does not apply to self-gravitating systems.
Section 4.5 outlines the extent to which statistical mechanics applies. Thus, my verdict
on the dispute is that there is (to an extent) a statistical mechanical description of SGS,
even though no thermodynamic behaviour emerges. Section 4.6 sketches an explana-
tion of why thermodynamics and statistical mechanics come apart in this case. This
explanation will hinge on the thermodynamic limit, and so I also outline the connec-
tions to the wider debate about the role of the thermodynamic limit in the relationship
between SM and TD. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Newtonian Gravity weighs in
In this section, I first review how incorporating gravity changes the physics of thermal
systems and discuss the type of systems well-approximated by this treatment. I then
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outline two examples of successful evolution equations. Finally, I discuss some of the
‘paradoxical’ features.
4.2.1 How the situation changes with gravity
Gravitational forces are negligible in the terrestrial thermal systems with which we are
familiar. But in extraterrestrial systems such as galaxies, this assumption is of course no
longer justified. Unlike the local collisions and forces in an ideal gas, the gravitational
force is long-range; the range of the dominant interaction is large relative to the spatial
size of the system. Consequently, the forces on a given star are not only due to its
nearest neighbours, but include a contribution from the large scale structure of the
stellar system. Indeed, if the density of stars is spatially constant (cf. Figure 4.1), the
gravitational force exerted on a given star (by the rest of the stellar system) at the apex
is the same from the patch of stars of solid angle dΩ surrounding it at distance r1, as
from the patch at distance r2. Clearly if the distribution of stars were exactly spherical,
there would be no net force on this star. However, if the density of stars falls off more
slowly in one direction, then only this very global feature of the entire stellar system
will be responsible for the force on our star. This contrasts sharply with the forces
experienced by a molecule in gas, which come only from its nearest neighbours and
thus is a much more local feature.
Figure 4.1: Diagram from Callender (2010) (adapted from Binney and Tremaine). In a
collisionless system with constant density of stars, the force exerted on a
star at the apex is the same from the band of stars r1 as from the band of
stars at r2.
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The gravitational potential V ∼ 1r is asymptotically zero; and this dominates the
behaviour of SGS due to (i) its infinite range and (ii) the fact that a (potentially infinite)
amount of energy can be released as two point particles get arbitrarily close together,
as seen in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: The gravitational potential energy. Here r corresponds to |qi − qj| in equation 4.1.
Here, we primarily focus on the gravitational n-body case where stellar systems are
treated as collections of n point masses. Unlike ideal gases, the total energy is not even
approximately the sum of the kinetic energy of the constituents since the (negative)
gravitational potential energy must be included. The Hamiltonian for such a system of
n ‘particles’ of equal mass m is thus:
H(q, p) =
n
∑
i=1
pi2
2m
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
∑
i 6=j
Gm2
|qi − qj| (4.1)
Whilst this is an idealisation, it provides a very successful description of elliptical
galaxies (1011 stars) and globular clusters, i.e. spherical gravitationally bound systems
of about 105 stars, which both contain very little interstellar medium (dust and gas).
Of course, for some systems we cannot ignore hydrodynamics — namely when
interstellar dust and gas are relevant. And for some systems general relativity cannot
be ignored. For example, this applies when black holes are present, and when the
cosmological structure i.e. curvature of space on very long length scales, cannot be
ignored, such as in the dynamics of clusters of galaxies.
Indeed, I should make an obvious and more general disclaimer: whilst Newtonian
thermal physics can be used in galactic dynamics describing extraterrestrial systems it
is (unsurprisingly) far from the whole story. Nevertheless, models based on the simple
Hamiltonian (4.1) have had some venerable successes: cf. §4.2.2.
4.2.2 Successes
I shall sketch two approaches, the first assuming stars do not ‘collide’, the second
allowing for collisions. To model these gravitating systems, the broad idea is to find a
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probability density function f in phase space and consider its evolution.
Modelling a stellar system to be collisionless requires the approximation that no
‘encounters’ occur. An encounter occurs when two stars are so close as to cause a
gravitational perturbation, altering their orbits. (Collisions involving physical contact
between stars are exceedingly rare and can be ignored in most models.)
The star’s orbit is then approximated by assuming the total mass of the system is
smoothly distributed instead of concentrated in point-like stars. This ‘collisionless’
(encounter-less) approximation holds for certain systems, in particular: for globular
clusters and elliptical galaxies (containing about 1010 stars) since, for timescales less
than the relaxation time, stellar encounters are unimportant except at their centres
(Binney and Tremaine, 1987).
Here, the relaxation time is proportional to the number of stars and the time taken
for a star to cross the galaxy (the crossing time). After the relaxation time the star’s
actual velocity differs from the smooth gravitational field case and its orbit will deviate
from the smooth field model by an amount of the order of its original velocity.
As in Boltzmann’s treatment of a dilute gas, we define a probability density function
f (−→r ,−→v , t) where f (−→r ,−→v , t)d3rd3v gives the probability at t of finding a star in volume
d3r around r with velocity within d3v of v. Since we assume all N stars have the same
probability density function (and are stochastically independent of each other), this
function is defined in a 6-dimensional phase space, rather than the 6N-dimensional
phase space of the entire set of N stars.
The collisionless Boltzmann equation gives this function’s evolution;
∂ f
∂t
+ [ f , H] = 0 (4.2)
where H is given by equation 4.1. Note that the collisionless Boltzmann equation is
nonlinear as the gravitational potential Φ(x, t) depends on the distribution of stars’
masses, f (−→r ,−→v , t).
We can define the entropy
S = −N
∫
f (~r,~v, t) ln f (~r,~v, t)d3rd3v. (4.3)
To look at the evolution of a stellar system over timescales longer than the relaxation
time, in which encounters between stars must be considered, we need what is (usually)
called the Fokker-Planck approximation. The encounter operator, Λ[ f ], gives the
difference of the probability that a star is scattered into and out of a volume of phase
space in a given time interval. Equation 4.2 becomes
∂ f
∂t
+ [ f , H] = Λ[ f ]. (4.4)
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To sum up: the collisionless Boltzmann and Fokker-Planck equations have proven to
be empirically successful evolution equations for the systems described at the end of
§4.2.1.1
4.2.3 Unusual features
However, the extension of thermal physics to SGS is far from seamless. There are a
wide array of problems surveyed in Callender (2011): of which I will consider only
three.
(1) Strong interactions. Firstly, functions, such as energy and entropy, are often not
additive or extensive for SGS. For an ideal gas the total energy E is the kinetic energy
K, whereas for gravitating systems the (negative) potential energy U contributes: E =
K + U. Functions such as energy and entropy are usually additive: the energy of a
combined system A+B is just the sum of the energy of A and the energy of B. Usually the
Hamiltonian of the joint system is HAB = HA + HB + Hint, but it can be approximated
by HAB = HA + HB. (So strictly speaking, the energy is additive iff there are no
interactions, i.e. Hint = 0). However, a SGS will not have even approximately additive
functions since the neighbouring stars do not contribute the majority of the influence
on a particular star (Cf. Figure 4.1). That is, the interaction Hamiltonian, Hint 6≈ 0.
The physical reason for this can be seen in Figure 4.3 and 4.4, showing how putting
together two ‘boxes’ of gravitating stars alters both boxes: the long-range attractive
forces result in ‘clustering’ or ‘clumping’ not seen for ideal gases (or indeed real gases in
terrestrial settings, which are well described by zero or only short-range forces between
constituents). For these gases, short-range potentials are dominant — adding two boxes
of gases does not alter the systems in such a dramatic way, since the systems only
interact at their boundary.
As a consequence, variables such as energy and entropy are usually taken to be
extensive. Here, a variable is called ‘extensive’ if it depends linearly on the size of, i.e.
the number of constituents in, the system (e.g. mass, internal energy, volume)2 and is
called ‘intensive’ if independent of system size (e.g. density, pressure). The energy of a
subsystem is proportional to the volume, whereas interactions between subsystems are
proportional to their interface boundary’s surface area and are, therefore, of a smaller
order of magnitude, provided the subsystems are big enough. So strictly speaking, even
for short-range potentials, entropy and energy are only extensive in the thermodynamic
1For some examples of solutions to the collisionless Boltzmann equation, the initial conditions and
approximations involved, see (Heggie and Hut, 2003, ch. 8). Much of the research in this area focuses
computational simulations. One useful class of models that take the velocity distribution to be
isotropic is Plummer’s model, named after Plummer who used this approximation to fit the observed
light distributions of clusters (Spitzer, 1987, p. 13).
2More generally, an extensive variable Q is homogeneous (in the modes nc) iff Q(kn1, kn2, ..) =
kQ(n1, n2, ...).
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Figure 4.3: Gas molecules in a box.
Figure 4.4: Stars in a box.
limit. But although this is a matter of degree, there is still a contrast of principle with
SGS. For energy and entropy are not extensive for gravitating systems, no matter how
large the system.3
(2) Putting in energy reduces the temperature. Gravitating systems can have a very
unusual property: negative heat capacity. The heat capacity (at constant volume) is the
amount of energy required to raise the temperature by one degree at constant volume;
CV =
∂E
∂T
∣∣∣∣
V
. (4.5)
When the system is in virial equilibrium (where 2K + U = 0), the total energy
is negative (E = K + U, so E = −K, where K is by definition positive). From the
equipartition theorem, we have K = 32 NkBT. This implies E = −32 NkBT and thus
3Callender (2011, p.974) takes the failure of extensivity to be a key problem, but suggests that perhaps
extensivity can be recovered through the Kac prescription (a rescaling of the temporal and spatial
parameters such that the constant c := −Gm2 in the Hamiltonian (1) becomes c = ± 1N ). Since the
merits of this prescription is an open issue in physics, I do not explore it further here.
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CV = −32 NkB: the heat capacity is negative. If the system gives out energy, the
temperature will increase. If you put energy into a system, the temperature goes down.
Indeed, unusual!
(3) The gravothermal catastrophe: Thirdly, there is the infamous gravothermal catastro-
phe (Lynden-Bell et al., 1968). To explain this, let us consider in general terms which
evolutions are entropically favourable. Whether a process (such as expansion) increases
entropy depends on whether the phase space volume increases. Thus, for example,
expansion of an ideal gas is entropically favoured since it increases the volume avail-
able. Ceteris paribus, the hotter the system the higher its entropy as more momentum
states are available (due to the increased kinetic energy). So whether an expansion of a
self-gravitating system increases or decreases entropy depends on how the competing
factors affect the phase space volume (Wallace, 2010). An increased volume means
more spatial states but results in a decreased number of momentum states as the kinetic
energy has decreased, since work is done against the attractive gravitational field.
Turning now to SGS: when the density contrast between the edge and centre of a SGS
is great enough, we conceptually divide the system into a uniform core and a uniform
halo, each in virial equilibrium. If a small amount of heat is transferred to the envelope
from the core, the core’s kinetic energy decreases, making it favourable for the core
to contract (as U = 2E, E has decreased so U is more negative). Since the core has
negative heat capacity, losing energy increases the temperature. The core decreases in
entropy but this is more than offset by the expansion and cooling of the halo.4 The heat
flow and contraction increases the temperature gradient between the core and envelope
and thus the process of heat transfer from the core to the halo is self-perpetuating.
The gravitational potential, V ∼ 1r , being unbounded from below as r → 0, means
that this collapse would appear to continue without end. For an infinite amount of
potential energy can be released by moving two particles closer and closer together,
as seen in Figure 4.2. Consequently, it seems that there are no equilibrium states. No
equilibrium will be reached since, according to the gravitational potential, the core can
keep contracting indefinitely becoming infinitely dense.
Is this gravothermal collapse observed? Here we meet a familiar philosophical
theme: that singularities in one theory can signify the breakdown of that theory, and
often signal some features of the successor theory (Berry, 2002; Batterman, 2001) — so
that idealisations taking some quantity to infinity can play a key role in inter-theory
relations. More generally, physics consists of models which have a limited domain
of applicability; if you push any model of physics far enough it will break down. As
Feynman quips: “When you follow any of our physics too far, you find it always
gets into some kind of trouble” (Feynman et al., 1964, §28.1). The same point is made
4Conservation of energy requires that the heat flow from the core to the halo increases the halo’s energy
— which is now less negative. Thus, it is favourable for the halo to expand and cool.
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in the literature about SGS: Hut says “whenever a theory predicts the occurrence of
singularities, it has been a sign that other physical effects, which have been overlooked,
will kick in before actual infinities are reached” (Hut, 1997).
But to return the question of gravothermal collapse: indeed, as Hut says, other phys-
ical effects eventually kick in. Globular clusters undergo this gravothermal collapse,
albeit over a period of tens of millions of years. Agreed: in a globular cluster, the forma-
tion of hard binaries provides the core with an energy source (Spitzer and Ostriker, 1997,
p. 363): nevertheless, once exhausted gravitational collapse will continue. Another
instance is a contracting gas cloud (that ultimately will form stars) where the heat is
emitted as electromagnetic radiation (due to the presence of an interstellar medium
which is absent from globular clusters). In the case of stars, fusion processes provide
the energy source to resist gravitational collapse but eventually this energy source runs
out. In this case, gravitational collapse resumes until another effect (dependent on
the star’s mass) kicks in. For example: for stars of around 10 solar masses, collapse
continues until a supernova occurs leaving a neutron star in which the degeneracy
pressure (a consequence of the Pauli exclusion principle) resists the attractive force of
gravity (Phillips, 2013).
But I will not need more details about these “additional physical effects”. For this
chapter, the main point of all these other effects is that they involve various theories and
subdisciplines of physics such as hydrodynamics, quantum theory — and statistical
mechanics.5
4.3 My Strategy for Reconciliation
Callender (2011) argues that to reconcile the two sides of the debate, we should take a
broader, more liberal view of thermodynamics. We should not ‘take thermodynamics
too seriously’ but allow for such unusual features. For example, equilibrium needn’t be
strict (Callender, 2001).
Thus Callender asks: what should we conclude from SGS’s unusual features? He
says “If there is a general lesson, I believe it is that we sometimes have too narrow a vision of
thermodynamics. In his beautiful review, Thompson (1972) writes that ‘to show that thermody-
namics exists for a given system’ we must (a) ‘prove. . . the existence of the thermodynamic
5Callender attempts to abstract away from these details above by altering the gravitational potential
by introducing a short cut-off potential η which prevents the gravitational potential → −∞ as
|qi − qj| → 0 as the potential is now bounded from below.
1
|qi − qj| → 1√(qi−qj)2+η2
(4.6)
Perhaps this short distance cut-off is artificial, but regardless of whether we impose it, there are still
no equilibrium states in the sense of a state with maximum entropy.
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limit’ and (b) ‘show that the resulting thermodynamics is stable’, i.e., prove that specific heat is
positive. By these criteria, self-gravitating systems badly fail as thermodynamic systems. Yet
thermodynamic techniques sometimes have proven successful when applied to self-gravitating
systems. How do we reconcile these two facts?” (Callender, 2011, p. 979).
I advocate a different view: by dividing thermal physics into thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics, no reconciliation is required. This is because phenomenological
thermodynamics does not apply to these systems (a claim I argue for in Section 4.4),
although, to a certain extent, statistical mechanics does (a claim I argue for in Section
4.5). Thus, the dispute over the applicability of thermal physics is deflated as merely
semantic: the Optimists are talking about SM whereas the Pessimists are talking about
TD.
Of course, dividing thermal physics into TD and SM is an incredibly contentious
matter. Can one draw a clean line and if so, where should one draw it? I submit that
some division, albeit a rough or vague one, must be possible, as a prerequisite of the
meaningfulness of the reduction debate, which after all requires that there are two
theories, one of which may or may not ‘reduce’ to the other. (And whatever one’s
qualms about the reduction debate, to say it is meaningless is surely just intellectual
defeatism).
That such a line can be drawn is a prerequisite of the reduction debate and how it is
drawn is important for whether a reduction exists: for claims of reduction are evaluated
not only in relation to a given account of reduction, but also in relation to the definitions
of the two theories.
I agree that there are multiple possibilities of how to draw the line between TD and
SM — and these different options have various foundational motivations. There is a
plurality of ways to carve up the terrain, and how one does it depends on one’s aims.
Thus if you believe that SM is the powerhouse of thermal physics (Wallace, 2015a),
your preferred line might be different from those who venerate thermodynamics (such
as (Eddington, 1928, p. 104)). In addition to this question of the conceptual priority
of TD or SM, the foundational debate between Gibbsians and Boltzmannians plays a
role. For instance, one might advocate a Gibbsian definition of equilibrium (that the
probability distribution is stationary) because it nicely lines up with the thermodynamic
definition (that the macrovariables are stationary). This is because the phase average of
a macrovariable6, using a stationary probability distribution will also be stationary - so
with reduction in mind, this Gibbsian definition is a good SM candidate for reducing
TD equilibrium. On the other hand, Callender advocates a Boltzmannian view of
SM: according to which equilibrium is defined to be the largest macrostate and the
system can fluctuate away from equilibrium, which is arguably unlike the traditional
6Of course, why Gibbs phase averaging works is a source of controversy, cf., e.g. Malament and Zabell
(1980).
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thermodynamic definition. In order that reduction is still on the cards, Callender
advocates taking a more liberal view of thermodynamics (Callender, 2001). Thus,
Callender’s reconciliation between the Optimists and the Pessimists is part of his wider
view of the foundation of thermal physics. Hence, the line I propose between TD and
SM in what follows may have different foundational motivations than that of Callender
and others.
Thus, whilst some split must be possible, that is not to say it is either precise or
wholly objective. Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics developed ‘cheek by jowl’
and so a sharing, indeed a blurring of concepts, methods and results seems inevitable.
As part of the historical progress of science, the original meaning of theoretical terms
in one theory bends under the success of another. As is well-documented, the success
of SM led to conceptual extensions of TD, such as negative temperatures. Indeed, one
might see this as evidence of a successful horizontal reduction, with SM the successor
theory. Furthermore, this explains how such a semantic dispute could arise between the
Optimists and the Pessimists; often physicists talk of ‘statistical thermodynamics’ and
arguably it is the (putative) reduction that has led to the blurring of the two theories for
practical purposes.
But the putative reduction of TD to SM is not only a diachronic reduction of an older
theory to its successor, but also a synchronic reduction of the higher-level macroscopic
theory to the lower-level underlying microscopic theory. The inter-theoretic relationship
between TD-SM differs from the classic horizontal reduction between Newtonian
mechanics and Special Relativity. Newtonian mechanics is wrong in certain domains
and predictions, but it is contested whether thermodynamics is wrong in the same way.
This is made especially clear by those who venerate thermodynamics, claiming it to be
fundamental. Planck, for example, took the second law of TD to be universal, applicable
to “every process occurring in nature” (Planck, 1926, p. 463) (as quoted in (Uffink,
2006b, p. 280)). One classic exponent of this view is Eddington, who claimed that: “If
someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s
equations - then so much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. If it is found to be contradicted
by observation - well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is
found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing
for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation” (Eddington, 1928, p. 104). Such a view is
certainly at odds with comparing TD to the (superseded) Newtonian theory when
discussing horizontal reduction. Thermodynamics is not straightforwardly ‘inferior’ to
statistical mechanics.
But in the case of SGS I will argue: TD does not apply but SM does. And it is of
foundational significance which theory these successes of thermal physics in this exotic
domain belong to. This is because of the above question of the conceptual priority
of TD and SM, which influences the reduction debate. For instance, one possible—if
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not popular—position is that it is a failing of the Boltzmannian entropy that it does
not strictly increase, whereas it is a virtue of the Gibbs coarse-grained entropy that it
does: because this is more faithful to the thermodynamic entropy (cf. (Callender, 2001)).
Thus, not only must we have two distinct theories and a definition of each, but we also
need to be clear on the conceptual priority of one over the other.
Despite these connections and complications surrounding reduction and the sharing,
indeed blurring of concepts, I contend that two core frameworks can be distinguished —
though of course, boundary cases may still remain. In broad terms, this goes as follows.
TD is an abstract theory, that proceeds in ignorance of the constitution of the system,
dealing instead only with macrovariables which obey the Four Laws (or really, Five
Laws — cf. Section 4.4 on the “minus first law”). In contrast, SM describes systems by
considering statistical, or probabilistic, distributional features of the microvariables. In
particular, the state space of equilibrium thermodynamics consists of equilibrium states
labelled by a small number of macrovariables, whereas the state space of statistical
mechanics consists of appropriate probability density distributions over microvariables,
such as position and velocity of the microconstituents. In order that we do not beg
the question about reduction, it is important that we keep the concepts of each theory
distinct. Accordingly, the concepts of SM, in particular a SM notion of entropy or
equilibrium may turn out to identical to the thermodynamic entropy or equilibrium
— but this would be a major case of theoretical identification and so should not be
assumed at the outset.
Having admitted the difficulties with dividing thermal physics into SM and TD,
I now offer two reasons why my position — the debate between the Optimists and
Pessimists can be deflated, because TD does not apply although (to an extent) SM does
— might be anticipated/seem natural.
Firstly: as highlighted in the introduction, TD was created in a time when there was
much scepticism about the existence of atoms. Because of this uncertainty surrounding
atoms, TD arose as a theory of empirical generalisations about the bulk properties of
matter, without regard to its microscopic composition. Einstein famously called ther-
modynamics a ‘principle theory’, in contrast to those ‘constructive theories’ that ‘build
complex phenomena out of relatively simple postulates’ (Einstein, 1919, p.228).7 The
generalisations of TD were extrapolated from regularities in phenomena familiar from
tabletop systems of gases, pistons etc. Thus it is unsurprising that these generalisations
do not hold in the radically different realm of stars and galaxies. But the constructive
theory now considered to underpin the generalisations of TD—SM—may well apply
(and this is considered in Section 4.5).
7This distinction, though announced in a ‘mere’ newspaper article has had a great legacy, e.g. in the
debate about the primacy of matter vs. geometry in the philosophy of spacetime, e.g. Brown (2005);
Janssen (2009).
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Secondly: my view is already suggested by some of the physics material reviewed
above. The thermal physics of SGS never abstracts away to macroscopic bulk variables
from the microvariables —i.e. the position and momenta of the individual stars— and
probability distributions over these microvariables.8 And indeed, Section 2.3’s discus-
sion of the gravothermal catastrophe used statistical mechanical notions of entropy.
Furthermore, the collisionless Boltzmann equation and the Fokker-Planck equation
for SGS originate from non-equilibrium SM...while it is equilibrium SM to which TD
putatively reduces. So the inapplicability of TD should be anticipated.
In the next section, I develop the sketch above, of what I take to be the key features
of thermodynamics, and then argue that the thermal physics used in SGS cannot be
thermodynamics.
4.4 Thermodynamics “Construed”
I will first present my perspective on thermodynamics in general (§4.1), and then argue
that thermodynamics so construed, does not apply to SGS (§4.2).
4.4.1 Thermodynamics in general
In this section I rehearse some of the key points from Chapter 2 about how I construe
thermodynamics, and add further details about thermal stability.
Recall that equilibrium was a central concept. A system is in a state of thermal
equilibrium when its macrovariables no longer vary in time.9 The state-space of TD is
the space of these equilibrium states, parameterised by two (or more) macrovariables,
such as p and V for a gas. That a system will reach equilibrium is a presupposition of
all of thermodynamics, and is encapsulated by the Minus First Law (Brown and Uffink,
2001).
Once a system reach thermal equilibrium, by the very nature of equilibrium, it will
just sit there indefinitely — unless it is intervened upon by an external system, or
8Interestingly, away from the Newtonian gravitation regime, matters may be different: the no-hair
theorems show that a black hole can be characterised by a few bulk variables: its mass, angular
momentum and electric charge.
9As discussed throughout this thesis, absolute equilibrium is a fiction: it is not realised exactly by any
system in the world. Insofar as the systems in question are also described by classical mechanics, then
- due to the Poincaré recurrence theorem - we know that given enough time any system will return
arbitrarily close to its initial state and thus not remain indefinitely in a given state. Thus, Feynman
is meant to have quipped that ‘equilibrium is the state the system gets into after the very fast stuff
[e.g. transients] is over, but the very slow stuff [e.g. Poincaré recurrence] has yet to begin’. But the
key point is that we get away with treating a system as if they were in thermodynamic, i.e. absolute,
equilibrium, because the ‘very fast stuff’ is over and the ‘very slow stuff’ does not matter for the
phenomena we are interested in.
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agent. Throughout Chapter 2, there was an important class of interventions that were
represented by a curve through the thermodynamic state space: quasi-static processes.
We saw in Chapter 2 that these quasi-static processes were the source of philosophical
controversy. Nonetheless I claimed that the curves in equilibrium state space repre-
sent the ‘common frontier’ of a sequence of small interventions to push the system
(approximately) along this curve. The system is ‘nudged’ from equilibrium (and so out
of the equilibrium state space, cf. (Norton, 2016, p. 45)) by altering one of the control
variables/external parameters — e.g. by raising the temperature by putting the system
(at temperature T1) in contact with a heat bath at T1 + ∆T. According to the minus first
law of TD, the system will reach a new equilibrium state at this new temperature. The
process is then iterated with a series of heat baths at different temperatures, and in this
sense the system is pushed along the curve.10
This picture of curves in equilibrium space involving nudging the system and it
returning to (a perhaps new) equilibrium state requires that the system is thermody-
namically stable. In particular, it requires that the second derivative of the entropy is
negative11: ∂
2S
∂E2 < 0. In terms of other variables, an alternative requirement for stability
is that the heat capacity Cv is positive (cf. Landau and Lifshitz (1969, p.47), Thompson
(1972, p. 72 )).
This is why positive heat capacity is often taken as a principle of thermodynamics.
Indeed, as I mentioned in Section 2.3 (2): strange non-thermodynamic behaviour can
occur with a system with negative heat capacity. For example, if a heat bath B (with
positive heat capacity, CBv ) has a lower temperature than a system S with negative
heat capacity CSv , heat flows from S to B raising the temperature of both. If |CBv |<|CSv |,
an equilibrium can be reached where both systems are at a higher temperature than
initially.12
To sum up: the state space of thermodynamics consists of equilibrium states labelled
by a small number of macrovariables. In order for a system to undergo any change,
the control variables must be altered by an external system (Lavis, 2017). Thus, a
curve through this equilibrium state space does not represent any spontaneous pro-
cess. Instead, a substantive idealisation is in play: and for this to be connected to the
behaviour of real systems the system must be thermodynamically stable so that after
small changes in the control variables the system returns to another equilibrium state.
10Whether this is an approximation in the sense of Norton (2012) is beyond the scope of this chapter.
11Here are some details. To check that the system is not unstable with respect to spontaneously becoming
inhomogeneous, (Avoras, 2013, §2.10) imagines splitting the system — already in equilibrium — into
two uneven halves (on the left (E+∆E, V +∆V, N+∆N) and on the right (E−∆E, V−∆V, N−∆N)
and then he asks: will the entropy increase or decrease? Using ∆S = S(E + ∆E, V + ∆V, N + ∆N) +
S(E− ∆E, V − ∆V, N − ∆N)− S(E, V, N), he shows that in order that ∆S = 0, the entropy must be a
concave function of (E, V) at fixed N.
12If the converse is true, |CBv |>|CSv |, then the heat bath B will not increase its temperature ‘quickly
enough’ as energy flows in. That is, the system’s temperature will increase faster than the heat bath’s
temperature and so they will not reach the same temperature.
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4.4.2 Thermodynamics does not apply to SGS
I claim: the theory discussed above is a far cry from the type of thermal physics used in
galactic dynamics, in trying to deal with the ‘gravitational million body problem’. In
this section, I will argue in a two-pronged attack that thermodynamics — as construed
above — does not apply to SGS.
As the state space of TD is the space of possible equilibrium states, we must first
consider: what would count as a thermodynamic equilibrium state for a SGS? It is
unclear. Binney and Tremaine simply deny that they are any (Binney and Tremaine,
1987, p. 269). Callender is more flexible, suggesting that some unusual states do the
job. (However, these unusual candidates are statistical mechanical states and so I delay
discussion of them until Section 4.5).
The gravothermal catastrophe hints at why: it seems that no equilibrium will be
reached since, according to the gravitational potential, the core can keep contracting
indefinitely becoming infinitely dense.13 At this point we face two options.
Either we maintain that such singularities are unphysical, as discussed in Section
4.2.3. They hint at the breakdown of the theory, and any attendant approximations we
may have used to deduce the singularity. No such infinities will be reached because
other effects will kick in. In the case of globular clusters, the formation of binary stars
provides an energy source to resist gravitational collapse. The question is then at
which point is the system in equilibrium, which macrovariables are stationary and
over which timescales. And there appears to be no clear answer to this. Thus, “the
claim that self-gravitating systems have no equilibrium, in particular, is the norm rather
than the exception” (Callender, 2011, p. 962) and “galaxies are not in thermodynamic
equilibrium” (Binney and Tremaine, 1987, p. 571).
The second option is that the collapsed state of infinite density is an equilibrium
state — after all, nothing will happen. But I submit that even if we dub this state a
thermodynamic equilibrium state, it is only one state and to do thermodynamics, we
need a whole state space of different possible equilibrium states so that, for instance, we
can define curves through this space and so discuss adiabatic and isothermal processes
(cf. Section 4.4.1). If we have one lone equilibrium state, then we cannot talk of
changing an external parameter such as volume in order to ‘nudge’ the system to a new
equilibrium state, if there is only one state in the whole state space!
This brings me to the second prong of my attack. Even if we could construct an
equilibrium state space, there is another problem: SGS are unstable. Perturbing (‘pok-
ing’) the systems, even very gently in the manner required for a quasi static process,
can lead to runaway instability. This is unsurprising: even without considering the
13“Doing nothing, whilst perhaps difficult for human beings, is altogether excluded for a self-gravitating
star system” (Heggie and Hut, 2003, p. 45).
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concavity of entropy (i.e. the condition ∂
2S
∂E2 < 0) and other mathematical conditions (cf.
footnote 12), we know this is exactly what happens in gravitational systems — recall
the ‘gravitational clumping’ in Figure 4.4! Not only will the system be inhomogeneous
with respect to the position of the constituents, but the negative heat capacity implies
that an initial temperature gradient is exacerbated. If one system loses energy to the
other its temperature increases, whilst the system gaining energy has a decreasing
temperature, perpetuating the heat flow between them indefinitely, as seen in Section
4.2.3’s gravothermal catastrophe. Initial temperature gradients are accentuated by the
heat flow rather than dissipated. This is characteristic of SGS; small inhomogeneities
(in the distribution of matter as well as temperature) get amplified not dissipated.
This lack of thermal stability means that after the small interventions used in en-
acting a ‘thermodynamic process’, the system will not return to a new (and nearby)
equilibrium as required in TD, i.e. by the minus first law of TD. Instead, because SGS
do not fulfil the conditions discussed in the previous section (such as positive heat
capacity) for thermal stability, a small perturbation will lead to a large change in the
state of the system.
Finally, as an aside, notice that the perspective of TD as a control theory brings to
light the unthermodynamic nature of SGS. The point here is not merely the obvious,
albeit amusing, thought that we cannot manipulate a star, let alone a globular cluster or
galaxy. (Cf. the quote from Rowlinson et al. (1993) which I earlier took as emblematic of
the Pessimists.) Whilst Elson says ‘globular clusters provide an ideal laboratory’ (Elson
et al., 1987, p. 565), there are important differences between SGS and ordinary TD
system that influence how we “manipulate” these systems in computer simulations.14
In particular, different parameters (such as temperature, density, size of the system)
cannot vary independently. The volume of the system is determined by the gravitational
potential, and thus volume is not independent of the energy of the system. Hut (1997,
p. 10) describes a SGS as having only ‘a single coupling constant’— the number of stars.
Therefore, even if we could induce the SGS to transition from one state to another, there
is only one control variable. As Hut (1997) vividly describes, in a star cluster there are
no cylinders or pistons. Instead the stars are confined by their collective gravitational
field.
To sum up the argument of this section: I have argued for
The Main Verdict: There is no appropriate equilibrium state space for a SGS. Fur-
thermore, the instability of SGS means that the minus first law of thermodynamics
does not apply, and consequently there can be no ‘thermodynamic processes’.
14For an insight into the difficulties — beyond the sheer size of N — with such computational models,
see (Heggie, 2003, p. 83).
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4.5 Does statistical mechanics apply to SGS?
I say Yes. That is, the success of thermal physics in application to SGS — such as the
collisionless Boltzmann equation etc. — should be attributed to statistical mechanics,
not to thermodynamics.
A critic might object that only the mathematical machinery of SM succeeds: stellar
systems contain vast numbers of stars (and we can’t even solve the 3-body problem!)
and thus the calculational problems we faced for a mechanical description of a gas of
1023 molecules arise again in the context of self-gravitating systems and so similar math-
ematical techniques are required. (Indeed, with the good comes the bad: similarities
in mathematical success are also followed by similarities in mathematical difficulties.
For instance, the scope of SM of SGS is limited to collisionless or weakly interacting
systems: some SGS have interactions that are too strong for SM to handle — just like in
the case of terrestrial SM! Cf. Callender (2010, §5)).
Accordingly, in this section I discuss the extent to which SM applies. I will agree
with the above critic: the applicability of SM does have limitations: in particular, the
evolution of self-gravitating systems never reaches a SM equilibrium. Nonetheless, the
success of SM is not merely mathematical: when a gravitational kinetic equation can be
given, the entropy cannot decrease. Thus, it is not merely the mathematical machinery
of SM that applies, although the success of SM must be qualified.
4.5.1 An approach to equilibrium?
Describing quantitatively the approach to equilibrium is a key part of the enterprise
of SM, known as non-equilibrium SM.15 Can we describe the behaviour of stellar
systems as an approach to equilibrium? If so, this would be a fundamentally statistical-
mechanical explanation of the phenomena.
But indeed, there is a problem. Thus Binney and Tremaine say that “we can always
increase the entropy of a self-gravitating system of point masses at fixed total mass
and energy by increasing the system’s degree of central concentration” (Binney and
Tremaine, 1987, p.268). Consequently, no density function f (−→r ,−→v , t) maximises en-
tropy for finite mass and energy.16 So if SM equilibrium is taken to be defined as the
maximum entropy state (a feature common to both the Gibbsian and Boltzmannian
definitions of equilibrium) a SM equilibrium cannot be found for finite systems.
There are three possible reactions. First, Binney and Tremaine conclude that the
15Thermodynamics only states that a system will go to equilibrium (a tendency that has been dubbed
the “minus first law” of thermodynamics, as noted in Section 4.1). It does not say anything about
how fast equilibration occurs.
16A density function that maximises entropy exists only for the isothermal sphere which has infinite
mass and energy (Binney and Tremaine, 1987, p. 268).
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behaviour of SGS cannot be treated as a relaxation to equilibrium. f (−→r ,−→v , t) is not
analogous to the velocity distribution of an ideal gas relaxing to the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution. Galaxies and other typical stellar configurations are not the result of a
long-term thermal equilibrium (Binney and Tremaine, 1987, p. 269).
Second, Callender (2011) takes a different view and suggests that the unconventional
states such as the collapsing core-halo states and similar Dirac δ-function ‘singular
peaks’ should “be regarded as equilibrium states for the same reasons cups of coffee at
room temperature can be” (Callender, 2011, p. 968). If these states can be interpreted as
SM equilibrium states, then (on this view) the behaviour of SGS could be an approach
to equilibrium.
However, a cup of coffee is in a local equilibrium state. Rather than being described
by a global Maxwellian distribution such as,
f (p, q) = Ne
p2
2mkT , (4.7)
the system is in a local Maxwellian distribution. For instance, the temperature of the
coffee varies with position, but locally looks like an equilibrium state. Thus over certain
distance scales, the coffee looks like it is in equilibrium.
f (p, q) = N(q)e
p2
2mkT(q) (4.8)
Whilst the cores of stars are in local but not global equilibrium, the unconventional
states that Callender proposes are not states of local equilibrium.17 Further, by Cal-
lender’s own lights the ‘Dirac peak’ is the wrong state to use; since he claims that
the canonical ensemble (in which the state is defined) is the wrong ensemble to use
for astrophysical systems and instead the microcanonical ensemble should be used
(Callender, 2011, p. 967).
Thirdly, you can walk straight in a particular direction without reaching some pre-
scribed destination. That is: when a gravitational kinetic equation is given, the entropy
(as a function of the distribution function) increases but never reaches a maximum.
17Individual stars are an interesting case: are they examples of SGS that admit of a TD description (and
so provide a counterexample to my thesis)? Since they are in local equilibrium, perhaps some of the
problems I raised in Section 4.4.2 for SGS such as globular clusters (i.e. ‘no equilibrium states’) do not
apply. Yet the equilibrium state in equation 4.8 is a probability distribution over microvariables p
and q — which, according to my classification of Section 4.3, is an example of SM, rather than TD,
machinery. What to conclude? I think it will depend on how one draws the line, i.e. what physics one
designates as ‘thermodynamics’. Thus, at the outset of his classic monograph ‘Thermodynamics of
the Stars’, E.A. Milne distinguishes two senses of thermodynamics: (i) a ‘restricted sense as denoting
the study of the equilibrium states of enclosed systems’ and (ii) a ‘general way to denote the study of
all those phenomena in which temperature plays a part... the science of heat transfer’ (Milne, 1930, p.
5). A more permissive definition of TD — along the lines of Milne’s (ii) — may classify this case as
TD. But for my account propounded in this chapter, individual stars seem to be a boundary case —
and one deserving of further study.
189
4 Stars and steam engines
Were there a maximum entropy state, we might want to call this the SM equilibrium
state. For SGS there is no such destination, but nonetheless these systems head in that
direction: so I conclude that there is (a weak sense) in which they approach equilibrium,
although they do not reach it.
This meshes nicely with our earlier discussion in Section 4.4.2. There we saw (in
the ‘second prong of attack’) that due to the instability of SGS, the minus first law of
TD does not hold: SGS do not spontaneously return to TD equilibrium after small
perturbations. I cannot of course go to into detail here about the exact relations between
SM equilibrium and TD equilibrium. But we expect non-equilibrium SM to in some
way justify or underpin the minus first law of TD. So not reaching SM equilibrium
(and consequently limiting the applicability of SM) fits with my earlier conclusion
that the minus first law does not apply to SGS. Furthermore, as we saw in the ‘first
prong of attack’, SGS do not reach a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. Had SM
equilibrium states been available this may have suggested that there is a way to find a
TD equilibrium state space, since SM equilibrium is meant to (in some sense) ground
TD equilibrium. Thus, the lack of SM equilibrium further supports the conclusion of
Section 4.4.
4.5.2 Surprise?
Should we think it surprising that statistical mechanics applies here? I say: No. The
application of SM to SGS is not surprising. For very similar assumptions are used
in the descriptions of dilute gases and of the SGS that SM is capable of describing.
First, the collisionless Boltzmann equation assumes that the stars in the system are
intrinsically identical (in particular having the same mass m) and non-interacting—
just as Boltzmann assumed for an ideal gas. Secondly, an assumption similar to the
Boltzmann’s infamous ‘Stosszahlansatz’ is made: the presence of star 1 being found in
a particular area of phase space does not raise or lower the probability of star 2 being
found there (Binney and Tremaine, 1987).
The application of SM may not be surprising, but it might nonetheless still be sur-
prising that we seem to have an SM description without a TD description. After all,
the concepts of each theory are frequently assumed to be intertwined: as discussed in
section 4.3, the two theories are not always cleanly separated. But in the next section I
given an explanation of why no TD behaviour emerges from the SM description.
4.6 The Bottom-Up Explanation
I have concluded that whilst there is (to some extent) a SM description of SGS, ther-
modynamics does not apply. This conclusion allows a peace to be made between the
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Pessimists and the Optimists. The Pessimists were sceptical that a theory concerned
with steam engines could be extrapolated so far from its human origins to such exotic
realms. To the extent that they are talking about the applicability of thermodynamics,
they are correct. But the Optimists are correct too — thermal physics is successful in
these exotic gravitational realms — provided that by thermal physics we mean statistical
mechanics.
But this verdict might seem surprising, given that in Chapter 2, I claimed that TD is
reduced to SM: that is, the lower-level theory Tb, SM, captures the behaviour of systems
described by Tt, TD. How can the two theories come apart? Throughout this chapter,
I’ve argued that SGS do not exhibit the equilibrating behaviour that is encoded in the
Minus First law. This behaviour is a prerequisite for a system to represented by an
equilibrium state-space as in TD . But SM has slightly different concerns. In particular, a
large part of the SM enterprise is to quantitatively describe the approach to equilibrium;
indeed, all of non-equilibrium SM is about this. Thus, there is a sense in which the two
theories have different concerns, i.e. different subject matters.
In this section, I sketch an explanation of this ‘coming apart’ of SM and TD in the
case of SGS, which I call the bottom-up explanation. The explanation of this fact is
that a particular mathematical limit — the thermodynamic limit — does not exist
(Padmanabhan, 1990, p. 295). The topic of the thermodynamic limit is a vast one;
see Ruelle (1999) for a classic presentation of both continuous and discrete systems.
The key idea is whether there is a mathematically well-defined ideal infinite system
obtained by n→ ∞, where n is the number of constituents of a system.18 Usually, the
thermodynamic limit not only takes n→ ∞ but also fixes the density, i.e. nV → k, whilst
n→ ∞. Generically, in the thermodynamic limit, a TD description is recovered from
the SM description. Thus, the bottom-up explanation I advocate is:
The Bottom-Up Explanation: Generically, in the thermodynamic limit, a TD descrip-
tion is recovered from the SM description. But the thermodynamic limit does not
exist for self-gravitating systems.
In filling out this explanation, I will discuss: (1) why the limit does not exist and (2)
the significance of its not existing.
(1) The thermodynamic limit does not exist for self-gravitating systems. To prove the
existence of a thermodynamic limit, it suffices to show that two conditions are met by
the system under consideration (Penrose, 1979, p. 1963); see also (Thompson, 1972, ch.
3) and (Ruelle, 1999, ch. 3):
18I should note that how such limiting procedures should be understood and classified is the topic of
philosophical debate, e.g. Norton (2012).
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1. Tempering: the interaction between distant constituents must be negligible. Here
is a simple example of such a tempering condition: a pair potential U(x) (where
x is the distance between the two particles) has a finite range if there is a distance
R0 such that U(x) = 0 for |x| > R0.
2. Stability: the interaction is stable: there is a real number B > 0 such that
∀n the potential energy of n constituents located at any spatial points x1, ...xn,
U(x1, x2...xn) > −nB.
These two conditions are violated by the long-range and short-range nature, respec-
tively, of the gravitational potential.
1. Tempering is violated because the gravitational potential between two distant
particles (i.e. stars) is V ∼ 1r , which is unlike the potential above: whilst the potential
decreases with distance, U(x) 6= 0 for any |x|. As we saw earlier, the interaction
between a star and its distant neighbours is not negligible, but indeed quite the reverse:
as seen in Figure 4.1, the long-range nature of the gravitational potential dominates the
behaviour of the cluster. Of course what counts as ‘negligible’ is not categorical, but
for no degree of accuracy does it seem we can treat these gravitational interactions as
‘negligible’.
2. Stability has two components. Firstly, the potential energy must be bounded from
below; condition 2 states that for n constituents there must be a number, −nB, such
that the potential energy is always greater than this number. But, as seen in Figure 4.2
the gravitational potential is not bounded from below: as r → 0, U → −∞. Secondly,
Stability requires that U does not grow faster, as a function of n, than n. This too is
violated by the gravitational potential. Hut (1997, p. 8) calls the gravitational potential
‘superextensive’: in fact, U ∼ n 53 .19
Thus, SGS differ from ordinary thermodynamic systems in (at least) two respects:
the thermodynamic limit does not exist and energy is not extensive for SGS.20
19The ‘back of the envelope’ justification Hut gives for this is as follows. “Take a large box containing
a homogeneous swarm of stars. Now enlarge the box, keeping the density and temperature of the
star distribution constant. The total mass M of the stars will then scale with the size R of the box
as M ∝ R3, and the total kinetic energy Ekin will simply scale with the mass: Ekin ∝ M. The total
potential energy Epot, however, will grow faster: Epot ∝ M
2
R ∝ M
5
3 . Unlike intensive thermodynamic
variables that stay constant when we enlarge the system, and unlike extensive variables that grow
linearly with the mass of the system, Epot is a superextensive variable, growing faster than linear”
Hut (1997, p. 8).
20Interestingly, despite their surface similarities, the gravitational potential and Coulomb potential differ:
the thermodynamic limit has been proven to exist for certain electromagnetic systems (cf. Lieb and
Lebowitz (1972), (Thompson, 1972, p. 71)). But this proof requires quantum considerations (roughly,
that there is a ground state so that the energy is bounded from below, so that the stability condition is
satisfied. The tempering condition can also be satisfied by electromagnetic systems. The presence
of both positive and negative charges leads to Deybe shielding (Callender, 2011, p. 961): the force
due to distant charges is ‘shielded’ so that U(x) ≈ 0 for suitably large |x|. But there is no analogous
effect of Deybe shielding for gravitational systems because the gravitational force does not ‘saturate’
(Lévy-Leblond, 1969).
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(2) What is the significance of the lack of limit?
In full generality, this is a hard question to answer. But here our task is smaller: to
explain why an SM description of SGS is successful, but yet no TD behaviour emerges.
Given how the two theories are seemingly interwoven, how do we have the applicability
of one without the other? The answer is that the thermodynamic limit connects the two
theories, but because the limit does not exist for SGS, we should be less surprised at the
applicability of one without the other.
I shall briefly spell out three examples of the thermodynamic limit connecting SM
and TD. Here the idea is that the differences between the TD description and the SM
description are washed out in this limit:21
(A) The thermodynamic limit is usually used to reveal features of SM functions. For
instance, the canonical and microcanonical ensembles are equivalent in the thermody-
namic limit. The significance of this result is sometimes glossed as: the equivalence of
ensembles in the limit shows that the same thermodynamic functions (and so behaviour)
results — no matter which ensemble is used to calculate those functions.
(B) SM descriptions involve probabilities, whereas the TD descriptions are non-
probabilistic. But in the thermodynamic limit, the probability of fluctuations away
from the mean value (e.g. the mean energy), tend to zero. Thus, in the limit, the SM
description becomes more akin to the non-probabilistic TD description.
(C) Furthermore, only in the thermodynamic limit are certain SM quantities extensive.
For instance, the Gibbs free energy is only extensive in this limit. Or, as seen in section
4.2.3, H12 = H1 + H2 is only an approximation, even for short-range potentials present
in familiar cases. Yet, the energy of a subsystem is proportional to the volume, whereas
interactions between subsystems are proportional to the boundary’s surface area — and
so scaling means that interactions thus become negligible, provided the subsystems
are big enough. Thus strictly speaking, even for short-range potentials, entropy and
energy are only extensive in the thermodynamic limit.
Because some SM quantities are only truly extensive in the thermodynamic limit,
they are only identical to their TD correlates in this limit. Thus, it is usual to say that
in the thermodynamic limit, the thermodynamic formalism/functions are recovered
from the SM description. For example, Oliver Penrose claims that “the first objective of
the study of the thermodynamic limit is to demonstrate that in this limit, the laws of
thermodynamics apply and to justify our statistical mechanical recipes for calculating
thermodynamic functions...” (Penrose, 1979, p.1957).
But is the existence of the thermodynamic limit a necessary and/or a sufficient
condition for recovering a TD description from a SM description? Callender (2011, p.
975) suggests it is neither necessary nor sufficient.
21But of course, there is much more work to be done to understand how the limit connects SM and TD;
here I only give a suggestive sketch.
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Yet it seems like the existence of the TD limit suffices for a TD description to be
recovered from the SM description. If it is a sufficient condition for the applicability
of TD, this might help determine which SM systems also fall under the purview of
TD. But it would be less enlightening for ruling systems out — since there could exist
an alternative sufficient condition for the applicability of TD. Furthermore, analysing
the counterfactual claim that ‘had the TD limit existed, then TD would have applied’
is hard for SGS: for the TD limit to exist, the system would have been fundamentally
different — as I argued in Section 4.2, the form of the gravitational potential dominates
the behaviour of SGS. And it is this potential which fails the tempering and stability
conditions.
But I agree with Callender that the TD limit is not established to be a necessary
condition: there could exist a type of system for which the thermodynamic limit of
a SM description does not exist but to which TD nonetheless applies.22 Thus, the
thermodynamic limit is not a ‘blanket prescription’: one need not prove the existence
of the thermodynamic limit, in order to be licensed to use the laws of thermodynamics.
Instead, we apply the ideas of thermodynamics to a system just when it is useful to
do so. Thus, thermodynamics might be useful for a system for which the limit does
not exist. (Black holes are a putative example — but much controversy surrounds this
claim.) But I contend, contra Callender, that SGS do not give us this counterexample,
since — as I hope to have established in Section 4.4.2 — TD is inapplicable to SGS.23
To sum up: the fact that the thermodynamic limit does not exist for SGS explains
why the applicability of SM and TD come apart for these systems.
Whilst I have been careful throughout the preceding section to talk of TD being
‘recovered’ from SM in the limit, the question I must now face is: how does the main
focus of this chapter— the domain of applicability of thermodynamics — relate to the
reduction debate?
22Of course, it would be an interesting development if the existence of the thermodynamic limit was
a necessary condition for the applicability of thermodynamics — but this is not something I can
establish here.
23Whilst it is conceivable that there is a system for which the thermodynamic limit does not exist and
yet thermodynamics is useful, there are reasons to be confident of the importance of ‘large N’ in what
is after all, a science of the bulk properties of matter. For instance, according to the Boltzmannian
perspective on SM, systems inevitably approach equilibrium because of the overwhelming vastness
of the equilibrium macrostate compared to the other macrostates. But this requires N to be large
— otherwise there will not be one macrostate dominating the available phase space. Whilst not
required for the cogency of their account in quite the same way, the Gibbsian also depends on the
thermodynamic limit/large N. For, as mentioned above, Gibbsian ensembles are only equivalent
in the thermodynamic limit – a fact held as vital by physicists. For instance, Huang says “From
a physical point of view, a microcanonical ensemble must be equivalent to a canonical ensemble,
otherwise we would seriously doubt the utility of either” (Huang, 1987, p.148): cited in Callender
(2011, p.977). Thus, whilst the Gibbsian canonical ensemble is applicable to a one-molecule gas —
unlike the Boltzmannian picture — the thermodynamic limit is nonetheless seen as crucial (Thompson,
1972).
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4.6.1 The connection to reduction
The first connection to reduction debate is as follows: there is a debate about whether
the role of the thermodynamic limit in SM descriptions of phase transitions blocks the
reduction of TD to SM. Briefly, the concern is that a singularity in the free energy can
only be achieved in the infinite limit24 and this infinite idealisation is unrepresentative
of real systems and so some contend that a complete reduction to SM is unavailable.
Others argue that the use of the limit need not block reduction and the relevant ‘singular
type’ behaviour is seen ‘on the way’ to the limit (Butterfield, 2011b). Does the above
discussion reveal that the thermodynamics limit is crucial (in a way problematic for
reduction) even away from the contentious case of phase transitions? Should it be
worrisome that functions such has the Gibbs free energy are only extensive (and thus
like their TD counterparts) in the thermodynamic limit? I think not. Rather than a
qualitative difference that springs out only at the limit — causing water to boil and
other phase transitions to occur — nothing so glamorous happens. Rather, here the
situation is one of ‘mathematical tidiness’, i.e. the interaction Hamiltonian really is = 0,
rather than ≈ 0 . Indeed, I contend that if reduction were thwarted by the ‘exactness’
only existing in the ‘unrepresentative’ limit, then this would set the bar so high for
inter-theoretic reduction that few or no cases would pass it.
Indeed, this was the intuition behind my functionalist account in Chapter 2. The
three examples (A)-(C) above showed how a TD description was recovered from the
SM description in the limit: we get back the extensivity of energy and categorical, rather
than probabilistic, functions. But I submit that the TD limit is not essential for reduction
(contra Batterman (2001)). Whilst the TD limit washes certain differences between the
SM and TD descriptions of a given system, often these differences do not matter for
reduction. This is because our SM descriptions successfully capture the TD behaviour
before the limit. (This was the project of Chapter 2). In fact, if thermodynamic behaviour
only occurred in this limit, we would never expect to see TD behaviour because no
actual systems are infinite. Thus, I take it to be a positive feature of my account that the
TD limit is not essential.
I now connect the question of domain of applicability of thermodynamics to the
reduction debate. Had TD applied to SGS, this could have been used to support the
view that ‘thermodynamics is fundamental’, in the manner of Eddington’s and Planck’s
views (cf. Section 4.3).25 But instead, this case study arguably adds to the conceptual
priority of SM. That SM applies without the emergence of TD behaviour agrees with
the moral of Wallace (2015a); SM is foundationally important not only insofar as it is
24The free energy is F = −kTlnZ where Z is the canonical partition function Z = Σnexp(− EnkT ). In order
for there to be a non analyticity in this function, n→ ∞.
25This veneration of thermodynamics, as seen in the quote by Einstein in the introduction to this thesis,
is one reason to think that the relationship between TD and SM is not just one of horizontal reduction.
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connected to TD.
Of course, the more charitable interpretation of the ‘TD is fundamental’ view is that
it is merely stressing the importance of TD: in particular, one might read the Eddington
quotation in Section 4.3 as emphasising the epistemic security of TD. The claim is
that the principle of entropy increase is a principle for which we have vast amounts
of evidence; in part because the domain of applicability of thermodynamics is taken
to include everyday occurrences such as people ageing, buildings crumblings and
coffee cooling. (Such a universal scope is also part of Albert and Loewer’s ‘Mentaculus’
project, cf. Albert (2000); Loewer (2018)). But the case of SGS heeds us to be cautious:
the scope of TD is not universal.26
4.7 Conclusion
The detailed empirical success of our descriptions of SGS form a fascinating, often
stunning, part of physics. But it is a success to be credited to the framework of ideas
provided by statistical mechanics, not thermodynamics. Thus, the situation is: there
is a SM description of SGS such as globular clusters and elliptical galaxies, but no
thermodynamic behaviour emerges. The unusual unstable behaviour of SGS, negative
heat capacities and runaway instabilities, is alien to thermodynamics — but this is
unsurprising when we consider the principle theory of thermodynamics as a control
theory whose state space is that of equilibrium states. In contrast, the constructive
theory of SM applies to SGS; we can write down a probability distribution for a given
star to occupy a certain position and have a certain velocity and that entropy associated
to that distribution is non-decreasing. The applicability of SM without TD has a
bottom up explanation: the thermodynamic limit does not exist for SGS and there is no
mathematical bridge between these two theories.
26This deflationary position about the grand claims surrounding TD meshes with my discussion of the
Second law in Chapter 2.
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In this concluding Chapter, I will suggest (1) how my conclusions throughout this thesis
tie together, (2) what the potential implications for other case studies in philosophy of
physics are, and (3) in which ways the issues considered here are interwoven with the
wider philosophical landscape.
(1) In Chapter 1, I distinguished vertical reduction from horizontal reduction. For
vertical reduction, Tt abstracts away from the details described by Tb: as such, the
two theories often describe different subject matters. In Chapter 3, this was clearly
demonstrated by the vertical reduction of statistical mechanics to its underlying dynam-
ics. The underlying quantum or classical mechanics describe the microscopic details,
whereas statistical mechanics concerns the macroscopic patterns that result from those
details. Indeed, that the higher-level irreversible equations describe something dif-
ferent from the microscopic equations was part of the justification of coarse-graining:
coarse-graining abstracts away from the microscopic details. We should not reject
coarse-graining, because then we would lose our descriptions of these higher-level pat-
terns: and thereby useful information about transport coefficients and the equilibration
timescale. These equations’ descriptions of the approach to equilibrium is the statistical
mechanical underpinning of the Minus First Law of TD.
For horizontal reduction, Tt approximates Tb — perhaps to a certain degree of ac-
curacy, or for a particular domain of applicability. An older theory Tt, where it was
successful, approximates the better, successor theory Tb. This is demonstrated by the
relationship between Newtonian mechanics and special relativity: in the domain where
the velocities are much smaller than the speed of light (such that vc → 0), Newtonian
mechanics approximates special relativity.
But this distinction between vertical and horizontal reduction was one of degree, not
of kind, since approximation and abstraction can overlap. One of the conclusions of
Chapter 2 is that the relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics is
not just a horizontal reduction. Instead, there are elements of vertical reduction, since
the two theories have (to some extent) different subject matters. The different subject
matters were manifest when considering the dynamics of each theory. For example,
quasi-static processes which I argued were so central to thermodynamics (especially
the second law), are not so central in SM.
What are the philosophical consequences of the two theories having different subject
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matters? It suggests that SM is not simply the successor to TD: this is not a straightfor-
ward horizontal reduction. But this conclusion is perhaps to be anticipated given the
high esteem in which some physicists hold thermodynamics. We saw in Chapter 4 that
Eddington venerated thermodynamics, and in the introduction, we saw that Einstein
claimed that the laws of thermodynamics are applicable to all systems and would never
be overthrown. Such claims would seem odd or surprising if thermodynamics were
merely a superseded theory.
But one might wonder how these grand claims about thermodynamics fit with my
construal, throughout this thesis, of thermodynamics. In particular, Einstein, Planck
and other giants claim that thermodynamics has a certain universality: how does this
fit with my verdict in Chapter 4 that thermodynamics does not apply to SGS? Or my
claim in Chapter 2 that the second law is not the source of all time-asymmetry?
My construal of thermodynamics was narrow: and so, one might read those who
venerate thermodynamics as referring a wider set of ideas than my construal of ‘ther-
modynamics’. For example, Milne (1930) distinguishes (i) the narrow sense I have
endorsed from (ii) the wider meaning of ‘thermodynamics’ as the science of all phe-
nomena involving temperature. So in the passages venerating thermodynamics, the
term ‘thermodynamics’ may have Milne’s second sense: ‘thermodynamics’ may refer
to all of thermal physics.
There is, of course, a connection between Einstein’s claim about (i) inviolability of the
laws of thermodynamics and (ii) the universal scope of these laws, as follows. When
one discovers a putative violation of a given law, one might restrict the scope of that
law, so as not to be applicable to that type of system or situation. For example, if contra
Newton’s original intention, we claim that the laws of Newtonian mechanics are only
applicable to systems with suitably low velocities, then we might be able to avoid
violations of these laws.
And so, for the case of the thermodynamics, one might likewise restrict the scope
of the TDSL, in light of certain violations. But, in Chapter 2, I argued that this is
not what is going on in the case of thermodynamics. I have not limited the scope of
thermodynamics in light of its reduction to statistical mechanics. Some say that the
TDSL is only a statistical truth: that there are violations. For example, we saw that
Maxwell restricted the scope of the TDSL to large systems — in light of the molecular
nature of matter. But I argued that the nature of matter does not have the consequence
that we can reliably have an engine more efficient than a Carnot engine. Thus, my project
in part supports Einstein’s and others’ claims that the laws of TD are not violated.
However, I do not endorse the assumption of universality. It is important to notice
how central quasi-static processes are to thermodynamics. And this, along with the
importance of an equilibrium state space, motivated my ‘narrow scope’ reading of
thermodynamics. Thus, my narrow scope reading of thermodynamics was not due
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to issues of reduction — but instead, due to the internal details of thermodynamics.
Nevertheless, I think my stricter construal of the term ‘thermodynamics’ is fruitful: it
sheds light on the debate about self-gravitating systems. I ruled that thermodynamics
was inapplicable to SGS (although SM was applicable to a certain extent). Thus, I claim
that thermodynamics does not have an unrestricted scope. But that is not to say that its
domain cannot be extended from steam engines.
One advantage of my functionalist approach to thermodynamics, is that it puts the
focus squarely on the behaviour of the system. For example, whilst I ruled that SGS are
not in the domain of applicability of thermodynamics, I am open to the idea that black
holes may be truly thermodynamic objects. This leads to (2).
(2) There is an analogy between the laws of black holes, and the laws of thermo-
dynamics. Loosely, the area of a black hole is non-decreasing and this is akin to the
non-decreasing thermodynamic entropy.27 Physicists, such as Wald, claim that “the
laws of black hole mechanics are the laws of thermodynamics” (Wald, 2001). But this
identity claim has generated controversy in the philosophy of physics. Some, such as
Dougherty and Callender (2016) and Maudlin (2017) are sceptical. There are various
differences between thermodynamic quantities, such as temperature, and their black
hole correlates, for temperature: surface gravity. For example, temperature is intensive
but surface gravity is not. Yet others are optimistic (cf. Wallace (2017, 2018), Prunkl
and Timpson (2018), Curiel (2014)). For example, Prunkl and Timpson (2018) show
that a black hole can be part of a Carnot cycle, and thus interact with other systems in
a suitably thermodynamic manner. Consequently, they conclude that the Bekenstein
entropy is the thermodynamic entropy: STD = SBH.
But I think this identity claim should be read as a realisation claim: the thermody-
namic entropy STD is realised by the Bekenstein entropy SBH (which is related to the
black hole’s area), and likewise, the thermodynamic temperature is realised by the
black hole’s surface gravity. If surface gravity only has to play the role of temperature,
then the fact that there are differences need not matter. The scepticism of Dougherty et
al. can be defused in the same way that, in Chapter 2, I defused Sklar’s worries about
statistical and non-statistical quantities. Namely: these differences are not part of the
functional or nomological role of temperature. Whether this functionalist strategy is
successful in the case of black holes depends on whether they display TD behaviour: a
claim which I postpone for future work.
(3) Having considered how my conclusions relate to other issues in philosophy of
physics, I now consider the connections to the wider philosophical landscape. In Chap-
ter 3, abstraction was centre stage in justifying coarse-graining in SM. But abstraction
was also central in Chapter 1’s overarching framework of levels of description. For
27I say this is loose because, as we saw in Chapter 2, the TD entropy can decrease if the system is not
isolated.
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both Chapter 1’s general idea of abstraction, as well as Chapter 3’s specific cases in SM:
there are many different possible abstractions. Abstracting involves throwing away
lower-level details, and so there is a lot of choice or variety over which details get
thrown away. In List’s framework, there are many possible abstraction maps σ, i.e.
partitions, over the lower-level possible worlds. In other words, there are so many
possible higher-level variables. As I noted in Chapter 1, somewhere in Platonic heaven
there is a mathematical function describing the trajectory of the centre of mass of
Trump’s hand and my cat’s claw. And, as we saw in Chapter 3, there is a higher-level
variable, the centre of mass of all philosophers of physics. Whilst, in principle, there
is an uncountable plurality of such variables, we do not use them. We would be hard
pressed to write down the function for the trajectory of such centres of mass. In general,
we describe the world using variables that we can manipulate, measure and control. In
the specific cases in SM, we want an abstraction map which leads to an autonomous
level of description: the lower-level details really do not matter for the evolution of the
higher-level variables.
Abstraction was important — both for giving a detailed justification of coarse-
graining in SM — but also more generally in thinking about the relationships between
different levels of description. Throwing away details, i.e. not caring about certain
things, in part explains why the higher-level theory has a different subject matter. Is
this an anthropocentrism? It does tie the different levels of description to our cognitive
abilities and our epistemic standpoint on the world. But, as I discussed in Chapter 3
for SM, and in Chapter 2 for TD, this is a very general anthropocentrism — it is not one
specific to thermal physics. As such, it raises questions about the plausibility of meta-
physical realism. But whether our descriptions of reality are really mind-independent
is, unsurprisingly, beyond the scope of this thesis. But I do claim to have established
that thermal physics is not anthropocentric in a way different from other scientific
theories. So we don’t need to be selective in our scientific realism.
In Chapter 2, I discussed how processes in thermodynamics require interventions
by an external agent. But interventions need not be considered anthropocentric — it
doesn’t matter that we stir or shake the system, only that some external system does.
Indeed, away from fundamental physics, sciences such as chemistry are awash with
interventions.
In Chapter 3, I argued that the choice of a particular coarse-graining operator Pˆ
doesn’t depend on our whims, but rather on whether we can find autonomous higher-
level dynamics (which I called the C+ dynamics). These higher-level dynamics were
autonomous provided that they are ‘forwards-compatible’: the dynamical evolution of
the coarse-grained probability distribution ρr is independent of the lower-level details
(in this case: ρir).
I hope this point about autonomy will generalise. If the higher-level description,
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theory or equation is independent of, or autonomous from, certain (but clearly not
all) lower-level details, then it will be robust under changes of these irrelevant details.
The lower-level states (or possible worlds) that differ only in these irrelevant details
will form an equivalence class — the members of this class will multiply realise the
higher-level state.
This explains the sense in which the higher-level patterns described by the special,
i.e. non-fundamental, scientific theories are robust. If the higher-level variables were
not autonomous from the lower-level details — e.g. if psychology were sensitively
dependent on the advances and details of cosmology — then we would struggle to
have the successful special scientific theories that we do. Indeed, that we are lucky to
hit upon different robust patterns at different scales or levels is the reason, to answer
Loewer (2009), why there is anything except physics.
I have described a sense in which the higher-level theories might be independent,
or autonomous; for example, if we have the meshing dynamics situation of Chapter 3.
But I also submit that these higher-level theories often describe novel phenomena. The
subject matter of psychology is different from the subject matter of physics. The higher
levels care about different things, and this is why a completed physics will not tell us
anything about minds and society (pace Putnam and Oppenheim). Even if black hole
thermodynamics guides us to a theory of quantum gravity, and even if this theory were
a final theory of ‘completed physics’— we will still be in the dark about psychological
phenomena like stereotype threat, economic phenomena like the 2008 financial crash or
why male platypuses have venomous spurs. But we needn’t look at disparate levels of
description: the subject matter of statistical mechanics, i.e. the concerns of the theory
and what it aims to predict, are different from the underlying microdynamics.
Thus, I claimed that if the higher-level phenomenon that Tt describes, is both robust
and novel, then —in this, admittedly weak, sense— it is emergent. And this is compati-
ble with Tt being reduced to Tb. I hope that this general claim from Chapter 1 has been
convincingly demonstrated in Chapter 3.
As a general methodological lesson, I hope to have demonstrated the dangers of not
engaging with the pernickety details in physics for metaphysics. In considering the
case studies of reduction in thermal physics, I have engaged with the details of a range
of debates in thermal physics, and gone beyond considering the ideal gas. I submit
that there is a danger for philosophy beyond the niche of philosophy of physics, in
considering the ideal gas to the exclusion of other cases: it makes the physics look too
simple.
Darwin said “false facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often
endure long...” (The Descent of Man as cited by Wilson (1985)). To echo Wilson: the
false fact of T = 〈K〉 — and I would add: the overemphasis on classical SM to the
exclusion of quantum SM — has endured too long.
201
Conclusion
And this has been injurious to the progress of philosophy, for it paints the physics in
too monochrome a light. By appreciating the richness of the physics, we see that many
of the features — multiple realisability, autonomy and emergence — are present in the
relationships between physical theories; those very theories that are meant to provide
the unproblematic contrast class to the philosophically interesting, or problematic, cases
of pain, the mind or the special sciences.
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